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Foreword
The Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia (ASSA) is one of 
Australia’s four government-recognised Learned Academies and 
consists of an elected fellowship of more than 550 of Australia’s leading 
social science researchers. Disciplines represented by the Academy’s 
Fellows imclude Accounting, Anthropology, Demography, Economic 
History, Economics, Education, Geography, History, Law, Linguistics, 
Management, Marketing, Philosophy, Political Science, Psychology, 
Social Medicine, Sociology and Statistics.
ASSA promotes high-quality research and scholarly cooperation 
across the social science disciplines in Australia and our region. ASSA 
strongly supports cross-sectoral collaboration with the other three 
Learned Academies (The Australian Academy of the Humanities, 
The Australian Academy of Science, and The Australian Academy 
of Technological Sciences and Engineering). 
ASSA is particularly concerned with providing social science 
knowledge and advice to government on issues of national importance. 
Social scientists have much to contribute to the evidence base for the 
development of sound public policy, and as a peak body ASSA is well-
placed to make independent, expert recommendations to government.
Every November ASSA convenes its feature event, the ASSA Annual 
Symposium. In 2014, the Annual Symposium took up the questions 
and opportunities of ‘Population Ageing and Australia’s Future’. 
The symposium was convened in partnership with the ARC Centre of 
Excellence in Population Ageing Research (CEPAR). CEPAR’s strength 
lies in its integrated approach, and its high-level expertise drawn 
from social science disciplines. CEPAR brings together researchers, 
government and industry to address one of the major social challenges 
of the 21st century: an ageing population. CEPAR’s mission is to 
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produce research of the highest quality that informs product and 
service development, and enlighten the public policy debate. 
The result is dedicated to improving people’s wellbeing throughout 
the full course of their lives. CEPAR recognises the need to build a new 
generation of researchers in tune with the best of global standards 
through an appreciation of the multidisciplinary nature of the issue. 
The Centre is an Australian collaboration between the University 
of New South Wales, the University of Sydney and The Australian 
National University and receives important support from government, 
industry and international university partners.
This volume reflects the contributions to the 2014 ASSA Annual 
Symposium, updated through 2015 and 2016, which aimed to highlight 
the latest research and its implications for the long-term challenges 
and opportunities of an ageing Australia. Leading scholars were 
invited to present their multidisciplinary expertise and evidence bases 
for broader public scrutiny and debate on population ageing and the 
implications for public affairs and policy development. It summarised 
recent Australian and international research on demographic trends 
and their likely impact. The research was not just an update of earlier 
work, but presented new perspectives on the change that is occurring 
to life-spans and how individuals and societies may adjust to that 
change. The  symposium emphasised the positive aspects involved 
in expanding life-spans, and the potential for enhancing individual 
and societal wellbeing. This volume brings together the symposium 
presentations with updates to 2016, and provides a coherent, scholarly 
analysis of the significant policy issues facing Australia.
Participation in the symposium extended beyond the ASSA to include 
policymakers, national peak bodies, and community representatives 
who added to the diversity of informed views. A subsequent invited 
Policy Roundtable reflected on the symposium papers and discussions 
in order to deepen policy engagement between the Academy and 
government practitioners. The roundtable focused on strategies and 
policy approaches to improve individual and societal wellbeing in the 
light of population ageing. The presentations and papers explored the 
scale and impact of societal ageing; global, regional and Australian 
perspectives; health and social wellbeing; and the responses required 
of government, families and individuals. Chapter authors were 
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encouraged to consider the symposium and roundtable discussions 
when finalising their contributions in order to communicate with 
wider public and policy audiences as well as academic researchers. 
Contributors draw on research evidence and policy directions across 
the full range of the dimensions of individual and societal ageing 
including opportunities for enhancing capacities over the life-span and 
the wellbeing of future generations. Participants at the symposium and 
roundtable considered responses to the diversity and social inequalities 
that arise in terms of gender, socioeconomic resources, ethnicity and 
geographical location. They also considered national directions for 
action by individuals and families, governments, businesses and not-
for-profit organisations. This includes strategies for increasing social 
engagement and health and wellbeing as well as achieving secure 
incomes, organising and financing health care, gaining suitable housing 
and managing intergenerational relations. Australian governments 
have a further focus on the fiscal implications of population ageing. 
The overall aim of the symposium and this volume is to stimulate and 
inform a deeper consideration of the impact of an ageing population 
and options for positive responses in the medium- to long-term for 
Australia’s economy, social cohesion and security. 
The primary contributors to this volume are, of course, the chapter 
authors. Each brought their own particular expertise to the 
symposium and the breadth of their combined contributions provide 
an impressive account of the current status and future prospects for 
our ageing population.
This volume would not have been possible without the redoubtable 
contributions of its three editors—ASSA Fellows Hal Kendig, 
John  Piggott and Peter McDonald—with assistance from Murray 
Radcliffe. They convened the symposium, participated strongly in 
the roundtable, contributed chapters to the volume and, of course, 
edited it.
Through the efforts of the editors and their colleagues we see quite 
clearly how social science research can help to shape this nation. 
It  draws together research from many disciplines—including 
Sociology, Demography, Economics and Psychology—to produce 
a rich assessment of the impact of population ageing in Australia and 
provide sound, practical evidence for future policy development.
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Introduction: A multidisciplinary 
approach to ageing
Hal Kendig, Peter McDonald and John Piggott
Increasing longevity is an historic triumph and population ageing 
is emerging as one of the major global issues of the 21st century. 
Australia’s  future will be deeply affected by the ageing of the baby 
boom  cohort, with large numbers expected to reach advanced ages 
during a time of economic uncertainty, pressures on health budgets, 
and the likely need for ongoing fiscal restraint. A new policy era is 
emerging, illustrated by the redesign of superannuation over the 
last 20 years, ongoing debate about retirement incomes policy, the 
establishment of a Commissioner on Age Discrimination and the ‘rights’ 
approach, and consumer-led directions in the Living Longer Living 
Better reforms of aged care. The government’s 2015 Intergenerational 
Report is the latest in a series of Intergenerational Reports (IGR) that 
serve as barometers of the sustainability of national government 
spending programs and raise wider questions about public policy 
priorities (Commonwealth of  Australia 2015). These initiatives are 
bringing additional evidence and critical arguments to the public 
debates, extending consideration of ageing well beyond health and 
welfare concerns to a consideration of its pervasive influences on 
national priorities including productivity, incomes, taxation, federal 
relations, and population policy. 
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Multidisciplinary concepts on ageing: 
New directions
Before reviewing social science conceptions of ageing, it is essential 
to recognise the social purposes of knowledge and the deep personal 
meanings of ageing. In an earlier statement for the Academy of Social 
Sciences in Australia (ASSA), we argued that ‘the quest for ageing 
well is arguably as old as humanity itself and it is deeply embedded in 
individuals’ consciousness and collective ideas of social advancement’ 
(Kendig and Browning 2011). Qualitative sociology has revealed 
how older people strive to maintain their identities, independence, 
and continuity as they grow older and face opportunities as well as 
constraints in their lives. Among the most enduring psychological 
models of successful ageing is the process of selective optimisation with 
compensation, in which older people are understood to ‘orchestrate’ 
their lives to adjust their aspirations and make other adaptations in 
line with changing orientations and declining capacity (Baltes and 
Baltes 1990).
A constructive approach to ageing aims to understand what is 
‘improvable’ in later life by identifying the resources and social factors 
that can enable positive experiences. As this volume demonstrates, 
there is accumulating evidence that ageing processes, previously 
thought to be immutable and based on biological facts, in fact have 
been changing and can remain changeable in the light of social forces. 
As Anstey demonstrates in her chapter on cognition, the phenomenon 
of ‘plasticity’ recognises that brain function is influenced by social 
exposures. A powerful use of social research is to understand the 
structural forces that accompany decline in people as they grow older, 
and to inform the public case for action and advocacy on their behalf.
The complexity of ageing from a social science viewpoint is apparent 
in the distinctions that need to be made between individual, population, 
and societal dimensions of ageing. Individual ageing involves complex 
bio-psychosocial developments embedded in the family, community, 
work, and social institutions in which individuals negotiate changing 
social relationships as they move through the life-course. Population 
ageing is fundamentally about the forces behind demographic change 
and the consequences for changing age structures. Societal ageing 
5
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extends beyond individual and demographic ageing to encompass 
the social constructions of ageing and the ‘treatment’ of older people 
in wider social, cultural, economic, and political life. 
It is important to appreciate the ways in which depictions of individual 
and societal ageing are shaped by the viewpoints of commentators. 
Personal views on ageing are, of course, important but they provide 
a very limited basis on which to assess the variation and complexity 
in societal ageing. The Intergenerational Reports provide reasonably 
objective projections on ageing populations but their interpretations, 
being couched in the interests of government, require careful scrutiny 
(Woods and Kendig 2015). The interplay between demographic 
imperatives and associated fiscal implications, and the social 
influences on individual ageing, provide the potential for a greater 
span of intervention than has been traditionally appreciated. 
Notable advances are underway in the multidisciplinary understanding 
of population ageing. Among the most important is recognition that 
many of the age differences assumed to be inherent in ageing are, 
in fact, cohort phenomena grounded in the different periods of history 
that people have experienced during their lifetimes. We therefore need 
to question the relevance of studies and depictions of ageing that are 
based on the Depression cohort of older people now in advanced old 
age. Understanding the future of ageing requires an understanding of 
the large post-war baby boom cohort that has had strikingly different 
life opportunities and now faces the profound challenges of increased 
longevity in later life.
Cross-sequential cohort analysis is a powerful demographic method 
for  unravelling the confounding effects of ageing and cohort 
progression. An important direction here is McDonald’s analyses of 
workforce participation, which show that relatively recent entrants 
to later life have in fact been working longer than their predecessors 
during this recent period of economic uncertainty. Collaboration 
between ASSA and the Bureau of Statistics has brought new 
understandings to  longevity and emergent policy and social issues 
(Gibson and ASSA 2010).
Our knowledge of the economic and fiscal consequences of 
ageing populations is being advanced in several important ways. 
Understanding age and intergenerational transfers in Australia—long 
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a vexed topic of debate—is improving with new work on National 
Transfer Accounts. These accounts now span many countries, and 
provide powerful new bases for understanding the public and private 
consequences of population ageing in Australia as contrasted with 
comparable populations and economies. Further, a range of economy-
wide modelling initiatives aim to inform policy formulation on the 
impacts of an ageing demographic on retirement incomes and pension 
reform (for example, Kudrna, Tran and Woodland 2015). The interplay 
between pension accumulations, tax treatment, public transfers and 
aggregate fiscal balance is complex, because both labour supply and 
saving behaviour (and further human capital accumulation) are affected 
by policy change. While these models do not capture the policy detail 
of micro-simulation models, they allow for the fundamental movements 
of relative prices and behavioural change that accompany large-scale 
economic policy reforms. 
In sociological thinking on ageing, the life-span framework provides 
a powerful way to understand social processes behind age differences 
and ageing experiences. From a developmental perspective, the most 
deeply seated psychosocial orientations, values, and attitudes are 
largely inculcated from early childhood and these understandings 
are fundamental in shaping subsequent life actions and experiences. 
Applications of the Cumulative Advantage/Disadvantage (CAD) 
theory (Dannefer 2003; Dannefer and Phillipson 2010) examine the 
consequences of divergent life pathways as people move through 
social structures during their lives. The life-span approach thus 
enables us to better understand variation in social inequalities and 
other outcomes through to later life. The life-span approach also 
enables us to consider how investments earlier in life can yield longer-
term benefits as younger people grow older and become the next 
generations of middle-aged and older people in the future. 
A relatively new approach in life-span research builds on life history 
concepts and methods in order to examine the effects of earlier life 
experiences in later age (Kendig and Nazroo 2016). Retrospective 
data collection techniques are improving but consideration needs 
to be given to the process of selective survival, which sees many 
disadvantaged people dying or dropping out of studies before 
reaching later life. Our Australian life-course research is showing that 
socioeconomic circumstances, health, and education in childhood 
have persistent consequences for subsequent life trajectories and 
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for wellbeing among the baby boom cohort on entry to later life 
(Kendig et al. 2015). This ongoing comparative study with England 
is also providing insights into the ways in which the differing post-
war development experiences and policies of the two countries are 
influencing their ageing populations.1
The mainstay of Australian psychosocial research on ageing, as per 
Part 3 of this volume, is longitudinal surveys of people from mid-
life through advanced old age. Over the past 15 years these studies 
have yielded new knowledge and been used in various research 
programs with a variety of special foci, for example, on particular 
cities, women, health, income and work. But what is really needed 
as a national priority is a comprehensive Australian survey focused 
on older cohorts that is multidisciplinary, nationally representative, 
and can be linked to administrative data sets. The gold standard for 
such surveys is represented by the US Health and Retirement Survey 
(HRS), the English Longitudinal Survey of the Aged (ELSA), and the 
Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). These 
studies cover multiple dimensions including family circumstances, 
health status—both self-assessed and through biomarkers—work and 
retirement, financial conditions, and cognitive ability, and service use. 
Questions, while not identical, are harmonised across countries, and 
this family of surveys now covers two-thirds of the world’s population. 
Our ageing population means that it is increasingly urgent that 
Australian researchers be given access to survey information of this 
kind. Using a format that harmonises with existing international 
studies, while taking careful account of the Australian context, would 
immeasurably strengthen the value of the data. Australia would be 
included in international studies using this ‘state of the art’ method, 
and cross-national studies by Australian researchers would be 
facilitated. The data bank could be made available widely on a public 
access basis with appropriate privacy protections.
1  They include the Australian Longitudinal Survey on Ageing (ALSA) (with innovative 
couples research) (Luszcz et al. 2014); the Personality and Total Health (PATH) cross-sequential 
study through the life-span (Anstey et al. 2011); the Melbourne Longitudinal Surveys of Ageing 
(MELSHA) (now completed so experiences through to the end of life can be examined) (Browning 
and Kendig 2010). The large-scale 45 and Up study (45 and Up Study Collaborators 2008) and 
the Australian Longitudinal Survey of Women’s Health (Byles et al. 2015) have large samples and 
they are also notable for data linkages to administrative records. The DYNOPTA study (Anstey 
et al. 2010) has attempted to coordinate these various surveys.
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Studies of ageing also need to take account of younger people and 
generational differences and relationships. Indeed, as Jean Martin 
demonstrated in her classic study, The Migrant Presence (1978), some of 
the best insights into a subgroup of a society and the social challenges 
they face can be revealed by observing mainstream views about them2 
(see also Shaver et al. 2015). As emphasised in the Symposium Opening 
Address by the Age Discrimination Commissioner Susan Ryan, attitudes 
and related practices towards older people in the community and in 
workplaces are powerful influences on older people’s self-respect and 
their opportunities for economic independence. A CEPAR-supported 
national Attitudes to Ageing study (Kendig et al. 2015) has examined 
the views of different age groups on intergenerational equity. It is 
also examining perceptions of the respect accorded to older people 
in everyday life and their ‘social treatment’ in other spheres of life 
including the workplace and health care. A follow-up survey now in 
the field will examine ways in which attitudes have changed over the 
2010–17 period of significant policy and socioeconomic change. 
The broader, social determinants’ literature reminds us that health 
and wellbeing are influenced not only by our absolute access to 
economic and social resources but also by our ‘social positions’ relative 
to those of others in work, local communities, and other spheres of 
life. Wilkinson and Pickett (2011) make a UK-based case that social 
inequalities not only disadvantage individuals but also erode societal 
capacities for achieving health, wellbeing, and productivity. However, 
inclusion of ageing in these broader, social and political debates on 
public health, in Australia as well as overseas, has been surprisingly 
limited (Schofield 2015). For example, while the English Marmott 
Review took a life-span approach in its landmark Fair Society Healthy 
Lives report, the emphasis was on opportunities in early and mid-life; 
the recommendations for later life were largely restricted to concerns 
for comfort or care (Kendig and Phillipson 2014). 
2  Martin’s impeccable scholarship, as an empirical anthropologist informed by social 
theory, was brought to full public engagement through her 1978 report commissioned by the 
demographer Mick Borrie when he led the National Population Inquiry. Shaver and colleagues’ 
recent intellectual biography The Martin Presence: Jean Martin and the Making of the Social 
Sciences in Australia, has documented how she established a continuing ’social science for public 
knowledge’ that has made deep contributions to understanding and building multiculturalism 




Understanding global priorities on ageing and Australia’s comparative 
position in the region and internationally provides an important 
context  for addressing ageing in Australia. Australia is a significant 
contributor to international work on ageing and gerontology 
(Kendig, Lucas and Anstey 2013) and in turn benefits from knowledge 
and collaboration in regional and global initiatives. We are increasingly 
connected with other countries through trade and political engagement 
with ageing emerging as an area of national opportunity, for example, 
in the development of pensions and health and aged care in China. 
At  the same time, Australia faces increasing global competition for 
skilled workers and investment.
An international perspective is also helpful in benchmarking how well 
Australia is faring in addressing ageing issues. Appendix 1 outlines the 
notable societal variations in the dimensions of population ageing and 
ageing well outcomes for Australia in comparison to other countries 
reviewed in Part 2 of this volume as well as New Zealand, the UK, 
and the US. As reviewed in Kendig and Browning’s chapter, positive 
directions on ageing are being determined by the United Nations, 
World Health Organization, World Bank, and other international 
organisations. 
International scholarship is moving beyond conceptual development 
and empirical research to challenge established thinking and is 
seeking to ‘re-image’ societal directions on ageing. In their aptly 
titled ‘Rethinking Age and Ageing’, the demographers Sanderson and 
Scherbov (2008) observe that, with increasing life expectancy, public 
policy will need to take more account of life expectancy beyond 
a given age (e.g. 65 years as a traditional age of retirement) relative 
to expectancy at birth. Several decades ago, Riley, Kahn and Foner 
(1994) provided a sociological analysis of what even today are still ‘lost 
opportunities’ as a result of ‘age and structural lag: society’s failure 
to provide meaningful opportunities in work, family, and leisure’. 
Their argument is that rigid social institutions, outdated attitudes, 
and entrenched interests have yet to adapt to the increasing capacities 
and potential of older people. The emergent idea of a third age, where 
increasing numbers of capable people are in a new life stage—between 
a second age of paid work and a fourth age of dependence—raises 
POPuLATION AGEING AND AuSTRALIA'S FuTuRE
10
important questions as to the uses of these additional years of later life. 
The English historian Peter Laslett (1989) observed that the relatively 
recent emergence of ‘this third age’ can be approached as ‘a fresh map 
of life’. 
In summary, this brief review has aimed to illustrate concepts and 
research directions in the social sciences that are contributing to 
policy-relevant thinking about population ageing in Australia. 
It has drawn principally on work in the disciplines of demography, 
economics, public health, psychology, and sociology as well as the field 
of social gerontology. It is important to note the range of contributions 
from across the social sciences—including anthropology, history and 
political science—to a broader understanding of ageing and its social 
and policy applications. There also is a large international literature 
in each of these areas as can be seen in the Handbook of Aging and 
the Social Sciences (George and Ferraro 2016), the Handbook of the 
Psychology of Aging (Schaie and Willis 2015), and the SAGE Handbook 
of Social Gerontology (Dannefer and Phillipson 2010). While each of 
the disciplines has their specialised contributions, the case advanced 
in this volume is that a comprehensive multidisciplinary approach 
has the greatest potential to address the complex, multidimensional 
challenges of an ageing Australia. 
Volume overview
This volume aims to bring a scholarly and policy-relevant approach 
to critically assess the outlook for Australia of the population ageing 
changes that arguably are among the most significant in human 
history. The chapters draw on multiple social science disciplines to 
marshall ideas and evidence to inform constructive actions to address 
the public and policy challenges ahead.
Part 1 presents perspectives on ageing that underpin the social science 
approach taken in later chapters on specific topics. This first chapter 
outlines our multidisciplinary directions in advancing ageing research 
and policy.
Gong and Kendig, an economist and a sociologist, then examine 
historical developments that have shaped Australia’s emerging 
response to ageing over the post-war era and directions for the future. 
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They demonstrate how the post-war baby boom cohort has been at 
the centre of profound socioeconomic and policy changes that have 
shaped their life trajectories towards later life and consequences for 
quality of life, social inequalities, and intergenerational equity.
In his chapter, Piggott, an economist, reviews emerging policy 
challenges in the areas of retirement and retirement incomes, health 
and aged care, infrastructure and housing, and regionalisation. 
He recognises that issues of intergenerational relationships, taxation 
and international interactions present considerable challenges and he 
points towards ways of addressing them.
Part 2 considers demographic change and diversity in Australia 
with the perspective of related international developments. 
McDonald assesses the demographic scenarios that underlie the four 
Intergenerational Reports that present evolving government views on 
Australia’s ageing future. He shows that, with each successive report, 
the newer demographic projections have placed Australia in a much 
more favourable position in relation to population ageing than almost 
all other developed countries on the basis of current policy settings. 
The implication for Australia is that population ageing requires long-
term sensible planning not hasty short-term fixes.
Can the effects of population ageing be mitigated through pronatalist 
policy approaches? Ogawa, Matsukura and Lee investigate 
comprehensive National Transfer Accounts for eight Asian countries 
with rapidly ageing populations to examine health and education 
costs of children as key influences on fertility rates and the ‘quality’ 
of children. They argue that higher wages for younger workers would 
lower the age at which young people become self-supporting and thus 
contribute to somewhat earlier childbearing.
Pakulski reviews European experiences with socioeconomic and 
policy issues in population ageing. These include changing health 
profiles, reduced dynamism in the workforce and requirements for 
developing health, housing, and retirement income systems that 
are fair and adequate but also efficient and affordable. He compares 
policy options for Australia and Poland in terms of the fundamental 
‘4Ps’: Population growth through immigration; Participation rates that 
increase the labour force; Productivity by promoting innovation and 
investment; and Pensions, or, more broadly, effective income-support 
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programs. He suggests that similar policy approaches can be applied 
to mitigate or adapt to population ageing by countries with different 
economic and political contexts. 
Part 3 moves beyond negative images of ageing, with their emphases 
on decline and dependency, to consider social and societal options 
for improving health and wellbeing. Kendig and Browning examine 
research and action on ‘ageing well’ as a constructive approach to 
investing in health capacities over the life-course, and maintaining 
and recovering health and wellbeing in later life through self-care and 
health promotion. In her chapter on enhancing cognitive capacities, 
Anstey presents ground-breaking research on how psychological 
and social actions over the life-span can improve cognitive capacities 
as resources for independence, contributions and wellbeing in an 
increasingly complex Australia. 
Windsor, Curtis and Luszcz consider social engagement as a hallmark 
of ageing well. Their chapter shows how social networks provide 
resources for navigating transitions through retirement, managing 
the challenges of advanced old age, and making contributions to 
families and communities. They present evidence-based approaches 
to combating social isolation and other interventions for promoting 
social engagement in later life.
Burns and Browning critically assess the emerging science of 
wellbeing for individuals and its importance for population-level 
policy. They recognise the importance of including social as well as 
economic indicators of a nation’s ‘wealth’. They reflect on the way 
forward in terms of incorporating wellbeing outcomes in Australian 
national policy, and the measurement and data collection issues that 
need to be addressed. 
The final part of this volume concentrates on policy challenges and 
responses by governments and by families and individuals, with an 
emphasis on retirement income strategies, health and financing aged-
care services. 
Bateman analyses Australia’s relatively new and highly regarded 
retirement income strategies that include the age pension, the 
superannuation guarantee and voluntary superannuation and 
other savings. She concludes that the Australian retirement income 
system relies on engaged, highly skilled, knowledgeable individuals 
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to make good financial decisions throughout their life. However, 
problems remain with poor financial literacy and poor understanding 
of retirement income products as well as substandard financial 
advice. She asserts that while the accumulation phase of retirement 
income saving has a high policy focus, the same cannot be said for 
the deaccumulation phase that leaves Australian retirees vulnerable 
to investment risk, inflation risk and longevity risk.
Hall and van Gool focus on the impact of an ageing population on the 
costs to health care. Contrary to much of the conventional assumptions, 
their chapter concludes that ageing per se is not necessarily a threat to 
the sustainability of the Australian health-care system. They make the 
case that redesigning incentives and services and making better use of 
the options provided by modern technology are essential to meet the 
challenges of chronic and continuing illnesses.
Ong considers options for financing aged-care services in the context 
of a projected doubling of costs to government by 2050. Financial 
pressure over the life-span is increasing for individuals as government 
is requiring more user contributions to education (usually earlier in 
life) as well as to care costs in later life. She proposes a housing asset–
based system of paying for care given that people now approaching 
retirement are likely to have more savings, high home ownership 
rates and high home values. The trend towards more private and 
public co-funding of services does, however, raise concerns about 
inequalities experienced by the increasing numbers of people who 
have not attained home ownership as they grow older. 
Podger concludes the volume with his interpretation of the chapters 
and notes that the historic triumph of ageing nonetheless presents ‘big’ 
policy challenges. He reviews the substantial scope for individuals’ 
own actions as well as comprehensive policy development to improve 
prospects for an ageing Australia:
• Social and economic participation of older people could be 
enhanced through reconsidering the concept of retirement in the 
light of increasing longevity and capacities in later life.
• Health and wellbeing could be enhanced by improved retirement 
income systems, better public health programs and health services 
inclusive of ageing people, and improved community engagement. 
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Overall, while Australia fares well with population ageing and the 
wellbeing of older people, international comparisons show that it has 
a way to go before reaching the world’s best standards for ageing 
societies (Appendix 1).
Concluding remark
New social science thinking and evidence point the way towards 
social, economic, and political changes that can improve individual 
and population ageing but many areas remain unexplored. More 
critical thinking and research investment is required in priority areas 
for personal wellbeing and policy action:
• healthy and productive ageing
• fertility and migration
• labour force participation and retirement
• longevity risk and risk management
• changing family structures and intergenerational relations
• the organisation of care and support. 
We need to be aware of the variable ways in which population ageing 
impacts on successive cohorts of men and women, advantaged and 
disadvantaged social groups, and the overall wellbeing of Australian 
society. Attitudinal and political factors set a changing social context 
that can facilitate or impede constructive responses. The implications 
of the staged timing of different societal ageing impacts and changes 
in the life-course also need to be explored further.
In conclusion, this volume is a testament to the range of research 
and thinking being conducted on population ageing. At the same 
time, it is a call for new research, policy and public affairs initiatives 
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2
Ageing and social change 
in Australia
Cathy Gong and Hal Kendig
This chapter aims to provide a constructive understanding of 
social change and ageing in Australia. It presents a history of ideas 
and evidence on ageing in order to reveal the societal context that 
has shaped successive cohorts reaching later life. Contemporary 
commentators are reviewed to show evolving ways in which ageing 
has been conceptualised and ‘problematised’, thus shaping as well 
as reflecting expectations and interests concerning ageing and older 
people. The history provides a backdrop to the policy and social 
context for issues considered in later chapters and influences the 
scope for constructive change. 
Central to this chapter and indeed to Australia’s future, is the 
experience of the large post-war baby boom cohort that has been 
centre stage throughout the post-war era and is now entering later 
life. Baby boomers, along with overseas migrants, have led the 
‘younging’ of Australia in earlier decades and now the ‘ageing’ of the 
population; both groups bring to later life varied life experiences that 
are fundamentally different from those of the Depression cohort now 
in advanced later life. The longevity revolution over recent decades, 
in which people are living many years beyond their 60s, is further 
reshaping the course of later life. Population ageing may be entering 
a new era in which lifelong economic prospects could be more limited 
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for ascendant cohorts. Divergence of ‘life chances’ within cohorts, 
notably in terms of gender and socioeconomic resources, draws 
attention to social processes generating inequalities over the life-span 
and the implications for intergenerational relations, social justice and 
policy actions (Dannefer 2003).
This chapter begins with a brief history of ageing in Australia from 
colonial days to the present. It then considers the increasing longevity, 
capacities, and resources of ageing people while living longer. 
The discussion turns next to the remarkable changes in stages in life-
span experiences over the past few decades and recent shifts in people’s 
expectations as to how they will fund their retirement. Outcomes for 
individuals and cohorts are considered in terms of economic resources 
and quality of life for age groups and generations. In the conclusion, 
critical issues of intergenerational equity are considered in the light 
of recent evidence on attitudes towards ageing and the socioeconomic 
prospects for cohorts into the future. 
Changing views on ageing
Australia has long thought of itself as a ‘young’ country as we are 
reminded by the phrase ‘for we are young and free’ whenever the 
national anthem is sung. We have been slow in coming to think of 
ourselves as an ageing country and this has arguably restricted our 
capacities to respond constructively to ageing individuals and an 
ageing society. Although debatable, the significance of ageing for 
Australia, as a major social change, was largely invisible until the 
1980s. Nevertheless, it is important to appreciate that the seeds of 
many negative responses to ageing, particularly in times of economic 
stress, have been sown and perpetuated for more than 100 years.
A penetrating analysis of Australia’s early experiences in ageing 
was provided in Davison’s (1995) ‘Our Youth is Spent and our Backs 
are Bent: The Origins of Australian Ageism’.  The conflation of the 
young age of the new colonies and the youthful European migrant 
population had some truth at the time (notwithstanding the now 
painful recognition that no account was taken of Aboriginal people and 
their ancient culture). In the 1850s, only 1 per cent of the population 
was aged 65  years or older, as a result of limited life expectancy 
and the youth of migrants who had left their older relatives in the 
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‘old  country’.  Concern  for intergenerational conflict through the 
1880s centred on newly affluent parents (notably in Victoria during 
the gold rush era) who were said to have invested heavily in children 
but who did not receive reciprocal support in turn as the parents 
reached old age.
Davison cites evidence that by the turn of the 20th century ‘old 
age’ was considered to begin at 55 years for women and 60 for men. 
The life-span at that time typically involved men entering the workforce 
at age 14 and remaining in work as long as health and opportunity 
allowed—often only into the 40s for manual workers. Compared to 
today, women had children early and continued through middle 
age; seldom was there an ‘empty nest’ before one or both parents 
had died. The Depression of the 1890s saw the numbers of the poor-
old increasing with homeless older people turning to charities and 
private asylums (and even prisons). At the time of Federation, state 
governments began to provide modest old age pensions to ‘deserving 
persons of good moral character’ (p 48), with the state thus defining 
retirement and old age.
The roots of Australian ageism arguably were located in the 
powerlessness of older people who were termed at the time as having 
a ‘lack of vital energy in old age’ (attributed in part to moral failure 
and poor health habits in middle age). Contemporary literature 
by middle-aged writers largely echoed these negative views, with 
disparaging depictions of ‘old women’. Some early feminist writers, 
however, noted that preparation in mid-life could slow the ‘inevitable’ 
effects of ageing, and a release from domestic duty could potentially 
allow ‘emancipation’ for older women (p 55). ‘Granny’ remaining as 
a working member of the household was ‘part of the natural order of 
things’ (p 56). Davison concludes: ‘The value of an historical approach 
is that it provides us with benchmarks against which we may measure 
current attitudes, and poses models of past change that might sensitise 
us to the forces transforming attitudes and structures to the present’ 
(p 59).
A more recent account by Jalland (2015) covers the history of old 
age in Australia from 1880 to 1980, including policy-focused issues. 
She  demonstrates the ongoing nature of many historical issues in 
ageing policies—including questions of user pays, means testing, and 
the balance of older peoples’ autonomy, perceived worthiness, and the 
POPuLATION AGEING AND AuSTRALIA'S FuTuRE
22
inevitable matter of constrained state resources and difficult choices 
for governments. Topic coverage includes state and federal government 
and department perspectives, retirement villages and aged care, and 
the failure of geriatric medicine from 1954–72. Drawing on family case 
studies, she establishes a sharp contrast between the lives of most older 
women and older men; and recounts improvements over the past 100 
years, while cautioning that ‘parsimonious’ approaches continued into 
the post war era. As with Davison, she argues for the contemporary 
value of historical understandings of the early precedents of ageing 
policy; and raises concerns about the prospective inadequacy of 
government responses in the decades ahead.
After the watershed World War II years, Australia as with other 
countries was preoccupied by nation building and investment in 
economic and social development particularly for younger people. 
An early post-war advocate on ageing, Hutchinson (1954) argued that 
older people were being abandoned and isolated by ‘modernisation’ 
and that urgent housing and welfare measures were required on their 
behalf. The post-war era saw massive social change attributable to 
migration, increasing longevity, marriage and baby booms, increasing 
marital dissolution, rising home ownership and, perhaps most notable 
of all for economic wellbeing, the rising workforce participation 
among women and rising housing costs. Overall, the generations have 
remained close in emotional and mutual aid terms while they were 
increasingly living in separate households, by choice, as incomes rose 
and housing shortages eased (Kendig and Lucas 2014). The more recent 
rise of households with no workers and single parents, however, 
is accelerating income inequalities as housing markets and standards 
of living are increasingly set by two-income households. 
Over the post-war era, older people have been increasingly recognised 
as a major disadvantaged group (National Commission of Inquiry into 
Poverty 1975) and included in universal health and welfare initiatives 
since the Whitlam Government. Recognition of population ageing as 
a major social change, however, was belated as is noted in McDonald’s 
chapter. The National Population Inquiry (1975) made scant mention 
of ageing as one of the major social changes underway at the time. 
Not until a decade later did the National Population Council commission 
Greying Australia: Future Impacts of Population Ageing (Kendig and 
McCallum 1986), which anticipated future changes such as rising 
needs for care services, and increases in retirees relative to workers. 
23
2 . AGEING AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AuSTRALIA
Families, home ownership and rising education were identified as 
important resources for ascendant cohorts of older people. The report 
did not anticipate very well subsequent increases in longevity, and the 
rapid development of occupational superannuation and community 
care. Thirty years ago this report concluded that ‘the view of old age 
as a defeated stage of life, so rampant today, is unlikely to last long 
when the baby boom joins the ranks of the aged’ (p 59).
Over subsequent decades a series of academic books, including those 
with a social science and policy focus noted below, have charted 
changes in thinking about ageing along with evolving social and 
policy developments in the field:
• Howe’s pioneering Towards an Older Australia (1981) set an early 
foundation for the study of ageing and gerontology. Its chapters 
describe and raise issues concerning older populations, their needs, 
and services (written by the few researchers who were working 
in the field at the time).
• Grey Policy: Australian Policies for an Ageing Society (Kendig and 
McCallum 1990) brought together growing national expertise 
in interpreting the ageing policy reforms by the Hawke/Keating 
Government of the 1980s.
• Ageing and Public Policy in Australia (Sax 1993),1 which began 
with the chapter ‘Perceptions and Attitudes’ and concluded with 
‘A Good Old Age’, provided a comprehensive account of health and 
aged-care developments in a societal context.
• Ageing and Social Policy in Australia (Borowski et al. 1997), building 
on further research investments such as the Commonwealth-
funded UNSW Social Policy Research Centre, provided more 
comprehensive accounts of what was to become the current policy 
framework of aged and health care, income support, superannuation 
and related policies.
1  This was the first of three books that Sidney Sax wrote after his ‘retirement’ from 
a  distinguished career, which included practising in geriatric medicine, being head of the 
Commonwealth Social Welfare Policy Secetariat, and principal advisor on health and welfare to 
Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser. Sax served as the first President of the Australian Association of 
Geronontology.
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• Gibson’s Aged Care: Old policies, new problems (1998) brought critical 
feminist and political economy perspectives to understanding 
ageing and dependency and key policy developments. For example, 
the book provides insights into complex topics such as ‘Regulating 
Quality of Care’ and ‘The Problem of Older Women Redefined’.
• Contemporary Issues in Gerontology: Promoting positive ageing 
(Minichiello and Coulsen 2005), argues for a ‘new gerontology’ 
challenging the disease and decline approach to ageing, and 
included chapters on ageism, mental health, sexuality, and ‘vehicles 
to promote positive ageing’.
• Longevity and Social Change in Australia (Borowski et al. 2007) 
reviewed developments primarily during the Howard/Costello era, 
widening the scope of ageing studies with chapters on lifelong 
learning, law, politics, advocacy, state governments, and the ‘ageing 
without longevity’ experienced by Indigenous Australians (Cotter 
et al. 2007).
Most recently, Challenges and Opportunities for an Ageing Australia 
(O’Loughlin et al. 2016) brings together CEPAR and health sciences 
researchers to present a constructive approach to population and 
policy issues in ageing (see also publications on www.cepar.edu.
au). The  book includes a chapter on Indigenous health and ageing 
(Clapham and Duncan 2016) that brings the perspectives of Indigenous 
researchers to a  better understanding of the lifelong disadvantage of 
their diverse peoples as well as appropriate support and care in their 
own communities. Another chapter (Radermacher and Feldman 2016) 
examines the complexity of ‘addressing difference’ in service systems 
inclusive of culturally and linguistically diverse communities. 
Overall, these books show growing emphases on the positive 
contributions by older people, their wellbeing, and more effective 
and equitable policy responses, for example, in superannuation and 
health services. As indicated by the government’s Intergenerational 
Reports, debates on population ageing are increasingly focused on 
rising costs to government, fiscal sustainability, and questions of 
intergenerational equity for younger people and their futures. Some 
themes are recurrent (and remain unresolved), for example, the 
vulnerability of groups experiencing lifelong disadvantages such as 
those of private tenants. There has been increasing attention to gender 
issues while important matters such as social class and politics (for the 
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latter see Butler 2015) remain relatively less examined. The literature 
is enriched by increasing accounts from the viewpoints of older 
people and authors having experience across university research and 
education, public policy in government, and public advocacy.
Increasing longevity
The contours of later life in Australia have been changing, with life 
expectancy rising steadily since well before Federation (Figure 1). 
The usual life span has risen from the 50s age range in the 1890s to the 
80s age range in recent years. During the lifetimes of people alive today, 
social and economic life has had to adapt to the increasing proportions 
of older people in families and communities. The social meanings 
and consequences of death and the patterns of intergenerational 
relationships have changed dramatically as dying moved increasingly 
from babies and young mothers to men and women in advanced later 
life. Overall, the expectation for living into advanced older ages has 
become a ‘normal’ and relatively predictable part of contemporary life 
rather than the preserve of a small number of privileged survivors 
among past generations.
Figure 1. Life expectancy at birth in Australia by gender, 1884–2009
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2011) .
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The increases of life expectancy have included more years after 
reaching what traditionally have been the markers for entering 
later life. The  trend has been continuing: from 1998 to 2012, life 
expectancy at 65 years increased from 16.1 to 19.1 years for men and 
from 19.8 to 22.0 years for women (Figure 2). Moreover, the additional 
years of later life included relatively more years free of disability; 
years of disability were increasingly being concentrated in the final 
years of life.
Figure 2. Expected life years with and without disabilities at age 65 
in Australia, 1998–2012
Source: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2014) .
Socioeconomic status is a key influence on inequalities of life 
expectancy. There is a life expectancy gap (at age 20) of six years 
between Australians in the top income quintile and those at the 
bottom income quintile; and a gap of five years between the highest 
and lowest quintiles for education (Clarke and Leigh 2011). An even 
greater socioeconomic disparity is seen in the 10-year life expectancy 
gap between Aboriginal and Torres Street Islanders and other 
Australians (AIHW 2011).
Change in the life-span
A life-span and social change framework provides a powerful way 
in which to understand age differences and ageing experiences over 
time. Lasslet’s (1989) thinking on the ‘new life course’, enables us to 
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consider the impacts of increasing longevity and social change on the 
‘second’, ‘third’ and ‘fourth’ stages of life for successive cohorts and 
intergenerational relationships.
As shown in Figure 3, a life-span could be roughly defined in terms 
of four indicative ages according to capacities for productivity and 
independence: 1) a first age of dependency and education indicated by 
the average age of leaving parent’s home (around age 21); 2) a second 
age of independence and work to the average age of retirement 
(around age 59); 3) a third age of independence and contribution 
until commencing care services (around age 80); and 4) a fourth age 
of significant dependency until death.
Figure 3. Indicative ages of four life stages across the life-span
Source: Gong’s own work based on the data on social trends from Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (2012) .
With increasing years of formal education and training, as required 
for a knowledge economy, and additional healthy years in late life, 
the  first three stages have been lengthening, while the last stage 
continues to be concentrated in the final years of life. Since the 1970s, 
young people have tended to reach many of the major life milestones 
later, and this will have an impact on how many years they can work 
in total to support themselves. 
In broad terms, there has been increasing scope for the emergence 
of the ‘third age’—that is an extended period of relatively active 
life—prior to a ‘fourth age’ characterised typically by a few years in 
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states of frailty and dependency. These trends have shifted Australian 
and global perspectives on ageing populations from an historical 
focus on ‘welfare and health’ to more emphases on the ‘inclusion and 
participation’ of older adults. This shift is reflected by more emphases 
over time in research and policy on ‘active ageing’ and ‘healthy and 
productive ageing’, focusing more on health promotion, employment 
and social engagement. 
Work and the ‘second age’
The ‘second age’ is the period of adult years characterised primarily 
by labour force participation and productivity. In the context of 
population ageing and possible workforce shortages, working longer 
can not only increase productivity and tax revenue, but also assist 
individuals to build up their own retirement income, thereby reducing 
the government’s potential liability (Commonwealth of Australia 2015; 
McDonald 2011). With longer and relatively healthier life expectancies, 
working longer is becoming necessary and more feasible: a significant 
challenge is how to enable people to continue to work as mild chronic 
diseases or disabilities arise in their 50s and 60s (Richardson 2014).
Workforce participation has recently been increasing for women 
at working ages as well as for both men and women at mature age 
(Figure 4). Although participation in paid work for Australian women 
aged 55–64 has increased dramatically, much of this growth represents 
part-time rather than full-time work (ABS 2005). There are two factors 
contributing to these increases. One is that gender roles have changed 
significantly as more women have remained in the workforce through 
mid-life while also maintaining responsibilities as primary carers; by 
comparison men have been contributing only slightly more to family 
responsibilities (Richardson 2014). The other change is that more 
people have been planning later retirement. For instance, in 2007, 
the  average age at which employed people intended to retire was 
64 years for men and 62 for women. This was about five years later 
than the average age of 59 of reported retirement for those who were 
already retired at the time (60 years for men, 57 years for women) 
(ABS 2012). 
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Figure 4. Labour force participation rate by age and gender in Australia, 
1999–2011
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2012) .
Ongoing contributions and the ‘third age’ 
The third age is the period after retirement, but prior to the onset 
of disability, in which individuals have the capacity to remain actively 
engaged (Laslett 1989). With recent increases in living standards and 
healthy life years after retirement, people in the third age have been 
able to expect to enjoy a life with self-fulfilling leisure and community 
participation after completing their responsibilities for paid work 
and dependent children (Chatzitheochari and Arber 2011). Realising 
these opportunities may require significant individual and societal 
adaptations by people at all ages in their family and social life as well 
as among employers and community organisations.
The emergence of a longer third age and the additional years of good 
health in later life provide a critical focus for considering social 
opportunities, risks and action possibilities for an ageing society 
(Biggs 2014). In Australia, older people already make substantial 
contributions beyond paid work to their families and the wider 
community through volunteering and other forms of unpaid work 
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(Loh and Kendig 2013). For example, their child care and caregiving 
to family members was valued conservatively at $7 billion in 2009 
(National Seniors Australia 2009). 
A shift is underway in how people expect to fund 
their retirement
The Australian retirement income system consists of three major 
components: the age pension, superannuation and other private 
savings. The age pension has developed as a social welfare safety net, 
providing a modest income for those who are not able to support 
themselves during retirement and a supplement for those with some 
private resources. Currently, government pensions and allowances are 
by far the most common source of personal retirement income for both 
men and women, with around two-thirds of both sexes relying on 
these as their main source of income. 
With the introduction of the superannuation guarantee in 1992, 
coverage increased substantially and the gender gap has narrowed. 
In  1974, only 32 per cent of employees (41 per cent of men and 
17 per cent of women) were covered by superannuation and they were 
generally higher paid professionals, managers and administrators in 
large corporations and the financial sector, as well as public servants 
and members of the defence force. By 1991, nearly one-third of 
private sector employees still had no superannuation (Warren 2008). 
In 1993, just after the introduction of the superannuation guarantee, 
81 per cent of employed persons (86 per cent of full-time workers and 
61 per cent of part-time workers, 82 per cent of employed men and 
78 per cent of employed women) were covered by superannuation 
(Warren 2008). 
The government age pension is still expected to be the main source 
of retirement income for the next two or three decades until the 
occupational superannuation system is fully mature (Warren 2008). 
In 2007, only 25 per cent of adult men and 10 per cent of adult women 
listed superannuation as their primary source of expected retirement 
income. The expectations of younger workers suggests that it will be 
decades before superannuation becomes the main source of retirement 
income as it is likely to rise moderately and slowly. This change 
reflects the impact of compulsory superannuation initiatives that were 
introduced in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
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There has been a lengthy debate that the age pension replacement rate 
(the pension compared to earlier earnings) in Australia is low among 
OECD countries, although it has been compensated to some extent by 
the low housing outlays afforded by a higher home ownership rate 
among older Australians (see Appendix 1 and Chapter 13). However, 
difficulties meeting the high entry costs of buying present major 
challenges for younger generations.
The gender gap in retirement incomes requires emphasis. First, women’s 
labour force participation has been limited (notably due to childbearing 
and child rearing) and marked by more interruptions, more part-time 
work, and lower rates of pay, hence less superannuation and wealth 
accumulation. Second, women are likely to live significantly longer 
than men, including more years requiring what can be expensive aged 
care. Third, marital breakdown and widowhood present particularly 
severe financial risks for women. 
Outcomes for individuals and cohorts
Economic resources 
Historically, Australia has been regarded as a country of egalitarian 
values with relatively equal distribution of wealth, a lack of visible 
poverty and generally comfortable incomes. In the 1960s, Prime 
Minister Harold Holt stated that he knew of no other free country 
where ‘what is produced by the community is more fairly and evenly 
distributed among the community’ (Whiteford 2014). However, this 
view of Australia came under scrutiny from the 1980s onwards as 
inequality increased rapidly: from around 2010, Australia became 
the 11th ‘most unequal’ of the 34 OECD members. At that time, the 
richest 20 per cent had 61 per cent of the wealth, while the poorest 
20 per  cent accounted for a mere 1 per cent of total household net 
worth (Whiteford 2014).
Over recent decades, poverty in Australia has encompassed more 
vulnerable groups beyond older pensioners, including more single 
parents, unemployed youth and other groups, especially those who 
rent privately. The Productivity Commission reported that people aged 
65 years and over (especially singles) nonetheless remain at high risk 
of experiencing deeper or multiple forms of disadvantage (McLachlan 
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et al. 2013; see also Gong et al. 2014). Among elderly singles in 2010, 
the vast majority of whom were women, 24 per cent experienced 
relative income poverty. People aged 65 years and over are far more 
likely to experience persistent poverty than average households 
(6.3 per cent compared to 4.4 per cent) (Table 1).
Table 1. Prevalence of forms of disadvantage among older 
Australians, 2010 (%)













23 .6 3 .3 11 .9 6 .3
Total adults 
over 65 years
13 .2 7 .9 7 .6 6 .3
Total 12 .8 13 .2 4 .8 4 .4
Source: McLachlan, Gilfillan and Gordon (2013), Table 1.
Notes: (1) Relative income poverty is defined as the household equivalised income being 
less than 50 per cent of the median household equivalised income. 
(2) Multiple deprivation indicates a combination of low income, low consumption and low 
net wealth . 
(3) Deep social exclusion was defined by 29 indicators across seven key life domains 
(including material resources, employment, education and skills, health and disability, social 
connection, community and personal safety) . 
(4) Deep and persistent social exclusion is defined as the household was having deep social 
exclusion in both years of 2001 and 2010 . 
A recent report on the wealth of generations by the GRATTAN Institute 
indicates that property and savings have driven wealth accumulation 
differently across age groups from 2003–04 to 2011–12 (Daley and 
Wood 2014). As a result of increases in housing prices, accumulated 
superannuation and other invested savings, the net wealth of people 
aged 45 and over increased substantially: people aged 65 to 74 have 
benefited most with an annual growth of net wealth of 2.9 per cent, 
followed by 2.6 per cent for people aged 75 and over. At the same time, 
households headed by those under 35 have had less wealth in their 
homes than did the same group eight years ago. They have to borrow 
more relative to income in order to adapt to the declining housing 
affordability, although compulsory superannuation could boost their 
lifetime savings to some extent. 
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Age and cohort changes 
Longitudinal research is beginning to shed light on how ageing 
and social change are related to inequalities over the life-span and 
the implications for social justice and policy actions. As indicated in 
Figure 5, successive birth cohorts have experienced different social, 
economic and policy circumstances during their childhood, education, 
work and retirement. For instance, the Depression generation born in 
the 1930s entered into late life in 1990 and the large baby boom cohort 
born in the 1950s is now gradually arriving in what has traditionally 
been regarded as later life.
Figure 5. Indicative age, cohort and time period
Source: Gong’s own work based on the definitions of generational cohorts. 
Figure 6 presents the major global economic events that occurred 
from the 1930s to 2015, helping to provide historical context for the 
experiences of different generational cohorts. The post–World War II 
era has provided the fundamental historical context for understanding 
the changing face of ageing in Australia, and set legacies that are still 
influencing future directions. The shock of the 2007 global financial 
crisis (GFC), after 25 years of strong economic growth, changed 
perceptions of the adequacy of expected retirement incomes, although 
in contrast to the recession of the early 1990s it did not result in large-
scale unemployment for older workers. It also increased policy and 
public concern for the costs of population ageing, and led to increased 
access to partial age pensions and other changes in the direction of 
government policies (Kendig et al. 2013).
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Figure 6. Indicative historic major global economic events, 1930–2015
Source: Gong’s own work based on the well-known major historical events . 
Four generational cohorts can be defined by their periods of birth 
and their subsequent exposures to global economic environments 
over recent decades (Figure 6). These generations can be characterised 
in terms of related social values, attitudes and behaviours:
• The Depression generation, the current cohort of older people who 
were born in 1944 or before, grew up in the Great Depression and 
World War II during the 1930s and 1940s with low education but 
access to full-time and relatively less-skilled employment when 
they were young (Carson and Kerr 2001). They subsequently 
experienced tremendous changes in work patterns, such as the 
rapid decline of the manufacturing sector, and restructuring that 
had particularly severe consequences for low-skilled workers, 
including precarious employment prospects and increasing risks 
of long-term unemployment in mid- and late life. 
• Baby boomers, who were born between 1945 and 1960, grew 
up in the post-war economic boom era, characterised by rising 
educational and employment opportunities, with relatively less 
gender inequality on entering adulthood (Carson and Kerr 2001; 
Biggs 2014). Their expanding opportunities and resources contrast 
sharply with the limited expectations and economic opportunities 
of the Depression generation who have, thus far, shaped images 
of ageing. 
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• The Younger generation (Generation X born 1961–1981 and 
Generation Y born 1982 or later), who grew up or entered 
adulthood during the slow and/or variable economic growth of 
the early 1970s,  the early 1990s and then the GFC in the early 
21st century, with the expanding tertiary sector. They have faced 
a more uncertain economy with less job security and higher income 
inequality, with more demand for adaptability to changes (Tetrick 
and LaRocco 1987; McDaniel et al. 2013). We have included only 
Generation X in this study by restricting individuals to those aged 
35 and over in the data analysed from the Household, Income and 
Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) surveys of 2001 to 2011. 
Cohort succession is significantly increasing diversity in later life 
and generating new perspectives on ageing. The GFC of 2007 and 
diminishing public programs over recent years have further changed 
perspectives. Younger generations will be particularly affected by 
rising income inequality and reduced expectations for job security, 
income growth, health care and other public benefits (for Canada 
see also McDaniel et al. 2013). Among the Australian generational 
cohorts, the baby boomers are commonly thought to be the most 
advantaged on the basis of their rising educational and employment 
opportunities and the booming residential housing market through 
the 1980s and 1990s. 
Recent changes in life satisfaction
This section examines the ways in which ageing and social change are 
related to quality of life as indicated by life satisfaction through adult 
life from the turn of the century. The opportunity to examine these 
issues arose with the longitudinal HILDA study that has surveyed 
Australians annually since 2001 (Summerfield et al. 2012).
Figure 7 (top three lines) shows that over the first decade of this century 
(from 2001 to 2011), overall life satisfaction increased slightly for the 
ageing baby boomers while they were moving towards later life. For 
the older Depression cohort, life satisfaction was higher than for the 
boomers, notwithstanding their advanced age, and it remained largely 
steady as they moved through to advanced old age. For the young 
cohort, however, life satisfaction on average was relatively lower when 
compared to the two older generations and declined slightly as they 
moved towards middle age. 
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In terms of satisfaction with health (bottom three lines), there was an 
understandable but only modest decline for all the three generations 
with increasing age. Overall, the findings suggest considerable 
stability of satisfaction with life and health as the birth cohorts have 
been moving through middle to later life. However, in interpreting 
these findings it is important to keep in mind that people who were 
very old and/or in poor health in 2001 were more likely to have died 
before 2011.
Figure 7. Satisfaction levels with life overall and health by age and cohort
Source: HILDA 2001–2011, Gong’s own calculation . 
More detailed findings (not shown on the figure) show that overall 
education and health confer relatively higher levels of health and life 
satisfaction across the cohorts:
• The Depression birth cohort had a relatively higher level of satisfaction 
in specific areas of life—free time, home, neighbourhood, local 
community and relationships with partner, children and parents, 
with very little decline in these areas with ageing even for those 
at advanced ages.
• The youngest cohort had the highest satisfaction with financial 
situation and employment opportunities (but this declined slightly 
as mid-life approached).
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• The baby boomers cohort had the least satisfaction in relationships 
with their children, although this was rising over the 10 years.
• The younger generation cohort had achieved the highest education 
levels followed by the baby boomers and then by the Depression 
cohort. 
• For all birth cohorts, higher education is associated with better self-
reported health as well as higher satisfaction with life overall, financial 
situation, employment opportunity and living environment 
(but lower satisfaction with free time and relationships).
• Again for all cohorts, women have relatively slightly higher life 
satisfaction levels than men; life satisfaction is the highest for those 
reporting excellent health (and it decreases significantly for those 
in poor health). 
• The better-educated in the young generation were slightly more 
satisfied  with their life overall than their peers at other ages. 
Education beyond high school conferred relatively less advantage 
for baby boomers; and it conferred more advantage for those in 
the Depression cohort who had certificates or more education. 
The findings suggest that requirements for education and skill sets 
have increased over time for successive cohorts. 
Other studies indicate significant overall impacts of the GFC on 
satisfaction with health and life. A national survey of baby boomers 
showed that the GFC was a significant ‘shock’ for their financial 
expectations, especially for those who were still employed compared to 
those who were retired at the time (Kendig et al. 2013). A longitudinal 
study in Canberra concluded that the GFC had a delayed effect in 
increasing depression and anxiety, particularly among baby boomers 
whose expectations for high standards of living in retirement 
apparently were threatened (Sargent-Cox et al. 2011). 
The future and intergenerational equity
Anticipating directions for the future is important to inform and guide 
constructive action, notwithstanding the difficulty of unforeseen 
developments such as the GFC. It is heartening that there has been 
notable progress for older people over recent generations along with 
rising standards of living in Australia. Understanding the past is 
important for appreciating social progress and also the cultural and 
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institutional inertia in social organisation, including the relative 
positions and power of various interests that can shape and resist 
change.
The expectation for a longer and healthier ‘third age’, with more scope 
for productivity in paid and unpaid work, is now being realised for 
the majority of ageing people. Their socioeconomic standing, notably 
with wealth in owner-occupied housing, has risen appreciably. Their 
psychological wellbeing overall is high relative to those in middle age 
and it appears to improve as people approach later life. There remain, 
however, pockets of intense deprivation among older people as there 
are among younger age groups. Notable disadvantage continues among 
older Aboriginals, women without partners, non–home owners, 
and those in poor health, including rises in the prevalence of chronic 
disease.
Some aspects of the future are relatively easy to anticipate. Baby 
boomers now in late-middle age have been advantaged by their 
educational and career opportunities from the 1960s and 1970s; they 
are now bringing these resources, life skills and expectations to their 
later life. Family relations are evolving in complex and varied ways 
but intergenerational bonds are deeply seated and generally remain 
strong. Housing assets for this cohort are generally high as a result 
of increased access to home ownership and appreciating real values 
from the 1980s onward. Superannuation accumulating since the 
1990s, with substantial employer contributions and tax subsidies, 
will be maturing. 
The cohort momentum behind these promising directions for older 
people is in some ways reversing earlier patterns in which people 
had been disadvantaged by their cohort of birth as well as ageing. 
The  major  proviso here, of course, is that the ‘accumulation’ of 
advantage has not been available to all groups of older (and younger) 
people and socioeconomic disparities appear to have been increasing. 
Current directions are for older single women to continue to be at 
a substantial disadvantage relative to men in terms of their vulnerability 
to poverty, poor health, and housing insecurity.
Attitudes to ageing and older people have also evolved since the 
‘ageism’ in the colonial era of ‘a society without grandmothers’ (Davison 
1995). A CEPAR-supported national Attitudes to Ageing in Australia 
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(AAA) study (Kendig et al. 2015) in 2010 found that the majority of 
younger people at the time were sympathetic to policies beneficial to 
older people as most believed that they were getting ‘less than their 
fair share of government benefits’. O’Loughlin and Kendig (2016), 
drawing on this same data base, report that attitudes on the capacities 
of older people, however, were less favourable: the findings indicate 
considerable ambivalence and negativity towards older people in the 
workplace. Across all age groups only a small proportion of people 
perceived strong intergenerational conflict. There were divided views 
on the lifelong opportunities of the baby boom cohort as compared to 
those who are following them. 
There are uncertain prospects for directions in real incomes, wealth, 
and the future of work. An optimistic note is struck in the otherwise 
pessimistic Intergenerational Report (Commonwealth of Australia 
2015), which, in its technical document, assumes growth of real income 
into the future. Home ownership, which has proved so important to 
mitigate the effects of reduced income in later life, is projected to 
decline for future cohorts of older and younger people (Stebbing and 
Spies-Butcher 2015). Employment is central to accumulating resources 
for one’s own later life and also for taxation supporting public transfer 
programs. While workforce participation has been increasing at older 
ages, ageing workers are likely to be in industries and occupations 
where jobs are under major threat from technological change and 
reorganisation of workplaces (CEDA 2015). Economic modeling has 
shown that the recent direction of government budgets has been 
to widen inequalities between the rich and poor and between the 
younger and older generations (Phillips 2015). 
Notwithstanding the significant concerns and uncertainties ahead, 
the chapters in this volume indicate that Australia is relatively well 
placed in terms of its demography, economy, and policies to respond 
constructively to population ageing. We may, however, be at a turning 
point in which future generations may well have lower lifelong 
economic prospects than the baby boom cohort now entering later life. 
Further, experiences over the life course are becoming more precarious 
for many in terms of family and work life. While some older people 
will continue to be disadvantaged by poor health and limited financial 
resources, the overall pattern is for older people to have an increasing 
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share of national wealth. This growing trend for at least a decade ahead 
raises the capacities of advantaged older people to pay for services and 
to contribute more to their families and to government revenue. 
The future can be influenced positively by governments, employers, 
and individuals that take action on the considerable potential for 
‘improvability’ for an ageing Australia. Big ideas that can assist in 
achieving better wellbeing outcomes include building human capital 
over the entire life span; ‘ageing well’ approaches in health and social 
policy; and employment and care practises that reinforce independence 
(Kendig 2016). Positive outcomes for all age groups and generations 
can be facilitated by further social change that recognises diversity 
over the life span and fosters positive attitudes and opportunities for 
older people.
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Population ageing in Australia—
National policy challenges 
and future directions
John Piggott
Population ageing comprises two related but distinct forces: the ageing 
of the baby boomer generation, and related policy challenges around 
retirement support, health care, aged care, and the management 
of intergenerational relationships; and the impacts of population 
dynamics and evolving changes in demographic structure, nationally, 
regionally and globally. The first is generally given more attention, 
for understandable reasons—the policy challenges are very direct 
and relatively near-term. In particular, retirement and retirement 
financing, health and ageing, and aged care are all important national 
priorities, requiring evidence-based changes in policy formulation, 
business practice, and family behaviour.
But the longer-term influences of shifting population dynamics may 
eventually have the more profound impact on Australians. I have in 
mind here the impact of generational imbalance on intergenerational 
solidarity, on taxation policy, on the structure of our labour force, and 
the impact of changing population structures within our major trading 
partners on demand for our trade, our investment, and migration. 
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These two aspects of population ageing are related not just because 
demographic change will evolve steadily and inexorably for at least 
the next generation. They are also linked through national response: 
what we do about an ageing demographic will profoundly impact the 
longer-term outcomes of population dynamics. The issue becomes 
even more complex because population dynamics internationally, 
but especially in Asia, will likely impact the Australian demographic 
transition and its economic and social correlates, through migration, 
sources of international investment, trade patterns, and ultimately the 
global level of economic activity.
While Australia, in common with most of the world’s nations, is ageing 
by most agreed measures, such as dependency ratio or median age, 
average remaining life expectancy is also increasing. Intergenerational 
dynamics are much more complex than the simple arithmetic used 
in measuring the traditional dependency ratio, the population over 
some arbitrary age, often 65, divided by the population aged between 
15 and 64. For policymakers, dependency lies at the heart of the issue, 
because, unless self-provision has been mandated, and/or family 
support is forthcoming, providing adequate services for those whose 
human capital has been mostly depleted requires taking resources 
from elsewhere, which in most cases means younger workers. Higher 
taxes and more informal resource commitment are the inevitable 
consequences of an ageing demographic, although alternative measures 
of dependency project differing impressions of the nature, timing 
and extent of this process. For example, a calculation of dependency 
ratios that holds constant remaining life expectancy as the cut-off 
for switching to ‘dependant’ status, rather than chronological age, 
generates dependency ratios that decline for some significant period 
before rising again (Spijker and MacInnes 2013). On the other hand, 
using National Transfer Accounts (NTA), of the type generated by 
Peter McDonald and his team for Australia (Rice et al. 2014), gives the 
opposite result (Prskawetz and Sambt 2014).
In what follows, much is speculative. I will first make some remarks 
about the challenges and opportunities generated by the ageing of 
the baby boomers, focusing especially on retirement incomes, and 
health and aged care, but also touching on housing and risk. I then 
take up the question of demographic dynamics, both domestic and 
international, and their impact on Australia’s future. 
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The challenges of an ageing demographic
There seems little doubt that an ageing population will lead to 
greater public sector support, simply because government, in its role 
as insurer of last resort, will be called upon more and more to cover 
the risks to which older people with depleted earning capacity are 
exposed. In an OECD background paper prepared by Ed Whitehouse 
and myself for a meeting of Ministers of Social Security in 2011 
(Piggott and Whitehouse 2011), we reported projections for a range 
of countries of outlays on pensions, health and long-term care, 
comparing 2010 and 2050. I reproduce Figure 1 from that paper 
here. In all these countries, outlays are projected to rise significantly, 
with the proportionate increase greatest for those countries, such as 
Korea, with the most rapidly ageing projections. Australia, along with 
demographically and economically similar countries such as Canada, 
registered about a 30 per cent increase, from 10 per cent to about 13 
per cent of GDP. While these calculations are now a few years old, 
their import remains clear. 
Figure 1. Fiscal costs of ageing populations (projected pension, health 
and long-term care expenditures, 2010 and 2050, per cent of GDP)
Source: OECD (2011), Pensions at a Glance: Retirement-Income Systems in OECD 
and G-20 Countries; OECD (2011), Help Wanted? Providing and Paying for Long-Term 
Care; European Commission (2009), ‘The 2009 Ageing Report: Economic and Budgetary 
Projections for the Eu 27 Member States (2008–2060)’, European Economy, No . 2/2009, 
Brussels; International Monetary Fund (2009), ‘Fiscal Implications of the Global Economic 
and Financial Crisis’, Staff Position Note No. 09/13, Washington, DC; Standard & Poor’s 
(2010), ‘Global Aging 2010: An Irreversible Truth’ .
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Retirement and retirement incomes1 
Australia is, on the whole, well served by the existing framework of 
retirement policy. While many questions remain unanswered, and 
there is much room for improvement, the current system is sustainable, 
has a high degree of integrity, and will, once the superannuation 
guarantee becomes mature, provide adequate resources in retirement. 
It is useful to think of our retirement income structure in terms of the 
three-pillar framework adopted by the OECD. The first pillar operates 
as a non-contributory transfer, which means it is potentially available 
to all.2 This is represented in Australia by the Age Pension. The second 
pillar offers payments related to pre-retirement labour income, on 
some mandatory basis (in Australia, the Superannuation Guarantee). 
Typically, this is based on contributions computed as some proportion 
of wages or salary, paid either by employer, employee, or both. The 
third pillar comprises voluntary retirement saving, typically tax-
preferred. 
Focusing on the first two pillars allows us to loosely link the 
instruments of policy to targets. The first pillar is designed to alleviate 
poverty, while the second pillar aims to encourage consumption 
smoothing between working and retirement life. Because the Age 
Pension is non-contributory, and the value of the maximum single 
benefit has recently been increased from 25 per cent to 27.8 per cent 
of average earnings, it  does a remarkably good job of ameliorating 
poverty among the elderly. If, like the US, we set the poverty line at 
40 per cent of median income, then the elderly poverty rate is only 
5 per cent (Chomik and Piggott 2014). Further, even when poverty 
is set at the OECD level, taking account of housing reduces elderly 
poverty to 13.5 per cent (Yates and Bradbury 2010). The calculation 
of high poverty rates reported by, for example, the OECD misses two 
important points. First, most households with a head aged 65 or more 
1  This material draws in part on my 2013 ASSA Hancock Lecture, www.youtube.com/
watch?v=lb6Uv4kIGfU. My views have also benefited from many discussions with my colleague 
Cagri Kumru. 
2  It may only be available subject to a means test, since its function is to ensure the elderly 
are adequately provided for.
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own a home outright.3 Second, the gap between the poverty line 
(set at 50 per cent of median household equivalised income) and the 
value of the full Age Pension is quite small.
When we turn to incentives, conventional economic wisdom 
emphasises the disincentive impacts of high effective marginal tax 
rates (EMTRs). But the overall economic impact of means testing is 
poorly understood, and is an important topic for further research. 
Here, we simply note three caveats to the presumption that means 
testing a social pension induces net perverse disincentives. First, like 
any other tax-financed financial transfer, retirement income transfers 
impact on incentives at two points in economic transactions: when 
the tax is levied, and when the transfer is received. These two points 
of price distortion need to be considered together in assessing the 
overall incentive impact of means testing. As the taper rate (and the 
associated EMTR) is reduced, the overall revenue requirement of the 
program will increase, and this will require higher tax rates to be 
applied to others in the economy, probably workers. If they already 
pay high taxes, as in developed countries, then the same argument 
about disproportionate efficiency costs of high marginal tax rates will 
apply, offsetting the EMTR reduction among pension recipients. 
Second, while a means-tested pension will impose high EMTRs on 
those at the margin of eligibility, where withdrawal of the pension 
is operative, many individuals potentially impacted by a universal 
pension will be unaffected by a targeted pension, whereas their 
behaviour would be impacted by a demogrant. For a given full pension 
value, steeper tapers will reduce the number of consumers affected by 
the social pension overall. It seems plausible that the group excluded 
by a steeper taper is likely on average to have more possibilities of 
behaviour modification than less well-off groups in the community. 
Third, recent analysis (for example, Conesa et al. 2009) suggests that a 
tax on capital income may have efficiency-enhancing properties in an 
economy where there are restrictions on age-based taxes, and where 
liquidity constraints prevail. A means test is an age-based tax on 
capital income, and more precisely, a tax on retirement capital (Kumru 
3  Those Age Pension recipients who rent receive rental assistance, which goes some way 
to making up the shortfall from the absence of principal residence. 
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and Piggott 2010). In more recent research with economy-wide models 
capturing these points, it is frequently found that steeper tapers may 
be efficiency-preferred.
The current Australian discussion around steeper tapers is therefore 
one that the recent economics literature supports, if at this stage only 
in a preliminary way (Sefton et al. 2008; Kumru and Piggott 2009). 
There is a major research agenda around means testing just getting 
underway. 
A final point on means-testing structures relates to the inclusion of 
earned income in the means test. Many countries with conventional 
social security have an ‘earnings test’, which effectively operates 
as a means test on earned income, while ignoring capital resources. 
Recent analysis (Hernaes et al. 2016) suggests that relaxing the 
‘earnings test’ on social security, which in the context of a social 
pension such as Australia’s can be interpreted as relaxing the means 
test on earned income, may lead to improved mature labour force 
participation. As we will see below, this is perhaps the most important 
family and market adjustment available to respond to the pressures of 
an ageing demographic, and a major policy challenge is to ensure as far 
as possible that policy structures and settings encourage rather than 
impede working longer. 
When it comes to income replacement or consumption smoothing, 
however, the picture is less sanguine. The Superannuation Guarantee 
(SG) provides resources for retirement, on a pre-funded basis, which 
makes it sustainable. But especially for workers whose pre-retirement 
income sits in the upper third of the earnings distribution, the SG 
falls well short of a well-designed retirement income. This is a major 
challenge for retirement design in Australia. Of the small group of 
countries relying on pre-funded mechanisms for income-replacement 
policies, Australia is alone in specifying no drawdown structure. Recent 
policy discussion concerning retirement income policy suggests that 
policymakers are aware of this. While much more research is required 
before we have a comprehensive understanding of this policy area, 
enough is known to give us a direction for policy reform. Much of 
the available and relevant evidence is summarised in three requested 
CEPAR submissions to the Financial Systems Inquiry (CEPAR 2014a, 
2014b, 2014c). 
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Overall, while many unanswered research questions remain, and 
there is much policy reform to be undertaken, the directions for 
retirement income policy reform are becoming clear. My assessment 
is that, in policy terms, we’re ahead of the game compared with most 
comparable economies. This may be cold comfort—many existing 
systems are clearly unsustainable, and will likely be subject to 
arbitrary reductions in benefits into the future, implemented at a time 
when households are least able to adapt—after their earnings capacity 
has been depleted. Perhaps the least settled aspect relates to the tax 
treatment of superannuation, although the blueprint laid out in the 
2009 Henry Review (Commonwealth of Australia 2009) provides an 
excellent starting point.
Health and aged care
Health and aged care provision is a major challenge even without the 
additional pressures associated with an ageing demographic. This is 
not my area of expertise, so I will be briefer. The Intergenerational 
Report (IGR) (Commonwealth of Australia 2009) suggests that the 
major source of increases in government health outlays to 2050 will 
not be population ageing, but technology improvement. Other reports 
suggest that the most important source of outlay increase will be 
demographic change. In a way, it doesn’t matter. To deliver up-to-date 
health care to Australians 30 years from now will cost a lot more than 
it does today, unless something changes.
One possible cost reduction measure is the promotion of e-health. 
A high proportion of public health outlays is devoted to hospital 
stays for chronically ill patients, whose acute episodes occasioning 
hospitalisation may have been avoided with closer monitoring. 
International evidence on the benefits of remote monitoring (I have 
in mind monitoring through home-based devices to a central hub that 
flags indications of acute attacks) is clear. One would think Australia, 
with its unique challenges around remote communities, would be at 
the forefront of these initiatives, but this does not appear to be the 
case. This is an example of infrastructure development for an ageing 
demographic, which I allude to briefly below, but there is a culture 
issue as well. Scalable adoption of e-health monitoring requires cultural 
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acceptance by both the health professions and their clients, and this 
may be as formidable a barrier to implementation as the installation 
of the required technology. 
A second aspect of health and aged care worthy of note relates to 
cognitive decline. With increasingly longevity, the incidence of 
debilitating cognitive decline, either dementia or simply major 
dysfunction, will grow, by rates that vary by source, but that are 
alarming. As Hurd et al. (2013) have demonstrated for the US, the 
potential costs of Alzheimer’s disease into the future are very high. 
But the costs of generalised cognitive decline may be even higher. 
To  the extent that cognitive capital, to use Kaarin Anstey’s term, 
can be maintained, these costs may be avoided. There is mounting 
evidence that maintaining workforce attachment is associated with 
lower rates of cognitive decline, even after self-selection is controlled 
for. For  example, Rohwedder and Willis (2010), using data across 
countries with substantially different policies regarding retirement 
age, find that early retirement has a significant negative impact on the 
cognitive ability of people in their early 60s that is both quantitatively 
important and causal. This has implications for policies towards 
mature labour force participation, discussed later.
In a way, the issue of cognitive decline provides a convenient 
bridge between health and aged care. Aged care presents enormous 
challenges: the strain on carers and family relationships, both intra- 
and intergenerational; the work-care dilemma; and the fiscal cost of 
care. 
On a framework for aged care, Australia has made a good start, with 
a policy stance articulating clear guidelines about the future shaping 
of policy. Missing is any clear account of funding sources. But for those 
owning one, it will probably be the owner-occupied home. The high 
owner-occupier rate among the elderly, combined with high home 
prices, certainly constitutes serious resources to purchase residential 
aged care when that becomes necessary, and the home and community 
emphasis of the new policy should ensure that happens less, and for 
shorter durations, than is currently the case. Work needs to be done, 
by academe, both government and business, to develop home equity 
drawdown instruments that elderly Australians feel comfortable and 
safe with. But that is doable, and there is some time in which to do it.
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Mature labour force participation
This is perhaps the greatest challenge, and greatest opportunity in 
economic, social and familial adjustment to population ageing, and 
in particular increased longevity. Working for longer is an inevitable 
consequence of living for longer, yet is resisted by many whose 
expectations of chronological age of retirement are challenged by this 
surprising shift in mature life expectancy. Yet many people, even the 
majority, of those now in their 50s, can expect to live to their 90s. 
And their healthy lives will extend also. Policies have to be adjusted 
to reflect this—superannuation access age, worker compensation 
insurance, and most importantly, attitudes have to change. Age 
discrimination is  increasingly under challenge by regulators and 
policymakers. Susan Ryan has suggested ‘career checks’ to see whether 
a job is conducive to working longer. Relatedly, continuing education 
should be directed to guiding workers into occupations in later years 
that they can pursue into their late 60s.
A number of workforce issues will likely arise as demographic change 
sets in. Diversity in the workplace needs to embrace age diversity as 
well as gender and ethnic diversity. Little research has been conducted 
into the impacts of age diversity in the workplace. An improved 
understanding of the implications of an age-diversified workforce 
would assist firms in establishing workplace practices to induce an 
accepting culture. Superannuation entitlements that are linked to final 
salary need to be changed so that a worker can stay in the workforce at 
a reduced wage without having his or her benefits reduced. Generally, 
workers will have to adjust to working longer, in response to longer 
and healthier lives. 
Housing and infrastructure
If a senior government official had been asked, 50 years ago, to predict 
the path of future urbanisation in Australia, he would very likely have 
indicated that the then major centres of Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane 
and Perth would be joined by major regional centres. Population 
growth and urbanisation would take place without extreme 
agglomeration. Nothing like that has eventuated. Instead, site rents in 
these four major centres have increased more than wages, and housing 
affordability has become a major social issue. 
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It is unclear why Australia’s population has become so concentrated 
in capital cities. One possibility is that technological innovation 
has allowed certain cities to become knowledge-intensive, creating 
new jobs, and that has meant that the best career opportunities are 
available in those cities (Glaeser and Resseger 2010). But the result is 
that housing affordability is currently strained, in spite of historically 
low interest rates.
This is a challenge in political economy. Local interests, represented by 
political groupings across Australia’s fiscal federal structure, severely 
constrains affordable housing development, and lack of complementary 
infrastructure exacerbates the problem. It is relevant to the ageing 
of the population because of its link with intergenerational equity 
(the  baby boomers hold the bulk of housing wealth), and because 
of its implications for the intragenerational distribution of wealth in 
future generations. I return to this point below.
Risk and risk management
Overwhelmingly, our financial services sector is geared to wealth 
management rather than insurance. At least two major social issues—
the ageing demographic and climate—mean that this will change over 
the next two decades. This change may not yet be fully appreciated, 
either by government or private insurers. The impact of climate risk 
on the financial sector has been explored by Whalley and Yuan (2009). 
Here we focus on the risks of being older, and the appropriate policy 
stance to maximise private coverage of the associated risks. 
The central point here is that to induce the private sector to accept more 
retirement risk, government has to develop financial instruments, and 
design policies and regulations such that these risks can be managed 
by private institutions. It is often observed that government already 
bears much longevity risk, for example, and does not wish to extend 
its exposure. But it should be recognised that the insurer of last resort 
is always the government—disaster and drought relief is just one 
example. So by carefully designing the nature of the additional risk it 
takes on, it can make it attractive for the private sector to insure where 
no products would be offered in the absence of government covering, 
for example, tail risk. 
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The challenges of population dynamics
Intergenerational relationships
Unbalanced demographies can place intergenerational relationships 
under strain. Because of the nature of intergenerational transfers, 
and  the impossibility of enforcing contracts necessary for the 
commercial provision of many intergenerational goods, most 
intergenerational exchange is mediated through family or government. 
There are enormous benefits to these exchanges, but in the case of 
governments, they require political will, and in the case of family, 
they require trust. 
Most aged care is still provided by family; much child care is provided 
by grandparents. Depending on your starting point, existing 
generations provide environmental protection for future generations, 
or deplete the environment for future generations. R&D investment, 
often subsidised by government, will predominantly benefit future 
generations, a forward intergenerational good, with benefits flowing 
to younger generations. Government-funded retirement transfers, 
such as the Age Pension, are a backwards intergenerational good. 
To maintain the institutional basis for these exchanges under 
demographic shift is challenging. Again, Australia is in a relatively 
favourable position. Its demographic change is slow and its policies 
are geared toward considerable self-sufficiency among the older 
generation. 
Nevertheless, caution is required. The current older generations 
are resource-rich as a whole, but the wealth is unevenly spread. 
If  policies, driven by the fiscal strains of demographic change, are 
adopted that disadvantage members of the younger generation who do 
not have access to parental resources, then this could well precipitate 
an intergenerational tendency toward increased intragenerational 
inequality. If home purchase cannot be achieved without parental 
aid, or university education becomes so expensive that only those 
with family resources will risk the debt, then we have the beginnings 
of a process where major conduits to wealth and human capital 
accumulation are denied to a segment of the next generation. This will 
happen only in the long term, but is all the more invidious for that. 
And once it has happened, it will be difficult to reverse.
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Along with higher education, housing will likely continue to be 
a major channel for wealth accumulation for successive generations of 
Australians. But where in the past access to these conduits to affluence 
has been available to most, it is possible that in the future it will be 
accessible only to those with the liquidity to accumulate a substantial 
deposit. In many cases, these will be the same people as those with 
family resources behind them. 
Tax revenues
Whatever we do, tax revenue will increase with an ageing demographic, 
and tax structure will need to be modified to meet the increased 
revenue requirement as tax bases change with changing population 
structure. We have a tax system where capital income tax is separated 
from the labour income tax. Major sources of capital income, the 
home and superannuation, are effectively taxed under an expenditure 
tax regime. To me, this is intuitively appealing. While there may be 
arguments for taxing the returns to both capital and labour income, 
there is no argument that the tax rates should be the same. Although 
some capital income taxation may be efficiency-improving, low capital 
income tax rates make economic sense. I find myself disagreeing with 
many tax analysts, that the way to increase tax revenue is to close 
the ‘gaps’ in the capital income tax base, whether it be the taxation 
of superannuation, negative gearing, or other capital income targets. 
This is not to say those tax structures could not be improved. But this 
is not the way to raise the revenue take. 
Two avenues for increasing tax revenue present themselves. First, 
the GST. Through a broader base and an increased rate, for example 
12 per cent, significantly more revenue could be raised. Because 
government benefits are indexed to prices, people who rely heavily on 
these as a source of income would be largely protected from the impacts 
of this tax increase. Low-income workers would be affected, however, 
as would self-funded retirees. To maintain overall progressivity, 
the two highest marginal rates in our personal income tax could be 
increased by two percentage points. This would impact in only a minor 
way on saving, because the major saving channels are protected from 
the capital income tax. It would of course impact labour incomes. 
But most people who earn at these levels of income are motivated by 
considerations other than disposable income per hour. The labour 
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supply impact would be small. Overall, our taxation system, while it 
could be greatly improved, functions well. It would function just as 
well, and raise more revenue, with these two adjustments. 
International interactions
At the moment, these are largely unmapped, another research program 
to be done. Some idea of the range of stage of demographic transition, 
and speed of adjustment, of our regional neighbours, is given in 
Figure 2. To see how these might matter, consider the following. 
China is currently still a young economy, but is ageing rapidly. 
The demographic dividend is still positive—it is a highly productive 
country, with relatively few dependants, old or young. In the next 
15 to 20 years that will flip. The workforce will decline, and an ever 
larger cohort of older people will come to rely on what will be largely 
government pensions. This will likely change expenditure priorities 
in China. Instead of government spending on infrastructure, it will 
be spending on transfers that will flow to households. And direct 
foreign investment from China may decline as well. This will generate 
changes in the pattern of import demand, impacting Australia’s terms 
of trade and overall welfare, and the shape and scale of our evolving 
infrastructure. 
Figure 2. Population ageing: Dependency ratio
Source: Chomik and Piggott (2012) .
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Migration patterns will also change. There will likely be fewer 
migrants from China, more from Indonesia and India. Specific 
workforce requirements, such as for aged care, may be sourced from 
other countries, such as the Philippines. 
Of course, this is just one scenario, and an oversimplified one at that. 
But Australia, as a small developed country with strong trade ties to 
the rapidly ageing and ever larger economies of Asia, will doubtless 
be affected by the unfolding demographic transition underway there. 
Surely a national policy challenge.
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Ageing in Australia: Population 
changes and responses
Peter McDonald
Population ageing is the historical outcome of falling rates of fertility 
and mortality with fertility having the larger effect. While population 
ageing has only occupied the minds of policymakers since the 
1980s, Australia’s population has been ageing continuously for over 
a century. Figure 1 shows that ageing accelerated in the late 1920s 
and the 1930s. This was because of the substantial fall in fertility that 
occurred during the 1920s and the sustained low levels of fertility 
during the 1930s as  a  result of the economic depression (Figure 2). 
Counter to the long-term trend, the population stopped ageing in 
the 1950s and 1960s, this time as a result of the higher fertility that 
occurred during the ‘baby boom’ years. The number of births in 
Australia from 1946 to 1965 exceeded the number in the previous 
20-year period by 1.63  million births. Today, those born in the 
1946–65 period are beginning to enter the retirement ages and are 
replacing the much smaller generation that was born from 1926 to 
1945. This is why the rate of population ageing accelerates from 2010 
through to 2040 (Figure 1) but this acceleration was not inevitable. 
It became so only because of falls in fertility and mortality rates from 
the mid-1970s onwards.
POPuLATION AGEING AND AuSTRALIA'S FuTuRE
66
Figure 1. The percentage of the Australian population aged 65 years 
and over, 1901–2097
Sources: Produced by the author from Australian Bureau of Statistics . Australian 
Historical Population Statistics 2014 . ABS Catalogue No . 3105 .0 .65 .001 . www .
abs .gov .au/AuSSTATS/abs@ .nsf/ProductsbyCatalogue/632CDC28637CF57ECA 
256F1F0080EBCC?OpenDocument and Australian Bureau of Statistics (2013) .
That the extent of population ageing today was not inevitable is 
illustrated by examination of the report of the National Population 
Inquiry (NPI) (1975). In the early 1970s, the Australian Government 
instigated a national population inquiry led by WD Borrie. In the 
Inquiry’s report, the most comprehensive report on Australia’s 
population ever undertaken, population ageing received only passing 
reference and no mention at all in relation to policy. Indicative 
population projections from 1970 to 2070 forecast that the proportion 
of the population aged 65 years and over would peak at between 
9 and 15 per cent, with this peak being reached by 2030 (NPI 1975, 
1:  294). In only two of the Inquiry’s six indicative projections did 
the proportion aged 65 years and over peak at 12 per cent or more, 
a level that was in fact reached in 1996. The reason the Inquiry failed 
to predict the future level of population ageing is that the demography 
of Australia changed dramatically soon after the report was completed.
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Figure 2. Total fertility rates, Australia, 1921–2011
Source: Produced by the author from Australian Bureau of Statistics . Australian 
Historical Population Statistics 2014 . ABS Catalogue No . 3105 .0 .65 .001 . www .
abs .gov .au/AuSSTATS/abs@ .nsf/ProductsbyCatalogue/632CDC28637CF57ECA 
256F1F0080EBCC?OpenDocument and Australian Bureau of Statistics (2015) .
From around 1975, both fertility and mortality rates in Australia 
fell much more rapidly than had been assumed in the projections. 
The  fertility rate in Australia in 1972, the last year for which the 
authors of the report had data, was 2.74 births per woman. By 1980, 
the rate had fallen to 1.89 births per woman and it has remained 
around that level ever since (Figure 2). Also from around 1972 
onwards, death rates at older ages in Australia fell rapidly after having 
been almost constant in the previous 50 years (Figure 3). For example, 
in 1920–22, the expectation of life for Australian men at age 65 was 
12 years. This was little changed at 12.2 years in 1970–72. However, 
by 2010–12, it had increased significantly to 19.1 years. Thus, while it 
is often said that population ageing today is driven by the baby boom 
generation reaching the older ages, this is only the case because of the 
massive reductions in both fertility and mortality that occurred from 
the early 1970s onwards.
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Figure 3. Age-specific death rates, 65–84 years, Australia, 1907–2003
Source . Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2006), Figure 6 .3: 109 .
Population ageing in Australia
As shown in Figure 1, in the period 2012–36, ageing in Australia 
increases at a sharper rate than at any other time in the 200-year 
history shown in the figure. In numerical terms, the percentage of 
the population aged 65 years and over increases from 13.8 per cent 
in 2012 to 19.8 per cent in 2036. Subsequently, the speed of ageing 
slows. Figure 4 shows the changes in the age structure of the 
Australian population between 2011 and 2061 as estimated by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). The two age distributions are 
‘bee-hive’ shaped, a relatively favourable outcome (McDonald and 
Kippen 1999) as the bulk of the population remains concentrated in 
the working ages and, by 2061, in the middle working ages rather 
the older working ages. As discussed below, this is a much more 
favourable outcome than most OECD countries, providing Australia 
with a relative advantage. The favourable outcome is the result of 
a relatively high fertility rate projected into the future in association 
with a high level of migration, with the migrants being mainly young 
adults. Table 1 shows the impact of four different levels of migration 
upon future levels of ageing in Australia. With zero net migration, the 
percentage of the population aged 65 years and over would increase 
from 14 per cent in 2013 to 28.4  per cent in 2053. With migration 
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of 300,000 per annum, only 21.2 per cent of the population would be 
aged 65 years and over in 2053. The ABS projections shown in Figure 4 
are based on the assumption that annual net migration will be 240,000 
per annum. The percentages in the working ages, 15–64 years, move 
in the opposite direction, being six points higher with the high level 
of immigration compared with zero migration.
Figure 4. Australia’s age distributions in 2011 and 2061
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2013): 40 .
Table 1. Long-term demographic assumptions in the 2002 and 2015 
Intergenerational Reports and the 2003 and 2013 projections of the 







Expectation of life at 
birth in 2051(years)
Males Females
IGR 2002 1 .6 90 83 .2 88 .2
IGR 2015 1 .9 215 87 .5 90 .1
ABS 2003 1 .6 100 84 .2 87 .7
ABS 2013 1 .8 240 84 .2 87 .7
Sources: Commonwealth of Australia (2015); Australian Bureau of Statistics (2003); 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2013) .
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Why population ageing matters
Population ageing matters to governments because of the typical age 
pattern of consumption and income as shown in Figure 5. Per capita 
consumption is much lower than per capita income at the older ages 
and becomes increasingly so as people get older. This deficit must 
be met from either public or private sources and, to the extent that 
the deficit is met from public sources, governments are faced with an 
increasingly more difficult fiscal situation the greater the proportion 
of the population in the older ages. This is shown more directly in 
Figure 6 in terms of government revenue and expenditure. Per capita 
expenditure exceeds per capita taxation from about age 62 onwards 
and the gap gets increasingly wider as age increases. In net terms, 
a typical 78-year-old costs all governments in Australia about $24,000 
per annum while the typical 43-year-old benefits government revenue 
by around $15,000 per annum. The more the population consists of 
78-year-olds rather than 43-year-olds, the greater the fiscal challenge 
for governments.
Figure 5. Per capita consumption and income by age, Australia,  
2003–04 and 2009–10
Source: Rice, Temple and McDonald (2014): 11 .
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This fiscal challenge is addressed by the Australian Government 
once every four years in the series of Intergenerational Reports (IGR) 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2002, 2007, 2010 and 2015). As required 
by the government’s Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998:
An Inter-Generational report is to assess the long term sustainability 
of current government policies over 40 years by taking account 
of the financial implications of demographic change (Commonwealth 
of Australia 2002: iii).
The first Intergenerational Report narrowed this to:
The report provides a basis for considering the Commonwealth’s fiscal 
outlook over the long term, and identifying emerging issues associated 
with an ageing population (Commonwealth of Australia 2002: iii).
The models used in the IGRs treat demography as exogenous, that 
is, demography trends simply to occur without being influenced by 
the economic or social outcomes of the model. This is despite the fact 
that international migration is almost certainly endogenous, that is, 
a product of future social and economic trends, and its level is subject 
to government policy. The IGRs do not talk about migration as a policy 
instrument despite the growing body of literature (see below) showing 
that migration in the long term has substantial impacts on the economy 
and therefore upon the government’s fiscal outcome. Fertility and 
mortality are ‘less endogenous’ than migration but expenditure on 
health interventions reduces mortality and international comparisons 
show that work-family policy explains why some advanced economies 
have very low fertility and others do not (McDonald 2006).
The implicit IGR assumption is that demographic trends are slow 
to  change. Accordingly, the demography can be included as an 
assumed input model without much danger of being wrong. However, 
if we compare the demographic assumptions of the 2003 IGR with 
those used in the 2015 IGR (Table 2), they are substantially different, 
indicating that the demography can change in a relatively short 
time-frame. An  increase in the fertility rate from 1.6 to 1.9 births 
per woman may not appear to be a large change but the implications 
are substantial. An increase in annual net migration from 90,000 to 
215,000 per annum is obviously considerable and, as demonstrated 
below, has a large impact on population and economic outcomes. 
Finally, the increases in the assumed expectation of life at birth in 
2050 are 1.9 years higher for women and 4.3 years higher for men. 
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These changes imply a  considerable increase in joint survival of 
partnered people. In  relation to aged care, partners are the leading 
carers implying fiscal savings for governments as the providers of non-
familial care.
Table 2. Impact of varying levels of net annual overseas migration 
on the age structure of the Australian population in 2053
Level of net annual 
overseas migration
Per cent of population 
aged 15–64 in 2053 (%)
Per cent of population aged 
65 and over in 2053 (%)
0 56 28 .4
100,000 58 25 .2
180,000 60 23 .4
300,000 62 21 .2
Per cent in 2013 67 14 .0
Source: McDonald and Temple (2013) .
The age structure effects of the changes in the demographic 
assumptions across the IGR reports is illustrated by considering the 
effects of similar changes in assumptions made in the ABS population 
projections published in 2003 and 2013 (Figure 7).1 The figure shows 
by how much the 2051 projected population increased in each age 
group due to the changes in assumptions made in the 2003 ABS 
projections and in the 2013 ABS projections. The bar for age group 
0–9 means that the 0–9 population in 2051 is 78 per cent higher in the 
2013 ABS projections than it was in the 2003 projections. This means 
the future child population in 2051 almost doubles simply because 
of changes in the assumptions about future demography. 
This large increase is due both to assumed fertility moving up from 
1.6 to 1.9 births per woman and to the additional births born to net 
migration being 125,000 per annum higher in the 2013 projections 
than was assumed for the 2003 projections. It is sometimes said in error 
that migration does not slow the ageing of the population because 
migrants also age. The statement is wrong because, besides the fact 
that migrants with an average age at arrival of 25 years are younger on 
average than the general population (37.3 years), migrants also have 
a lot of births before they get old. Indeed, they have grandchildren 
before they get old.
1  The ABS projections are used because the age structure outcomes in the IGR projections 
are not published.
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Figure 6. Per capita total government spending and taxes by age 
(total government means the Australian Government and State 
and Territory Governments), 2009–10
Source: Commonwealth of Australia (2015): 58, using data from Rice, 
Temple and McDonald (2014) .
Figure 7. Percentage increase in the population in each age group in 
2051 due to changes in the demographic assumptions made between 
the ABS 2003 and 2013 official population projections
Source: Produced by the author from data published in Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(2003) and Australian Bureau of Statistics (2013) .
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The changes in assumptions between the two projections 
also  substantially increase the numbers in the young working ages 
(25–34 and 35–44) but the numbers at older ages do not increase very 
much at all, especially for the old-old age group (80+). If there is one 
demographic certainty, it is that, over 40 years, a projection of the 
population aged 80 and over will be relatively accurate as it will be 
affected only by errors in the mortality assumption. So, shifting from 
the 2003 IGR to the 2015 IGR, the future population of Australia 
becomes much younger. This has the following implications.
In relation to consumption (public and private), it makes no difference 
whether the person is age 15 or 79 or any age in between (Figure 5). 
The profile of age-specific consumption is flat. Consumption is 
lower for children under 15 and higher for those aged 80 and over. 
Importantly, this means that consumption expenditure is relatively 
resilient to changes in age structure. The real issue with ageing of the 
population is on the income side of the equation. Figure 5 shows that 
aggregate income is highly susceptible to changes in age structure. 
It also shows what a huge benefit it was to the aggregate bottom line 
that employment rates increased for persons aged 55 and over between 
2003–04 and 2009–10. In relation to the fiscal bottom line, more 
children are a problem in the short-term because their income is far 
less than their consumption. But further out, the additional children 
already born since the 2003 IGR was published enter the labour force 
just at the time that the baby boom generation hits the old-old ages. 
This will have obvious benefits for the fiscal outcome. Furthermore, 
the additional children have been born to more educated women 
and to skilled migrants, thus we can expect them to have high levels 
of human capital when they hit the labour market.
The shape of income and expenditure for governments (Figure 6) 
is  a  little different from the aggregate (private and public) income 
and expenditure shown in Figure 4. Government expenditure is 
higher for children than for working-age Australians and rises with 
age from age 25 onwards and sharply from age 60 onwards. Taxation 
revenue mirrors the aggregate income curve of Figure 4 except 
for the fact that children and older people are also tax generators. 
This is particularly  the case in relation to the Goods and Services 
Tax (GST). In  2009–10 dollars, the average 13-year-old generated 
$1,500 per annum in GST and it would be a lot more if the GST was 
levied on fresh food and education, both major private expenditures 
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for 13-year-olds. The average 80-year-old also pays about $1,500 in 
GST and this also would be a lot more if the GST covered fresh food. 
Income tax, not unexpectedly, is closely related to income-earning and 
this is the key reason that changes in age structure put governments 
under fiscal pressure.
In summary, the income side of the government’s fiscal situation is 
much more sensitive to changes in age structure than is the expenditure 
side. It is important that government expenditure is efficient and 
equitable and there are many improvements that can be made in this 
regard, but given the sensitivity of budgets to income rather than 
to expenditure as the age structure changes and with the successive 
IGRs consistently showing massive increases in living standards over 
the 40 years, it seems reasonable to think that much of the solution 
to population ageing may lie on the income side of the equation. 
Aside from taxation, the income side of the government’s equation 
is aided by migration and by increases in labour force participation, 
and government fiscal outcomes swing massively on future growth 
in labour productivity. All three of the three Ps (productivity, 
participation and population),  therefore, have important impacts 
in the context of population ageing.
The impact of immigration on future 
GDP per capita
Per capita gross domestic product, a frequently used measure of 
living standard, is the product of the employment to population ratio 
and output per worker. If the employment to population ratio falls 
because of population ageing, GDP per capita will also fall unless there 
is a commensurate rise in output per worker (labour productivity). 
However, the Australian employment to population ratio rises with 
increases in migration (McDonald and Temple 2013). This means 
that if labour productivity is at least as high for migrants as it is for 
non-migrants, migration will increase the growth rate of GDP per 
capita. The effect of varying migration levels upon the future growth 
rate of GDP per capita in Australia is shown in Figure 7, under the 
assumption that labour productivity is the same for migrants as for 
non-migrants, and its growth rate is constant across the projection 
period at 1.6 per  cent per annum. The ageing of the population 
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(fall  in the employment to population ratio) has a large impact on 
the growth rate of GDP per capita between 2013 and 2023 because 
of the retirement from the labour force of the baby boom generation. 
For example, with zero migration, the growth rate of GDP per capita 
would fall from 1.83 per cent in 2013 to 1.33 per cent in 2023 simply 
because of the ageing of the population. The figure shows that this 
impact is mitigated to a meaningful extent by migration both in the 
short-term and the long-term. The impact of the additional births 
to migrants has an evident secondary impact on the growth of GDP 
per capita in the 2030s and 2040s.
Beyond this employment to population ratio effect on the growth of 
GDP per capita, if migrants are more skilled than non-migrants or if 
migrants fill pivotal roles in new investment endeavours, migration 
will also have the effect of increasing labour productivity. There is 
some evidence that this is the case in that the education levels of 
migrants are well above the general education level of the population. 
Furthermore, contrary to the popular perception, two studies have 
shown that migration in Australia, through its stimulatory effects, 
increases the wages of low-wage workers (Peri, Docquier and Ozden 
2010; Migration Council of Australia 2015). In the international 
comparative study, this result was only evident for two countries, 
Australia and Singapore, both of which run large skilled migration 
programs (Peri, Docquier and Ozden 2010).
There is also an argument that young workers are an important source 
of economic dynamism and that they are the assimilators of new 
technology in each era of new technology (McDonald and Temple 
2006). The skilled migration program that Australia runs substantially 
shifts the median age of the labour force to a younger age than would 
be the case with no migration. Many new skilled immigrants are 
recent graduates of the Australian university system and therefore 
can be expected to have skills that are well honed to the needs of 
the Australian labour market (Migration Council of Australia 2015). 
Over the next 40 years, largely because of migration, Australia will 
experience significant increases in the number of its young workers. 
Many other OECD countries will experience the opposite: rapidly 
declining numbers in the young working ages.
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International comparisons of population 
ageing
Among OECD countries, there is a bifurcation of countries according 
to the current level of fertility. One set of countries, that includes all 
of the Nordic countries, all of the English-speaking countries and 
all of the French- and Dutch-speaking countries, have fertility rates 
of 1.7 births per woman and above. The other set of countries, that 
includes all of the Southern European countries, all of the German-
speaking countries and all of the advanced East Asian countries 
(including China), have fertility rates that are below 1.5 births per 
woman (McDonald 2006). Population ageing is much more severe in 
countries with very low fertility. 
Across countries, there is considerable variation in the speed and 
extent of population ageing. Essentially, there are two groups of 
countries: those where fertility fell to near-replacement level by the 
1930s and those where fertility has fallen from the 1950s onwards. 
For the first group of countries, essentially European countries and 
the advanced English-speaking countries, the most rapid period of 
ageing is from 2010 to 2030, mainly because most of these countries 
experienced post-war baby booms and all have experienced falls in 
mortality rates at older ages since the 1970s. The baby boom was 
largest in the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
and moderately large in almost all Western and Northern European 
countries but small in the Southern European countries (van Bavel and 
Reher 2013). However, as described above for Australia, contemporary 
ageing is also affected by the levels of fertility and migration since the 
1970s. Variations in ageing across these countries from 2010 to 2030 are 
shown in Figure 8. By 2030, Australia will be the ‘youngest’ of all of 
these countries according to the United Nations, followed by the other 
English-speaking countries and then the Nordic countries. As these 
were the countries that had the largest baby booms, it is evident that 
the relatively high levels of fertility in all of these countries, and for 
some high levels of migration, have offset the ageing effect of the baby 
boom generation to some extent. Despite relatively low fertility and 
a sizeable baby boom, Switzerland ages only slowly between 2010 and 
2030 because of its expected high levels of migration. The ‘oldest’ of 
these countries will be Italy and Germany because of sustained low 
levels of fertility.
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Figure 8. Percentage of population aged 65 years and over, 
2010 and 2030
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division: esa.
un .org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel_indicators .htm .
In the countries where fertility has fallen from high levels only since 
the 1950s, ageing is determined by the speed, recentness and level 
of the country’s fertility decline. When the fertility rate falls rapidly, 
a large generation is followed fairly closely by a small generation. When 
the large generation reaches the older ages the subsequent smaller 
generations are in the working ages, leading to rapid population 
ageing. The recentness of the fertility decline, of course, determines the 
time at which the large generation reaches the older ages. Finally, the 
extent of the fertility decline, the most important of the three factors, 
determines the difference in the sizes of the successive generations. 
There seems also to be a relationship between the speed and the level 
of the decline. Countries that experienced a very rapid fall in fertility 
tend also to be the countries where fertility has fallen to very low 
levels (under 1.5 births per woman).
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Figure 9 shows the extent of ageing across selected Asian countries 
from 2010 to 2050. In the countries where ageing is not so prominent 
in 2050 (the Philippines, India, Indonesia and Malaysia), fertility 
has fallen slowly over the past 40–50 years and still remains above 
the replacement level. For the other countries in Figure 9 (except 
for Japan), the extent of population ageing is very great in the next 
40 years. This is because fertility fell very rapidly between 1970 and 
2000 in these countries and, in China,2 Singapore, Thailand and Korea, 
fertility has fallen to very low levels. Japan was older in 2010 than 
most of the countries in Figure 8 will be in 2030, and it gets much 
older over the next 50 years. This is essentially the result of very low 
fertility sustained over a long period.
Figure 9. Percentage of population aged 65 years and over, 
2010 and 2050
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. esa.
un .org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel_indicators .htm .
2  The Wittgenstein Centre also produces population projections for all countries of the 
world. Its projection of the percentage of the population of China aged 65 years and over in 2050 
(28 per cent) is much higher than the United Nations level shown in Figure 9 (23 per cent) (Lutz, 
Butz and KC 2014). The two agencies differ on what is the current level of fertility in China. 
I consider that the Wittgenstein Centre estimate is more reliable. Differences for other countries 
shown in Figures 8 and 9 are small.
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Figure 10. The 2050 age distribution of Japan
Source: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (2002): 11 .
The age distribution of Japan in 2050 (Figure 10) contrasts dramatically 
with that of Australia (Figure 4). In Japan in 2050, the largest numbers 
of people are aged between 75 and 80 and the age structure tapers 
downwards with ever smaller numbers as the age gets younger. 
The working-age population is comparatively old with a considerable 
shortage of young workers. This age structure has been referred to 
as the ‘coffin’ shape (McDonald and Kippen 1999) and, indeed, if the 
demography of Japan were to remain unchanged, the population 
would largely disappear in the 100 years after 2050. For many years, 
the Government of Japan has been attempting to raise the fertility rate 
so that the longer-term future is rosier than this, but, to date, fertility 
has remained below 1.5 births per woman and Japan is still heading 
on this trajectory. If the fertility rate were to increase in the future, the 
Japanese economy would still face a major struggle to support its aged 
population before the new larger generation reached the labour force 
ages. There are no easy solutions to this dilemma, especially when 
Japan already has a high debt to GDP ratio.
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Concluding remark
The Intergenerational Reports produced by the Department of 
Treasury have focused on the challenges that Australia faces because 
of population ageing. These challenges are addressed in other chapters. 
However, it is important to note that with every successive IGR, 
the projected population is relatively younger than in the previous 
one. This is because the Australian fertility rate has risen and is 
close to the replacement rate and because the level of international 
migration has increased substantially. It is important that these 
favourable demographic trends continue. As shown in the analysis 
above, by 2030, Australia will be the youngest among the English-
speaking countries and the countries of Western Europe. It will also 
be younger than many of the current advanced economies in Asia. 
Thus, from the demographic perspective, Australia is in a favourable 
position. This  means that accommodating to population ageing 
becomes a  matter of long-term sensible planning not hasty short-
term fixes.
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Declining fertility and the rising 
costs of children and the elderly 
in Japan and other selected 
Asian countries: An analysis 
based upon the NTA approach
Naohiro Ogawa, Rikiya Matsukura and Sang-Hyop Lee
Since the late 1960s, the growth of the world population has been 
steadily slowing down, primarily owing to an almost worldwide 
decline of fertility. Because of the reduction in world population 
growth rates in the second half of the 20th century, the outlook we 
have today is substantially different from the one we had a few decades 
ago. It is often mentioned by some demographers that while the 20th 
century was the century of ‘population explosion’, the 21st is likely to 
become the century of ‘population ageing’ (Lutz et al. 2004).
At present, 60 per cent of the world population resides in Asia, and, of 
this percentage, almost half live in societies with below-replacement 
fertility. In particular, East Asia’s fertility has been at the lowest 
level in the world in recent decades. In addition, mortality has been 
steadily improving over the past several decades, particularly in East 
and Southeast Asia. As a consequence of these demographic shifts, 
numerous Asian countries have been experiencing rapid population 
ageing, which is also being reflected in the increasing number of 
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reports on a host of population ageing–related problems in the popular 
press in these countries. To address these ageing-related issues, a new 
analytical methodology called National Transfer Accounts (NTA) has 
been developed in the past 10 years (Lee and Mason 2011).
By drawing heavily upon the NTA system, Ogawa et al. (2015) have 
recently attempted to (1) examine, on the basis of a pool of time-series 
data, primarily from three low-fertility East Asian countries or areas 
(Japan, South Korea and Taiwan), the nexus between the direct public 
and private costs of children and the number of children that parents 
would raise during their reproductive span; and (2) investigate whether 
or not there exists a competing relationship between the young and 
the aged as recipients of private and public financial resources in 
the three East Asian countries. Along a similar line of interest, this 
chapter will expand the scope of analysis by adding a few more Asian 
countries (China, India, Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam) and 
by utilising more recent data for Japan and South Korea. 
In the next section, we briefly highlight fertility, mortality and age 
compositional transformations that occurred over the last few decades 
in Japan and neighbouring East Asian countries (South Korea and 
Taiwan). In the subsequent section, some of the basic features of the 
system of NTA, which serves as the basic analytical framework of the 
present study, are succinctly presented. Following the NTA approach, 
we then analyse, for illustrative purposes, Japan’s changing pattern 
of intergenerational transfers, both public and familial, over the past 
25 years, especially focusing on the cost of children and the elderly. 
By combining computational results for Japan with those for seven 
other selected Asian countries (South Korea, Taiwan, China, India, 
Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam), we estimate the relationship 
between the cost of children and the fertility rate in those economies. 
In addition, we test, by employing a pooled dataset on the cost of 
children and the cost of the elderly, the applicability of the ‘crowding 
out’ hypothesis to these selected Asian countries. The final section 
summarises the major findings in the present study. 
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Declining fertility and population ageing 
in East Asia
According to the most recent vital statistics available in the three East 
Asian countries, Taiwan’s Total Fertility Rate (TFR) for 2013 was 1.07 
children, the lowest among the three nations, followed by South Korea 
(1.24 children for 2014) and Japan (1.43 children for 2013). In hope of 
raising fertility, the three East Asian countries have been implementing 
a wide range of pronatalist policies and programs, but have had only 
limited success so far (Retherford and Ogawa 2009; Ogawa et al. 2015).
In Asia as a whole, Japan was the first country to experience a steep 
fertility decline. Furthermore, the magnitude of Japan’s TFR decline, 
which occurred in post-war years, was one of the greatest among all 
industrialised nations. In fact, following a short baby boom period 
(1947–49), Japan’s TFR declined by more than 50 per cent, from 4.54 to 
2.04, during 1947–57. This dramatic reduction of fertility over a single 
decade is the first such experience in recorded history. Subsequent to 
this unprecedented fertility reduction in the 1950s, there were only 
minor fluctuations around the replacement level until the first oil 
crisis of 1973. Thereafter, the TFR started to fall again, hitting the 1.26 
mark in 2005, which was an all-time low in Japan’s modern history. It 
should be noted, however, that, after 2005, the Japanese TFR slowly 
recovered to 1.43 in 2013. Nonetheless, if fertility were to remain 
constant at the current level, each new generation would decline by 
31 per cent. 
East Asia’s rapidly declining fertility has been attracting a substantial 
amount of attention, inside and outside the region in the past few 
decades. In contrast, however, a relatively limited amount of attention 
has been paid to the rapidity with which the mortality transition has 
been under way in the region over the past several decades. Japan’s 
unprecedented mortality transition is a good illustration. Japan’s life 
expectancy at birth in 1960 was 65.3 years for men and 70.2 years 
for women, and these two values were the lowest life expectancies 
among the OECD member countries at that time (Mason and Ogawa 
2001). However, by the mid-1970s, Japanese life expectancy for 
both sexes combined became one of the highest among the OECD 
members. In 2013, Japan’s male life expectancy at birth exceeded 
80.2 years to become the fourth highest in the world, while its female 
POPuLATION AGEING AND AuSTRALIA'S FuTuRE
88
life expectancy rose to 86.6 years, the highest in the world (National 
Institute of Population and Social Security Research 2015). As regards 
South Korea and Taiwan, the corresponding figures for females in 
2013 were 85.1 and 82.8 years, respectively, and for males, 78.5 and 
76.4  years (Statistics Korea n.d.; Department of Statistics, Ministry 
of the Interior, Republic of China (Taiwan) n.d.). 
Because of such long-term transformations in both fertility and 
mortality, the age structures of the three East Asian economies have 
been shifting to a marked extent. In the case of Japan, the proportion 
of those aged 65 and over increased from 4.9 per cent in 1950 to 
24.1  per  cent in 2014, which indicates that Japan’s population is 
currently the oldest in the world. In sharp contrast, the number of 
those aged below 15 has been declining for 33 consecutive years from 
1982 to 2014, and Japan now has fewer children than at any time 
in  the past 100 years (Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Communications, Japan 2015).
Moreover, although Japan’s elderly population reached the 10 per cent 
level in 1984 and was the last to do so among the industrialised 
nations, Japan became the first industrialised country in which 
the aged comprise more than 20 per cent of the total population. 
The length of time required for the increase from 10 to 20 per cent was 
only 21 years. Compared with European countries such as Sweden and 
Norway, Japan is ageing approximately three times as fast. In addition, 
in the first half of the 21st century, both South Korea and Taiwan are 
projected to age faster than Japan despite the fact that the onset of the 
population ageing phenomena there came with a delay compared to 
Japan, with Taiwan catching up with Japan by 2054, and South Korea 
by 2059 (Ogawa et al. 2015)
What can the National Transfer Accounts 
(NTA) do?
With a view to analysing a host of socioeconomic and demographic 
problems caused by age structural transformation, the NTA Global 
Project, an international collaborative research project, was launched 
a few years after the turn of the century. At present, a total of 
46  countries, including Australia, are participating. The project’s 
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principal objective is to develop the NTA, a methodological system for 
measuring economic flows across age groups, for each of the member 
countries. 
Societies take different approaches to reallocating resources from 
surplus to deficit ages, and there are two possible methods. One is 
reliance on capital markets. Namely, individuals accumulate capital 
during their working lives and, when they are no longer productive, 
they support their consumption in old age by relying on capital income 
(interest, dividends, rental income, profits, etc.) and by liquidating 
their assets. The other method relies on transfers from those at surplus 
ages to those at deficit ages. Some of these transfers are mediated by 
the public sector, but many are private transfers, of which familial 
transfers are most important. The material needs of young children 
are fulfilled mostly by their parents, which is true everywhere in 
the world. In most Asian societies, familial transfers between adult 
children and the elderly are also very important. Some of these 
transfers are between households, but intra-household transfers 
seem to be of more importance, since family members in Asia tend to 
form multigeneration households that involve large intergenerational 
transfers. 
The NTA provides a comprehensive framework for estimating 
consumption, production, and resource reallocations by age. 
The  accounts are constructed so as to be consistent with and 
complementary to the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). 
The NTA are being constructed with sufficient historical depth to 
allow for analysis of key features of the transfer system, and can also 
be projected into the future and thus enable us to analyse the economic 
and policy implications of future demographic changes. Furthermore, 
sectoral disaggregation allows the analysis of public and private 
education and health care spending. It should be noted, however, that 
no gender differentiation is incorporated in the NTA system, except 
in an experimental way.
It is worth noting that a comprehensive volume containing numerous 
NTA country reports, and several chapters on the methodological basis 
of NTA and intercountry comparative analysis on selected topics, has 
already been published (Lee and Mason 2011). Furthermore, an NTA 
manual was published by the United Nations Population Division in 
2013, intended for national experts and planners who are interested 
in constructing the NTA system for their country.
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Calculating the private and public costs 
of children and the elderly
(a) Plausible theoretical links between the costs 
of children and the elderly 
According to the data gleaned in the three most recent rounds 
(2002, 2005, 2010, Kaneko et al. 2008 and NIPSSR 2011) of the Japanese 
National Fertility Survey conducted by the National Institute of 
Population and Social Security Research (NIPSSR), the high cost of 
children remains the most important reason for having fewer children 
among married women of reproductive age below 50. The survey 
respondents were asked to select as many possible replies as they 
wished from 13 precoded responses in order to explain why they 
did not intend to have their ideal number of children. The response 
category that attracted the largest number of responses was ‘because 
rearing and educating children requires too much money’. 
The foregoing result is consistent with what Becker’s economic theory 
of fertility (1960, 1981) states. According to an essential idea of the 
Becker model, if parents spend a greater amount of resources on a child, 
they derive greater satisfaction because the child is of ‘higher quality’. 
In Becker’s fertility model, to increase the amount of satisfaction 
in the conditions where there is a higher private cost for having 
children, the parents opt for the substitution of quality for quantity of 
children, thus operating to decrease fertility. Consequently, Becker’s 
model suggests that there exists a trade-off between the number of 
children in the family and the quality of children. It should also be 
stressed that, besides private costs of children, public spending on 
children may also play an important role in determining the quality 
and quantity of children parents have. For example, subsidising the 
quality of children reduces the private cost of acquiring high-quality 
children, thus leading to higher fertility.
More importantly, the trade-off between spending and the number of 
children is related to generational equity. Preston (1984) has raised the 
possibility that population ageing will lead to a decline in the welfare 
of children relative to the welfare of the elderly. In Japan, the cost 
of the elderly has been rising in parallel with the cost of children, 
partly owing to the maturity of the pension programs (Ogawa and 
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Retherford 1997; Ogawa, Chawla and Matsukura 2010). In addition, 
as  a consequence of the increased political power of the elderly 
induced by rapid population ageing, and due to the fact that the 
Japanese government’s budgetary resources are severely constrained, 
it is highly conceivable that a ‘crowding out’ effect between the 
resources directed to the young and to the elderly might be occurring.
(b) Age-specific profiles of per capita private and 
public consumption for children and the elderly
Before proceeding any further, it should be pointed out that a fuller 
explanation of the NTA’s basic concepts, containing the crucial 
computational assumptions, definitions of other key variables, and 
the theoretical consideration behind each key equation is available on 
the NTA website (www.ntaccounts.org). In this subsection, therefore, 
we confine ourselves to discussing primarily how the direct public 
and private costs of rearing children and supporting the elderly are 
computed in the NTA system. 
In NTA, consumption, both private and public, is comprised of 
education, health, and other consumption (food, clothing, housing, 
durables, etc.). Moreover, because the young population, particularly 
at school ages, has little or no labour income, its consumption is 
virtually equal to the direct costs of raising children. In contrast, the 
direct living costs of the elderly need to be calculated as a difference 
between their consumption and labour income. In addition, it should 
be noted that, although the foregone income is an important part of 
the costs to be incurred in rearing children and taking care of elderly 
persons, it falls outside the scope of this paper. 
The age-specific profile of the per capita private education cost 
is estimated by applying a regression equation to the micro-level 
data gathered in a nationally representative household income and 
expenditure survey. In the case of Japan, the equation is applied to 
the six rounds (1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009) of the National 
Survey of Family Income and Expenditure (NSFIE), carried out by 
the Statistics Bureau of Japan. Similarly, the age-specific profile of the 
per  capita private health care cost is also estimated on the basis of 
the same survey data, using a similar regression equation. 
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Furthermore, the age-specific profile of the per capita cost of private 
consumption, excluding private education and health, is estimated 
by a relatively simple a priori method, as shown below: 
 
(1)
Where (a) = equivalence scale of age group a and D(z) is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 when condition z is met, but is 
otherwise zero. The computed equivalence scales at varying ages are 
as follows: 0.4 for the age group 0–4, and 1.0 for the age group 20 and 
over, whereas the scale values for the age group 5–19 increase linearly 
with age. 
Now, let us discuss the public costs of children and the elderly. 
The  age-specific profile of the per capita public education cost 
is computed by utilising the published data on the government 
expenditure for each level of education and the number of pupils and 
students at each level of education in 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 and 
2009. The age-specific profile of the per capita health care expenditure 
is estimated on the basis of published government data concerning 
age-specific outpatient and inpatient costs per case and age-specific 
incidence of receiving such medical treatments. In the case of per 
capita expenditure on public consumption in general (e.g. government 
employees’ salaries, road maintenance costs, national defence, etc.), 
we assume that every person consumes equally, and simply divide the 
total annual expenditure for each component of public consumption, 
except for education and health, by the total population. 
Using these computed results for age-specific profiles of various 
components of consumption, we estimate the age-specific profile of 
per capita consumption for 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009, 
private and public sectors combined. In Figure 1, we have plotted 
for illustrative purposes the estimated results of per capita total 
consumption only for three selected years (1984, 1994 and 2009). 
For comparative purposes, we have also plotted the corresponding 
age-specific profiles of per capita production (labour income) for the 
three selected years. (For a more detailed methodological explanation 
pertaining to the per capita production profiles, see Ogawa, Mason, 
Chawla and Matsukura 2010). It should be also noted that these 
estimated results are expressed in terms of year 2000 constant prices.
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Figure 1. Age specific profiles for per capita consumption (C) 
and production (YL): Japan, 1984, 1994 and 2009
Source: Provided by author .
A few points of interest can be derived from this graphical exposition. 
First, by drawing upon information contained in Figure 1, we can 
calculate the size of income-consumption deficits by age in 1984, 1994 
and 2009. Throughout the time under review, as shown in Figure 2, 
there are sizeable income-consumption deficits at both young and 
older lifecycle stages. Obviously, these lifecycle deficits (LCD) must be 
covered, with reallocations coming largely from the surplus of income 
generated at the lifecycle surplus stage during the current period or 
from assets accumulated during previous periods. 
Second, it is also worth noting in Figure 1 that the age at which 
an average individual shifts from a net consumer to a net producer 
gradually increased from 23 years old in 1984 to 25 in 1994, and 29 in 
2009. At the other end of the lifecycle, the age transition from a net 
producer to a net consumer was postponed only marginally from 
58 years old in 1984 to 60 in 2009. The fact that the shift in the crossing 
age at the later stage of lifecycle was relatively small is attributable to 
the existence of the mandatory retirement age. (It should be noted, 
however, that as a result of a new legislation, the retirement age 
in Japan was gradually raised from 60 to 65 between 2006 and 2013.)
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Third, the age-profiles of per capita consumption were rising almost 
continuously over time. The 1984 and 1994 age-profiles show a mildly 
shaped double hump, being high at both young and older ages. 
The first peak corresponds to the high costs of the young, while the 
second peak is related to the high costs shouldered by household heads 
under multigenerational living arrangements. In addition, it is worth 
noting that the amount of per capita consumption rose distinctly 
among those aged 65 and over in 2009. This can be accounted for by 
the implementation of the Long-term Care Insurance (LTCI) scheme, 
starting from the year 2000. In-home care for the frail elderly, which 
had until then been informally provided by family members, thus 
became formalised as a part of the market economy. As a result, Japan’s 
per capita consumption profiles have, over time, become more similar 
to those of the United States, Sweden and Costa Rica, among the NTA 
member countries (Tung 2011).
Figure 2. Lifecycle deficits: Japan. 1984, 1994 and 2009
Source: Provided by author .
(c) Changing pattern of lifecycle deficits and total 
reallocations
As is widely described in numerous publications pertaining to the 
system of NTA, the accounts measure intergenerational flows for 
a certain period of time (usually a calendar or fiscal year), and are 
governed by the following relationship:
95
5 . DECLINING FERTILITy AND THE RISING COSTS OF CHILDREN AND THE ELDERLy
 (2)
Where = labour income; = asset income; t = public transfer 
inflows; t = private transfer inflows; C = consumption; S = saving; 
t = public transfer outflows to the government; and t = private 
transfer outflows. Rearranging terms in Equation (2), the LCD, which 
is the difference between consumption and production, is matched 
by age reallocations consisting of reallocations through assets and net 
transfers, as expressed below:
 
(3)
Furthermore, to gain further insight into Equation (3), we can express 
the mathematical relationship by using the relevant data for 2009 as 
illustrated in Figure 3. In this graphical exposition, the vertical scale 
represents age-specific per capita deficit, which corresponds to the 
difference between per capita consumption and per capita production 
at each age. It should be further noted that the graph indicating the 
age-specific aggregate-level deficit takes into consideration the number 
of persons at each age, thus showing a pattern substantially different 
from the one displayed in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Total reallocations: Lifecycle deficits (LCD)
Source: Provided by author .
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At this point, caution should be exercised with regard to the following 
two remarks. First, both ‘familial transfers’ and ‘private transfers’ 
are used interchangeably in this paper; both of them refer to private 
transfers received by households from any source, of which the 
predominant share is, surely, familial transfers. Second, although net 
private transfers are comprised of bequests and inter vivo transfers, 
the computation of the bequest component has not been completed at 
the time of writing. For this reason, bequests are excluded from the 
computational results reported here.
By applying the time-series data for Japan to Figure 3, we have 
produced Figure 4, which shows how the pattern of three components 
of reallocation of the LCD changed in Japan over the past 25 years. 
The  three components are reallocations through assets, public 
transfers,  and private transfers, measured on an annual basis. 
Panels A, B and C illustrate annual reallocations of the LCD observed 
in 1984, 1994 and 2009. 
A brief comparison of the three panels reveals the following three 
important results. First, there was a marked increase in the impact of 
the rapid growth of the elderly population upon transfers over time. 
The amount of net total transfers given to the elderly aged 65 and 
over increased by 3.5 times from 1984 to 2009. Concretely, the amount 
of net public transfers to the elderly grew 5.4 times in real terms 
over this time period. It is also worth noting that the role of asset 
reallocations in financing the lifecycle deficits has become extremely 
important among the elderly population—the amount of asset-based 
reallocations increased by 12 times in real terms during 1984–2009. 
In the face of such phenomenal growth of the importance of asset-
based allocations, however, the total amount of net public transfers 
dominated that of asset allocations in the elderly population in 2009.
Second, despite the shrinking of the young population, the total 
amount  of net transfers to the population group aged 0–19 grew 
by 8  per  cent during 1984–2009. It should also be added that the 
composition of the net transfers changed considerably over time. 
That  is, during 1984–2009, the amount of net public transfers 
given to this age group rose by 37 per cent in real terms, while the 
corresponding figure for net familial transfers declined by 13 per cent. 
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Figure 4. Changing pattern of three components of per capita 
reallocation of lifecycle deficit: Japan. (a) 1984, (b) 1994, and (c) 2004. 
Source: Provided by author .
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Third and more important, the net familial transfers are negative 
among relatively young elderly persons. As indicated by a circle in 
Panel C of Figure 4, this phenomenon is particularly pronounced in 
2009 among the elderly in their 60s and 70s. This implies that the 
amount of financial assistance that the relatively young elderly persons 
provided to their adult children and/or grandchildren exceeded the 
monetary assistance from the latter to the former. It is also worth 
noting that the amount of these negative net familial transfers from the 
relatively young elderly to other age groups rose during the prolonged 
deflationary period beginning from the mid-1990s. Up until the early 
2010s, the unemployment rate remained at a high level and labour 
income hardly grew at all in both nominal and real terms. 
Rising per capita costs of children and the 
elderly in selected Asian countries
To facilitate our analysis in this section, we define the following two 
new variables: ‘the child LCD’ and ‘the elderly LCD’. The former 
represents the per capita direct cost of raising children up to their 
self-sufficient ages, i.e. the age at which the age-specific LCD shifts 
from positive to negative, based upon the system of NTA. The latter 
represents the per capita direct cost of the elderly from the age at 
which they cease to be self-sufficient up to the age of their death. 
The per capita direct cost of the elderly corresponds to the sum of the 
age-specific LCD, computed as consumption minus production.
(a) Spending per child and the number of children 
in Japan and other selected Asian countries
As previously discussed, one of the most crucial concepts in the 
economics of fertility is the trade-off between the spending per 
child and the number of children, and this idea is fully embedded 
in Becker’s model of fertility decision-making (Becker 1960, 1981). 
Becker’s theory states that higher income leads to an increase in the 
demand for higher-quality children and a more modest increase in the 
demand for the number of children (quantity). But because higher-
quality children are costly, this leads couples to substitute away from 
quantity. In other words, the basic trade-off has to do with private costs 
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of children, i.e. costs borne by the fertility decision-makers (parents). 
Moreover, public spending on children may play an important role 
as well. For instance, with the provision of government subsidies for 
improving the quality of children, the private cost of acquiring high-
quality children is likely to be reduced, which may result in raising 
fertility.
As mentioned in the previous section, the child LCD is the consumption 
of children (both public and private) minus the value of labour by 
children, i.e. the cost that children themselves cover. The child LCD 
is calculated for single years of age and can be used to construct a 
synthetic cohort measure of the cost of children. It represents the 
direct cost of children, assuming that they were raised from birth to 
adulthood consuming and producing at the same age-specific rates 
that prevailed in the year in question. 
We normalise the child LCD by dividing it by the mean labour income 
of prime-age adults aged 30–49. This facilitates comparison across 
countries and also indirectly controls for the effects of income on 
child spending. In order to allow for mortality risks in childhood, 
we have also adjusted the normalised child LCD, by using appropriate 
life table values. Thus, the computed values can be interpreted as the 
years of prime-age adult labour devoted to rearing a child from birth 
to economic independence, or to the child’s death, should that occur 
during childhood. 
Using the computed results of the child LCD per person below a self-
sufficient age and the mean per capita labour income of adults aged 
30–49 for Japan, we have calculated the normalised per capita child 
LCD adjusted for survivorship up from birth to the self-supporting 
age in 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009. The calculated values 
increased monotonically over time, namely, 9.6 years of labour income 
in 1984, 10.3 years in 1989, 10.9 years in 1994, 11.9 years in 1999, 
13.0  years in 2004, and 14.1 years in 2009. In addition, we have 
carried out the same computation for Taiwan (1981–2005) and South 
Korea (1996–2010). In the case of Taiwan, the normalised per capita 
child LCD adjusted for survivorship increased almost continuously 
from 7.7 years in 1981 to 16.6 years in 2005. In the case of South 
Korea, the corresponding value rose linearly from 9.0 years in 1996 to 
14.1 years in 2010. Besides these three East Asian countries, we have 
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included in the analysis the normalised per capita child LCD adjusted 
for survivorship for the following five Asian countries: China in 
2002 (6.5 years of the mean labour income), India in 2004 (9.0 years), 
Thailand over the period 1981–2004 (from 8.0 years to 10.4 years), 
the Philippines in 1999 (7.8 years), and Vietnam in 2008 (8.5 years). 
In order to quantitatively examine the trade-off between spending 
on children and the number of children, we have pooled the 
results on the child LCD derived from the eight countries, and have 
linked them to the time-series data on TFR for each country under 
investigation. In  the case of Japan, TFR declined considerably from 
1.81 in 1984 to 1.37 in 2009. Taiwan’s TFR declined substantially from 
2.46 to 1.12 from 1981 to 2005, while South Korea’s TFR fell from 1.60 
to 1.22 during the period 1996–2010. In the case of Thailand, the TFR 
declined from 3.69 in 1981 to 1.66 in 2004. TFRs for the remaining 
four countries were as follows: 1.82 for China, 2.85 for India, 3.56 for 
the Philippines, and 2.08 for Vietnam.
In Figure 5, a total of 51 data points of the normalised per capita 
child LCD for the eight Asian economies for various years are plotted, 
coupled with the TFR for the corresponding years. As displayed in 
this graph, we have fitted the data by regressing the natural logarithm 
of the normalised per capita child LCD onto the natural logarithm of 
the TFR and, hence, the coefficient is the elasticity of the quality–
quantity trade-off. 
As is well-known, a coefficient of –1 implies that a 1 percentage point 
decrease in the number of children is accompanied by a 1 percentage 
point increase in the cost of children and, hence, the total change in 
spending by adults on childrearing remains constant. As presented 
in Figure 5, the estimated elasticity for the eight Asian countries 
combined is –0.698, implying that a 1 percentage point decrease in 
the TFR leads to a less than 1 percentage point increase in the total cost 
of childrearing per adult. 
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Figure 5. TFR versus normalised per capita LCD for children: 
Selected Asian countries
Source: Provided by author .
This result has changed dramatically once we have undertaken 
a  regression analysis, as displayed in Figure 6, by focusing on the 
relationship between the human capital component (education and 
health costs) of per capita child LCD and the TFR. It should be noted 
that, except for the fact that we have used the human capital component 
of the per capita child LCD in place of the per capita child LCD as 
a whole, all the data points plotted in Figure 6 have been constructed 
in the same manner as in Figure 5. The regression result indicates that 
the computed elasticity (–1.512) is much larger than the one shown 
in Figure 5 for the total cost of children. This elasticity is also much 
larger than the cross-sectional elasticity reported by Lee and Mason 
(2010). In addition, the goodness of fit, as measured by adjusted R2, 
is better in the case of the computed result shown in Figure 6 than in 
Figure 5. Hence, the health and education components of per capita 
child LCD are more closely linked to fertility change than the other 
components of child LCD. This finding is consistent with the widely 
held view that human capital factors have been playing an important 
role in the relationship between economic growth and fertility change 
in Asian countries, particularly in East Asia (Ogawa, Retherford and 
Matsukura 2009; McDonald 2009).
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Figure 6. TFR versus normalised per capita human capital spending 
for children: Selected Asian countries
Source: Provided by author .
For the purpose of shedding more light on the nexus between 
human capital factors and fertility, we have conducted the following 
two additional regressions for the eight Asian countries. In one of 
them, we  have fitted the data by regressing the natural logarithm 
of  normalised per capita public human capital spending onto the 
natural logarithm of the TFR. In the other regression, the natural 
logarithm of normalised per capita private human capital spending 
has been regressed on the natural logarithm of the TFR. The results of 
these regressions, not detailed here, indicate that both the public and 
private components of human capital spending have fairly comparable 
association with fertility, i.e. the elasticity of –1.302 for public human 
capital spending and the elasticity of –1.618 for private human capital 
spending. 
These computational results appear to be inconsistent with those 
obtained in the work recently undertaken by Lee and Mason. In their 
recent analysis of NTA data covering 19 countries (including not only 
Asian, but also European and Latin American countries), Lee  and 
Mason (2010) have found that the quantity–quality trade-off is very 
strong for public spending (particularly on education) but not for 
private human capital spending. As displayed in Table 1, however, 
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private human capital spending (particularly education) tends to 
be very large, and even exceeds public human capital spending 
in the Asian  economies, particularly in such East and Southeast 
Asian countries as South Korea, Taiwan, China, and Vietnam. More 
importantly, it should be noted that primarily because East and 
Southeast Asia are ‘success-oriented’ societies, parents in this region 
are prone to spend a vast amount of financial resources on their 
children’s education (McDonald 2008). 
Table 1. Proportion of private spending in per capita educational costs 
for children and youths aged 0–24: Selected economies
Country Year Percentage
Sweden 2003 3 .1
France 2001 5 .0
Austria 2000 5 .8
Slovenia 2004 8 .7
Hungary 2005 11 .1
uS 2003 17 .0
Costa Rica 2004 22 .3
Japan 2009 26 .0
India 2004 38 .9
Chile 1997 39 .4
Indonesia 2004 39 .6
uruguay 1994 46 .4
Philippines 1999 48 .2
South Korea 2005 51 .6
Taiwan 2005 69 .4
China 2002 71 .2
Vietnam 2008 75 .6
Source: Author’s calculations .
The regression results presented thus far appear to conform to the 
view that there is a distinctive trade-off between the number of 
children and the combined (familial and public) spending per child 
in East Asia. Caution should be exercised, however, in interpreting 
these  fitted results. It should be noted that all the regressions for 
the Asian countries are based upon a mix of cross-section and time-
series data heavily dominated by Taiwan. Given such limitations, 
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the fixes that are usually employed to deal with well-known statistical 
problems that limit the value of aggregate regression estimates are 
not practical in this case. Moreover, these regression results do not 
represent causal relationships. That is, the variable on the right-hand 
of the regressions is not necessarily an explanatory variable, while 
the variable on the left-hand of the regressions is not necessarily 
a dependent variable. Hence, the regressions estimated here should be 
treated only as descriptive device, thus making causal interpretation 
impossible. 
(b) The nexus between the per capita child LCD 
and the per capita elderly LCD 
In recent years, the cost of the elderly has also been rising in ageing 
Asia, particularly in East Asia (Takegawa 2005). A question therefore 
arises: is there a ‘crowding out’ effect between the resources going 
to the young and those allotted to the elderly? To shed some light 
on this question, we have calculated (1) how many years of the mean 
labour income of prime-age adults aged 30–49 is needed to finance the 
per capita LCD for a child, and (2) how many years of prime-age mean 
labour income is required to finance the per capita LCD for an elderly 
person. The data for the computation have been prepared for the same 
eight Asian countries in the same manner as in our foregoing analysis 
pertaining to the cost of children and fertility. 
The computed results are plotted in Figure 7. The pattern emerging 
from this graph seems to roughly indicate that both the cost of a child 
and the cost of an elderly person tend to grow in the same direction, 
thus suggesting that there is no distinctive ‘crowding out’ effect in 
these eight Asian economies. (The simple correlation coefficient 
between the two variables shown in this graph amounts to 0.791.) 
These results seem to suggest that in these Asian countries, working-
age adults are sandwiched by their elderly parents and their children, 
heavily relying on assets to meet their own material needs as well 
as their familial and social obligations to other generations. 
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Figure 7. Relationship between the cost of children and the cost 
of the elderly: Selected Asian countries
Source: Provided by author .
For comparative purposes, we have calculated the cost of a child and the 
cost of an elderly person for NTA member countries in other regions. 
Although relevant graphs are omitted, the following two observations 
can be safely made. First, in both Latin America and Africa, we found 
virtually the same pattern as the one prevailing in the selected Asian 
countries. Second, European countries show a totally different pattern 
from these developing countries, and the cross-sectional data gleaned 
from the European countries involved in the NTA project indicates 
that there is no significant relationship between the costs of the two 
age groups.
Concluding remarks
In the present study, we have examined the relationship between the 
cost of raising children up to self-supporting ages and the number of 
children parents have, by drawing heavily upon the computed results 
for the eight selected Asian countries. The results suggest that the two 
variables in question have a negative association in the case of these 
eight Asian economies, and that the calculated elasticity is –0.698. 
POPuLATION AGEING AND AuSTRALIA'S FuTuRE
106
More importantly, as regards the per capita child human capital costs 
and the TFR, the calculated elasticity amounts to –1.512, which 
suggests that, in the eight Asian countries under examination, the 
health and education component of the per capita child LCD is more 
closely linked to changes in fertility than the other components of the 
per capita child LCD.
So, what can the Asian economies with below-replacement fertility 
do to restore their fertility levels in the years to come? The fact that 
higher-quality children are costly leads couples to substitute away 
from quantity. This basic trade-off relationship between the quality 
and quantity of children plays a crucial role in determining the private 
cost of children defrayed by parents. Moreover, public spending on 
children also plays a vital role in this respect. By subsidising the 
quality of children through public resources, for example, the cost of 
acquiring high-quality children is reduced, and consequently higher 
fertility is encouraged. 
Apart from the provision of government subsidies for pronatalist 
purposes, the child LCD can also be reduced by lowering the self-
supporting ages. One of the possible policy measures for this purpose 
is creating more stable full-time job opportunities for young workers. 
In  the case of a shrinking population such as that of Japan, hourly 
labour productivity can be raised through better vocational and on-
the-job training. In addition, greater women’s labour force participation 
is another option, but methods for ameliorating the potential impact 
of female paid employment on fertility need to be carefully considered 
before implementing this policy option. 
The trade-off between the cost of children and the number of children 
is important not only in terms of formulating effective fertility policies 
but also from the standpoint of generational equity. As hypothesised 
by Preston (1984), population ageing induced by reduced fertility and 
extended longevity should lead to a decline in the welfare of children 
relative to the elderly. However, contrary to Preston’s hypothesis, 
one of the conclusions derived from our study is that the ‘crowding 
out’ phenomenon between children and the elderly competing for 
limited public and private resources could not be observed in the 
eight selected Asian countries in the past two decades or so. 
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Facing the challenges 
of an ageing society
Jan Pakulski
Since the mid-20th century the world’s population has been ageing, 
most noticeably in the most advanced (developed) societies, with 
social consequences so profound that they justify forging the concept 
of the ‘ageing society’. The ageing society emerges as a result of, 
principally, low fertility rates and decreasing mortality combined 
with increasing longevity. Sociologists and social demographers 
see such a  society as a harbinger of a shift to the ‘fourth stage’ of 
demographic transition, whereby birth and death rates stabilise at a 
low level and longevity increases (Cardwell 2006). Parallel to these 
processes, there are some changes in the social structure, economy, 
culture and politics, as well as attempts by governments to devise 
strategies of adaptation-cum-modification to meet the challenges 
posed by rapid ageing, such as a proliferation of ‘ageing problems’, 
a shrinking labour force, escalating costs of pensions and aged-
care services, and social-political conservatism. Australia’s relative 
success in facing these challenges suggests the broader applicability 
of a general strategic model or policy template—described below as 
the ‘4Ps’ (a modification of the 3P strategy suggested in Australian 
Intergenerational Reports)—to other developed countries, such as 
Poland, that are facing the challenges of ageing.
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‘Ageing society’ refers to a specific type of society that emerges during 
demographic transition in which large shares of populations become 
old (65+) and very old (80+). Ageing societies share a number of 
similar challenges, such as widening individual ‘problems of ageing’ 
(poor health, loneliness, social isolation, impoverishment of old 
people); depletion of the labour force and an increasing dependency 
ratio, which together slow down growth; rising pension, aged-care and 
health costs and accompanying budgetary strains; and the increasing 
generational pressures of ‘silver/grey lobbies’ that contribute to rising 
conservatism, slow down reforms and threaten to skew the allocation 
of resources (e.g. United Nations 2001; Harper 2006; Harper and 
Hamblin 2014).
It is estimated that the proportion of such older (60+) people 
worldwide—at present around 12 per cent—will nearly double by 
2050. Even in Australia, where the total fertility rate is relatively 
high (1.9), and where immigration of young people also remains high, 
thus ‘cushioning’ the impact of ageing, the proportion of people 
aged over 65 will double by mid-century from about 13 per cent to 
about 27 per cent, with centenarians constituting 0.01 per cent of the 
total population.1 In  Poland, where the process of ageing has been 
aggravated by a low (1.3) fertility rate and high emigration of young 
people, the anticipated change is more rapid and—potentially—more 
disruptive, with the population shrinking, an estimated 30 per cent of 
people reaching the retirement age by 2050, and the age dependency 
ratio more than doubling. 
As would be expected, with the process of ageing accelerating in most 
developed societies, the attention paid to population ageing and the 
challenges that accompany it has been increasing. As the UNDESA 
Report (United Nations 2013) notes:
Between 2005 and 2013, the percentage of Governments that 
considered population ageing as a major concern has increased in 
more developed regions (from 76 to 92 per cent) … [with] more than 
9 out of 10 Governments in Europe and North America considering 
population ageing as a major concern in 2013.
1  For these and other figures see Commonwealth of Australia (2015).
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Yet, this increase is seldom accompanied by a debate about the 
‘population targets’, as well as the nature and effectiveness of policy 
responses, which range from ‘mitigation’, typically in the form 
of  pronatalist policies that aim at boosting fertility, to ‘adaptation’, 
typically in the form of boosting old age provisions and services. 
One  generation after the ageing has been recognised as a source 
of serious challenges, there seems to be an emerging consensus that 
ageing poses urgent developmental and intergenerational problems, 
and that effective responses have to combine mitigation with 
adaptation, and that they have to be strategic in adopting a long-term 
perspective (e.g. Bloom et al. 2011; Harper and Hamblin 2014).
The trajectories of ageing, as well as the acuteness of problems 
that ageing engenders, differ between developed societies, but the 
similarities of the main challenges, as well as experiences of the 
initial stages of ageing, enable us to formulate some general ‘lessons 
conclusions’ in the form of a generally applicable strategic policy 
model. This policy model reflects the experiences and successes 
of Australia—a developed society that relatively successfully faces the 
process of ageing—but can be applied to other developed societies, 
especially those, like Polish society, facing more serious challenges 
and experiencing the problems of ageing more acutely. 
Polish society is ageing fast and faces many more problems of ageing 
because it is ageing faster and is less affluent than Australia, and has 
prepared less for the demographic transition (Table 1). The median age 
today is 38, and it will have increased to 51 in 2050. The demographic 
dependency ratio (the ratio of people 65+ compared to those aged 
15–64) is predicted to shoot up from 19 per cent (2010) to 36 per cent 
(2030) and then to 56 per cent in 2050. The current very low fertility 
rate (1.3 births per woman) is not likely to increase, because spending 
on pronatal policies is very low (1 per cent of GDP, compared to 
3.3  per cent in neighbouring Germany), high child care and child-
raising costs, and growing pressure on women to take employment 
and delay conception—or to emigrate. Poland has a much lower living 
standard than Australia, higher debt, and much more strain placed 
on the budget, and these factors limit its preparedness for ageing and 
restrict the field of manoeuvre for government. Yet, as argued below, 
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these are problems shared, to various degrees, by all developed and 
ageing societies, and they do not prevent Poland from applying—
with necessary modifications—the 4P strategic model.2
Table 1. International comparison of social-demographic indicators: 



















Australia 1 .9 37 [45] 13 .4 48 24 [40] 1 .8 65
Poland 1 .3 38 [51] 13 .5 40 38 [32] 0 .0 56
Source: Based on Commonwealth of Australia (2015: 9) and OECD (2013) . 
TFR=Total Fertility Rate; TDR=Total Dependency Ratio (aged 0–14 and 65+ per 100 aged 
15–64); AAPG=Annual Average Population Growth; LFPR=Labour Force Participation Rate .
The focus of this chapter is on these general policy strategies—
their overall pattern, rather than the detailed content and modes 
of implementation—and on the applicability of these strategies in 
developed societies with different ageing profiles and migration 
regimes. In order to highlight these strategies and discuss their 
broader applicability, we first discuss briefly:
• those challenges of ageing that generate the most concern and 
anxiety; and then
• the strategies that have been designed and partly tested with 
considerable success in Australia.
Ageing societies and their problems
One reason for widespread anxiety related to ageing has been poor 
anticipation. Until the 1980s, most social scientists in developed societies 
had anticipated the levelling of birth rates at or above reproduction 
levels, steady population growth, and even overpopulation. In fact, 
the mid-20th century ageing trends have proved persistent: birth rates 
have continued to fall throughout the late stages of modernisation, 
especially the Western-type modernisation that increasingly relied 
2  For an overview of ageing and its social consequences in Australia, see Commonwealth of 
Australia (2015). For an overview in Poland see Devictor (2012) and OECD (2013). For the overall 
policy implication of ageing, see McDonald and Kippen (1999). For the impact of immigration on 
ageing in Australia, see McDonald and Kippen (2001a). 
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on the occupational activisation (participation) of women, and, 
consequently, on the delay of marriage and child-bearing. Moreover, 
the initially widely acclaimed pronatalist policies have proven costly, 
difficult to implement, and less effective than expected, thus resulting 
in their half-hearted embracement and application (e.g. Kaufmann 
2011). At the same time, death rates have continued their ‘secular 
decline’, and longevity has been steadily increasing, resulting in 
a  declining proportion of young and economically active people, 
and  an increasing proportion of the aged (65+), usually ‘retirees’, 
and the very aged (80+) who increasingly suffer from dementia. 
There have, of course, been some variations in the processes of ageing 
and its social consequences—principally between more affluent 
and less affluent societies, and between high immigration and low 
immigration ones—but the consequences of population ageing 
have been roughly the same in developed and developing societies, 
though, naturally, developed societies face these problems earlier 
than developing ones. The problems include, above all, the widening 
of ‘ageing problems’ (illness, loneliness, social isolation, dependency, 
impoverishment), shrinking of working populations combined with 
increasing dependency ratios (dependent/working), and increasing 
generational ‘burdens’ (rising costs of welfare and aged care, rapidly 
increasing health costs). All of these trends result in declining economic 
dynamism (diagnosed as an aspect of ‘secular stagnation’), combined 
with the mobilisation of ‘grey lobbies’ and rising conservatism—
all exacerbated by the Great Recession hitting the advanced societies, 
and by the misconceived responses of some recession-traumatised 
governments. These responses include anti-immigration campaigns 
and ‘deficit-cum-debt’ funding of welfare and aged-care services 
that have proven unsustainable and that amount to intergenerational 
‘burden shifting’ (e.g. Harper 2006; Harper and Hamblin 2014; 
Torp 2013; Commonwealth of Australia 2015; Summers 2014).
Due to a combination of poor anticipation, misconceived initial 
responses, and the constraints of the Great Recession, ageing started 
to transform into a set of inter-related and spiralling problems. The net 
effect of all these problems has been a steep stratification of societies 
in their vulnerability to ageing problems, and a generally increasing 
awareness-cum-anxiety about the problems of an ageing society.
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Five inter-related problems attract the attention of students of ageing 
societies. First and foremost is the high cost and dubious effectiveness 
of the major ‘modifier’—pronatalist policies. These policies are 
expensive (e.g. 3.4 per cent of GDP in France; 3.9 per cent in Denmark), 
they often backfire (e.g. reducing participation of women in the labour 
force), their effectiveness differs widely, and their overall efficiency 
seems to depend on the design of the policy packages. Moreover, they 
seldom bring fertility close to the reproduction level, and are seen as 
only a part of the strategic policy response (e.g. Goldstone et al. 2013; 
Gray et al. 2008).
Second is a set of problems related to the spread—together with 
population ageing—of the typical afflictions of ageing: chronic 
illness (especially dementia and related conditions), loneliness, social 
isolation, dependency and impoverishment. These problems have 
been well diagnosed and analysed, so we add only that they are not 
just widening in scope, but are also gendered (women outlive men) 
and this requires some attention (seldom granted by decision-makers). 
When not tackled, these problems result in the formation of an ‘aged 
underclass’. 
Particularly worrisome—and challenging for policymakers—are 
problems related to the widening scope and mounting costs of aged 
care for dementia-afflicted aged. While the quality and cost of care at 
‘lower life expectancy’ levels—when most people were dying from 
circulation/heart diseases and, if they survived those, then of cancer—
could be sustained in affluent societies, dementia and related chronic 
diseases/conditions have proved extremely difficult and costly. Neither 
families nor medical facilities, nor even the expanding added care 
programs, are capable of providing adequate and effective care; added 
care often being required on a 24/7 basis by qualified staff. Similarly, 
loneliness and social isolation pose a growing, as well as a widening, 
problem, because they are reinforced by communication difficulties 
(often coming with illness), mobility limitations, lack of facilities, 
and—last but not least—decreasing family networks combined with 
high mobility of children and family members. Impoverishment 
has hit the ageing population not only as a result of limitations to 
welfare budgets, but also due to the financial vulnerability of the 
aged: they are much less capable of managing their finances, become 
vulnerable to fraud, and are frequently exploited by unscrupulous 
care providers. These factors contribute to the rapidly widening 
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‘dependency syndrome’—declining capacity of the aged to sustain 
their autonomy—which quickly translates into care needs and costs, 
as well as a growing frustration and anger among the dependent aged, 
whose dignity is reduced.
Perhaps the most widely publicised—especially at a time of 
intensified deficit fears and budgetary strains—are the problems 
related to, and generated by, workforce shrinking and pension costs. 
They concern, above all, the shrinking and ageing labour force and 
the related increase in the ‘dependency ratio’ and pension burden.3 
These problems—in fact a whole galaxy of inter-related problems—
have been well diagnosed and analysed. If unmitigated, they threaten 
the standard of living of new generations, as well as the integrity of 
governmental budgets (lowering revenue, a declining tax base and 
wealth generation, increasing budgetary costs, etc.) (e.g. Bloom et al. 
2011; Harper and Hamblin 2014; Commonwealth of Australia 2015). 
Closely linked is the problem of spiralling welfare (including aged 
care  and health) expectations and costs. The historically expanding 
welfare state generates its own self-propelling—and unsustainable, 
according to some critics—dynamics. At the core are growing welfare 
(‘social’) rights, regularly translated into entitlements, and their 
accompanying public expectation—particularly high in the baby boom 
generations—that these rights-cum-entitlements will expand in scope 
and quality. Such an expectation trajectory is fed by the culture and 
politics of welfare. The former creates norms and standards associated 
with the notion of social development: higher development = more 
extensive, intensive and costly services. The latter (the ‘demand side’) 
feeds into the regular ‘promises’ of further expansion and improvement 
of services made by most parties and most political candidates in 
the process of electoral competitions (the ‘supply side’). Both feed 
into the spiralling costs and into politically delegitimising effects 
(‘broken promises’ and declining trust provoking populist backlash). 
This is particularly dangerous in societies in which the aged welfare 
constituencies increase in absolute and relative terms. And it is 
3  Thus, among EU members, the old age dependency ratio (number of people aged 65+ 
as  a  percentage of 20–64 years old) increased from 22 in the mid-1980s to 30 today, and 
is estimated to skyrocket to 55 in 2050 (United Nations 2013).
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dangerous because the very cost of welfare provisions, both generally 
and ‘per unit’, has been increasing, while the willingness to address 
this problem has not (e.g. Harper and Hamblin 2014; Torp 2013). 
Spiralling welfare costs require prompt reactions and long-term 
mitigations. Otherwise welfare will transform into a ‘burden’ easily 
passed to the next generation (as public debt, pension obligations, 
anticipated cost of mitigation, etc.). This is easy—and dangerous—
because the issue of intergenerational equity (distribution of burdens) 
has not been absorbed into the political debates over social fairness 
and justice. Forthcoming generations, as cynics say, have no vote, 
and little political influence, and they are regularly burdened by 
unsustainable debts and mitigation costs (e.g. the costs of environmental 
mitigations). This is the case with the ‘post–baby boom’ generations 
in most Western societies. These generations face not only escalating 
welfare costs, an increasing ‘dependency rate’, and stagnating growth, 
but also the ‘triple whammy’ of mounting (public and private) debts, 
rising costs of living, and massive (though hard to calculate) burdens 
of environmental modifications. It is as if the ageing baby boomers in 
advanced societies have lost not only the capacity for anticipation, but 
also a sense of what is fair to their descendants. 
The fourth set of problems of ageing concerns the costs and burdens 
of  health care. These deserve a special mention because of their 
magnitude and rate of acceleration—higher than other welfare 
costs—as well as their declining manageability. The fast acceleration 
is the result of expanding expectations and demands, as well as—
and increasingly—the changing nature of ageing chronic conditions 
(like  dementia). Ageing chronic conditions are those that cannot 
be cured, and require expensive treatment (e.g. Alzheimer Disease 
International 2014). Moreover, hopes of a prolonged healthy life, 
due to ‘morbidity and mortality compression’, now appear to have 
been exaggerated. The ‘market’ cost-inflation is also relevant: 
costly medicines, costly procedures, costly care, all resulting from 
the demand for high-cost ‘niche’ treatments (for the affluent aged) 
becoming a ‘mass’ expectation and demand.
With the ageing of the labour force, there is an accompanying problem 
of declining entrepreneurialism, innovativeness and productivity, 
which affects the associated developmental dynamism of advanced 
societies. This danger has been recently and separately diagnosed 
in the most rapidly ageing societies, such as Japan and South Korea, 
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and in the Western advanced societies (‘secular stagnation’). It seems 
that developed societies enter an unexpected slow-down in their 
economic dynamism that is, at least partly, related to ageing. They tend 
to become less dynamic and innovative, and more conservative and 
routine-prone than younger societies with youthful and expanding 
labour forces. That poses a number of problems, especially in the 
context of competitive globalisation.
One should also point to the problems coded into the fashionable—
but seldom effective—mitigation strategy labelled, variously, ‘family-
friendly’, ‘fertility-raising’ or ‘pronatalist’. Such strategies consist 
of creating incentives to have more children through ‘revaluing the 
traditional roles’ of women as mothers (the domain of the conservatives) 
and/or offering payments, services and facilitations to families with 
children. While the unwanted side-effects, wrong targeting and (dubious) 
cost-effectiveness of such strategies have been widely discussed, the 
unintended consequences and ‘ironic side-effects’ deserve  attention. 
Perhaps the most damaging unintended consequence is the reduction of 
opportunities for women—opportunities for careers, self-realisation and 
the financial independence and dignity associated with them. Poorly 
designed pronatal policies may also undermine the very ‘medicine’ 
for workforce depletion, namely labour force participation by women 
(e.g. Harper 2006).
Finally, one should mention the sociocultural changes that accompany 
ageing. While it is fashionable to stress the advantages and benefits 
of ageing—declining criminality and violence, peaceful conservatism, 
etc.—the problems associated with those very tendencies should also 
be kept in mind. Ageing societies turn more conservative and more 
crime/violence fearing. This may reduce aggressive behaviour, but 
also increases the irrational fear of crime—and makes pressures for 
(inevitably expensive and often socially divisive) security measures, 
such as gated communities, harder to resist. Conservatism of age 
typically aids conservative parties, and spawns conservative policies 
that cement the status quo and reduce the pressures for early, costly, 
but necessary reforms. Yet such reforms are essential for effective 
social and political adjustment. 
This brings us to the central topic of effective policy strategies. Such 
strategies, we argue, have to be ‘learned’, rather than ‘invented’. 
They work better when adopted from successful ‘policy leaders’, 
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rather than derived from party ideologies under pressure of crises. 
Obviously, the effective strategies have to be complex and systemic—
like the problems themselves—and must combine preventive, 
mitigating and adjusting measures. Perhaps most importantly, they 
should be bi-partisan and long-term strategies that are propelled by 
prudent anticipation backed by social science, rather than short-term 
(‘reactive’) political opportunism that gets hold of political parties 
competing for votes in greying electorates. The ‘should’ in the last 
sentence is to be interpreted as advocacy for ‘best practice’ and for 
‘successful/effective outcomes’. I want to argue that the strategic 
approach to the problem of an ageing society will be improved by 
monitoring diverse policy outcomes and by learning from ‘the relative 
successes’ of such societies as Australia.
The Australian strategy: ‘4Ps’
Australian decision-makers, it is argued here, combine mitigation with 
adaptation in a strategy—referred to as ‘3Ps’ (see Commonwealth of 
Australia 2002, 2007, 2010 and 2015)—that proves comprehensive and 
effective in mitigating the dangers of ageing and countering the key 
anxiety-generating problems of an ageing society. This effectiveness 
is highlighted in a comparison with Poland, a society that faces wider 
and more serious challenges related to population ageing, and, at the 
same time, a society that illustrates the broader applicability of the 
Australian strategic model template (expanded to 4Ps). The ‘4Ps’ of 
the strategy’s shorthand name stand for the four elements of the policy 
template: people, productivity, participation and (added) provisions. 
The first three are well known, and have been discussed in previous 
Intergenerational Reports (Commonwealth of Australia 2002, 2007, 
2010 and 2015). 
It should be stressed that the 4Ps strategy is by no means a problem-free 
‘model ideal’, or that the policies pursued by Australian governments 
are necessarily successful in implementing the model template. Rather, 
we argue that the policy strategy outlined below: (i) addresses the 
key challenges, problems and threats posed by ageing; (ii) does this in 
a comprehensive and sustainable manner by combining modification 
with adaptation; and (iii) has been partly but successfully ‘tested’ 
through an application that has reduced the scope of some problems. 
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Therefore, we can learn from this relative success by generalising the 
strategy—or rather those elements that seem to be most important for 
successful mitigations and adaptations. Such strategic policy ‘model 
templates’, though, it should be remembered, can never be copied 
‘verbatim’ without appropriate adjustments. Rather, implementation 
requires careful adaptation to the ‘local idiom’—careful grafting 
rather than mechanical copying. 
Population: Rejuvenating immigration and immigrant 
integration
This is the most important and the most effective element of the 
proposed strategic model template. Rejuvenating immigration—which 
has to be controlled and selective to play this role—is rare and difficult 
to sustain. Moreover, in order to ‘work’ as a ‘moderator of ageing’, 
it has to be backed by policies facilitating the integrative adaptation of 
immigrants; this is labelled ‘(integrative) multiculturalism’ in Australia 
(e.g. McDonald and Kippen 2001a).
Australia is not only a high-immigration society, but also a permanent-, 
selected- and young-immigration society. Since 2005, immigration 
levels  have increased to around 220,000 per annum—reaching 
around  300,000 in 2008–09 and then declining again to 150,000–
180,000—adding nearly 1 per cent of the total population per year. 
Most of these immigrants are selected for desirable skills, education and 
swift integration into the labour force and society. Importantly, nearly 
nine out of every 10 immigrants are aged under 40, with the median 
age within the 20–24 range. A growing proportion of immigrants come 
through Australian educational institutions, which facilitates social 
and economic integration and high incomes. The key facilitator of swift 
integration, though, is a strategy of multiculturalism that encourages 
integration, reduces mal-integration, and minimises discrimination. 
Altogether, this immigration-cum-integration strategy provides the 
main and most effective mitigation of the problems of ageing, though 
its maintenance becomes more difficult with the less-controlled inflow 
of immigrants and refugees from less developed regions and their 
more difficult experiences of integration. Nevertheless, population 
projections—based on current/recent migration, fertility and 
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mortality rates—show a steady (1.3 per  cent) and balanced growth 
of population, with a slow rate of ageing, and the dependency ratio 
falling gradually from about 4.5 today to about 2.7 in the 2050s.
Poland represents a very different pattern with very low fertility, 
prevailing out-migration and medium-level unemployment—all ripe 
for policy reforms. The out-migration of young and skilled men and 
young and highly educated women, in particular, exacerbate the 
problems caused by the process of ageing-cum-labour force depletion. 
The greatest ‘population loss’ has been in the 24–29 age group—among 
men with secondary and vocational education and among women with 
tertiary education. This is why the old age dependency ratio, which 
at present is not much different from Australia’s (20–22 per cent) is 
expected to grow to 55 per cent in the next generation—a level similar 
to that anticipated in Germany, Italy and Spain (Okólski and Topińska 
2012; The Economist 2009).
Yet, increasing immigration from the East gives Poland wide scope 
for policy manoeuvres. With fast growth (over 3 per cent), rapidly 
increasing living standards and declining unemployment, Poland 
has become an attractive destination to her eastern neighbours, 
especially Ukraine—a country experiencing economic and political 
crises and with a much lower standard of living. Ukraine and Belarus 
have similar languages and cultures and can count on the sympathy 
of Polish people, which facilitates integration. Moreover, Poland 
harbours residues of the multiculturalism it inherited from the 16th–
18th-century Jagiellonian Commonwealth with similarities to the 
Australian ‘integrative multiculturalism’, which can therefore serve as 
a moral political idiom in legitimising mass immigration.
Productivity: Monitoring and sustaining high efficiency
The negative effects of a shrinking labour force can be effectively 
mitigated, as the Australian example shows, by monitoring and 
promoting productivity increases. The key role of the Australian 
Productivity Commission and Australian Workforce and Productivity 
Agency in monitoring productivity nationwide, and the role of 
reforms increasing the productivity of the (shrinking) labour force 
have been discussed widely in the policy literature. Here we would like 
to stress the overall direction of the reforms, including ‘productivity 
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agreements’ replacing ‘workplace warfare’, and the adaptive reforms 
of education (including mass upskilling of the workforce) providing 
a backbone for productivity boosting reforms that have proved so 
crucial in sustaining economic growth, income increases and a high 
standard of living. 
The key component of the productivity increases (between 1.5 per cent 
and 2.2 per cent per year) in Australia has in recent decades been 
growing labour productivity. This has been sustained by reforms 
that boost competition, by harnessing innovations, absorbing new 
technologies and utilising as a springboard the educational revolution 
that accompanied a shift in production towards the service sector 
and its high-tech, high-skill end. Capital productivity, by contrast, 
has been declining, mainly because of massive investment in the 
declining mining/mineral boom. The success in increasing labour 
productivity—through a mixture of labour market and workplace 
reforms, education/training, and support for innovation—indicates 
that it could become an effective ‘cushion’ against the ageing-related 
shrinking of productive labour.
The danger of declining productivity—be it due to the fading impact 
of reforms, the declining inflow of educated and skilled migrants, 
high (‘boom-windfall’) profitability, low unemployment or high/
uncompetitive labour costs—can be countered only by the continuous 
monitoring and boosting of productivity across all sectors of the 
economy, as well as by promoting a ‘culture of high productivity’ 
across society. The latter encounters two serious barriers: the rising 
tide of conservatism, partly as a result of the ageing population, and 
the pressures of high consumption and leisure expectations of the 
(ageing) baby boom generation. In this context, one should stress 
that the highest productivity growth in Australia occurred in the 
post–World War II decades and was achieved by a highly liberal 
war generation. Since the beginning of this century, this growth has 
floundered; Australia is ranked 50th on total productivity growth. 
The generational shift, a conservative-complacent cultural wave, and 
the mining boom that brought with it an enormous jump in investment 
and windfall profitability, all lowered the reformist pressures and 
growth in productivity, while an increased inflow of educated and 
skilled immigrants helped to sustain productivity increases.
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Poland is well placed in respect of productivity growth. Labour 
productivity in Poland remains much lower than in Australia, but it 
has also been increasing much faster (around 25 per cent in the last five 
years, compared with around 6 per cent in the last five years in Australia) 
(PRP  2013; Commonwealth of Australia 2015; Trading Economics 
2014). This growth is high in both industry and services, coincides 
with increasing education and technological absorption, and follows 
the steady increase in exports. Most importantly, this growth is seen 
as sustainable, reflecting intense reforms and steady industrial-cum-
service growth, and therefore opens the way for effective cushioning 
of the effects of ageing in the forthcoming decades. However, the 
‘productivity dividend’ badly needs social-political reinforcement in 
the form of a ‘social contract’ between the government, trade unions, 
and employer organisations. Such a contract—followed by reforms—
should not be difficult to develop considering the still strong residues 
of national solidarism created by the Solidarity movement and post-
communist reforms.
As Devictor (2012: 6) points out:
Experience suggests that increasing labour productivity is also 
a  complex, multidimensional task. It involves efforts in areas such 
as: the quality of education (basic education, professional training, 
higher education, life-long learning, etc.); the business environment, 
to support job creation and innovation; labour regulations, to help 
jobs move towards more productive and growing firms; economic 
transformation in sectors where productivity remains low, including 
agriculture; etc. This is an agenda that needs to be pursued regardless 
of demographic trends, but that the aging of society makes even 
more pressing.
Participation, employment and unemployment 
One of the successful measures expanding the labour force and 
reducing the ‘socioeconomic’ impact of ageing—that typically 
brings a decline in the number of working persons—has been the 
high participation rate. Australia had one of the highest participation 
rates of people aged 15+ among the OECD countries in 2013, and 
this rate is predicted to stay at a high level for the next 40 years, 
while migrant participation will be falling, and female participation 
increasing. Australian women have doubled their proportion in the 
labour force within one generation (to the current 59–65 per cent in 
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all adult cohorts) and this growth is likely to continue. Another aspect 
of the Australian strategy of cushioning the impact of ageing through 
participation is the gradual extension of working time through 
incentives to professionals to continue their work, and the phasing in 
of the increase of the retirement age to 70 (by 2030). Thus the steady 
increase in participation rates, combined with prolonged employment, 
offers to Australian society another buffer against the impact of sudden 
ageing and its labour- and growth-depleting consequences.
The biggest challenge comes from another aspect of participation: 
hours worked. The volume of work and the level of unemployment 
have a large impact on economic outcomes; and that forms a formidable 
challenge, because the number of hours worked has been falling 
with a shift to part-time and temporary employment, especially 
among women and older workers. Women often prefer part-time 
employment because it is easier to square with their home/parental 
duties. Older workers are tempted to ease their load, especially when 
it does not adversely affect their superannuation funds and pensions. 
The decline in working hours is likely to continue with the expansion 
of the female and old labour forces, thus threatening the integrity 
of the participation strategy.
A similar threat comes from increasing unemployment, or rather 
decreasing employment. ‘Postmodern’ (increasingly service) economies 
shed low-skill and secure jobs, and create more fickle jobs demanding 
high social and technical skills (see Summers 2014). This means that 
unemployment is likely to become a chronic condition for large low-
skill segments of ‘postmodernising’ populations, even in countries like 
Australia, where the labour force is highly skilled, flexible and mobile. 
In the light of trends in the most developed societies, the assumption 
of low (5 per cent) and stable unemployment in the Australian 
Intergenerational Report must strike us as highly optimistic—or as 
a harbinger of increasing public employment (straining the welfare 
budget).
Participation rates in Poland are lower than in Australia, doubtless 
due  to more rapid ageing and higher unemployment (see Table 1). 
The share of people 65+ is expected to nearly double by 2030, and 
almost triple by 2050, while the trend in participation in the 15–64 age 
cohorts had been less favourable, declining until 2007–08 and then 
increasing only slightly. But these trends are reversible, and, in fact, 
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are starting to change. Participation rates, especially among women, 
has stabilised on the low level, and it is hard to predict how it is likely 
to be affected by the newly introduced child bonuses and by the 
promised lowering of the retirement age. Thus, while unemployment 
has been falling and the number of hours worked has been increasing, 
one should not assume the continuing increase trend in workforce 
participation rates in Poland, especially among women.
This opens the way for many-fold reforms boosting participation even 
further. The current (and minor) rise in female participation can be easily 
reinforced because it has followed a rapid increase in female education 
and—though less strong—growth in employment opportunities 
in the public sector. That may bode well for the future of female 
participation in Poland—and for the cushioning effect against ageing. 
Second, as shown by the experience of almost all developed societies, 
‘if you live longer, you have to work longer’. Government attempts 
to increase the retirement age have been quite successful, though 
they follow disastrous incentives for early retirement of ‘uniformed 
services’, and an equally imprudent decision by the opposition Law 
and Justice (PiS) party to ‘restore’—when in government—the ‘old’ 
retirement age of 60 (women) and 65 (men). The biggest challenge is 
to increase participation by older (over 55) workers. Only 35 per cent 
of 55–64-year-old persons in Poland are employed (compared with the 
EU average of 51); this requires facilitations (such as upskilling) and 
incentives (such as tax breaks).
Provisions: Pensions and superannuation funds
The fourth P is most challenging in its design and most difficult in 
its implementation. It consists of policies that secure financial and 
fiscal sustainability for old-age pensions and welfare services, and that 
implies not only balanced budgets (extremely rare among developed 
societies) but also savings preventing future financial squeezes and 
over-runs. In negative terms, such policies prevent the impoverishment 
of, and degradation of services for, the aged, including health/medical 
services. When faced with the unanticipated and rapid ageing of 
populations, governments face the challenge of expanding old-age 
pension provisions without creating deficits, debts and budgetary 
strains that, in turn, easily create or fuel social divisions and political 
tensions (e.g. Kendig et al. 2013). In Japan, a country that best 
127
6 . FACING THE CHALLENGES OF AN AGEING SOCIETy
illustrates the escalating costs of old-age pensions and aged care, the 
connected health and care costs—left untackled until recently—have 
been increasing geometrically: 6 per cent of GNP in 1970, 18 per cent 
in 1992, 22 per cent in 2013, and are expected to have increased to 
27 per cent by 2025 (Ogawa 2014). Australia has largely avoided such 
dramatic fiscal pressures, though one estimate of budgetary deficit 
related to old-age pensions and aged-care services has been $40 billion 
and $13 billion respectively.
Broadly defined, provisions also include (i) financial adaptation 
(cum-cost-containment) of the growing number of aged, increasing 
longevity, and growing expectations of the ageing baby boomers; and 
(ii) the expansion of aged care and services, including the adaptation 
of the entire living environment to the specific needs of the aged. 
It ranges from trivial—like accessible housing and parking—to more 
sophisticated, such as easily driven cars, internet medicine, means-
tested concessions and sophisticated information provision. Such 
services work if they are driven by the principle of widening and 
lengthening participation and the social benefits that participation 
brings to society and individuals, rather than by the self-serving 
needs-assessment of professional workers, who often create perverse 
incentives for dependency and the associated budget strain.
Australia has a relatively small deficit (2.5 per cent of GDP) and 
net public debt (around 15 per cent of GDP). The government has 
managed to contain the escalating costs through the monitoring 
and topping up of pension funds (including the $109 billion Future 
Fund to cover public service pensions), the building up of a strong 
($1.8 trillion) superannuation system, with compulsory contributions 
rising to 12 per cent, the creation of private–public ‘partnerships’ in 
service provision (HACC4, PACE5), the expansion of the ‘user pays’ 
principle combined with phased-in means-testing, and the expansion 
of market-regulated old-age services. To this policy set may be 
added a facilitation-cum-incentive for co-funding old age services by 
pensioners with high-value but ‘frozen’ assets through various forms 
of ‘liquidification’, such as reverse mortgages.
4 Home and Community Care.
5 Positive Action towards Career Engagement.
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Poland, like most EU economies, is less prepared for a massive increase 
in old-age provisions (PRP 2013). The pension system has been 
reformed, but the country’s superannuation-like open pension funds 
(OFE) have been emasculated. As Devictor (2012: 10) notes:
The funding of the pensions system is obviously a key concern. 
Poland went through a full restructuring of its system over a decade 
ago and is reasonably well prepared. Yet, there remain uncertainties 
over the pension levels that will be provided in the medium-term. 
Under Poland’s notional account pension system accumulated 
contributions are divided by life expectancy: thus, as life expectancy 
increases, benefits automatically decrease (unless people retire 
later) and the question is whether they will remain adequate. Some 
countries, such as Sweden, Italy, or Latvia, are also grappling with 
these issues.
Restoring private retirement funds, together with providing incentives 
(tax and otherwise) for saving for retirement, would not only restore 
balance between the ‘three pillars’ of old-age financial provisions 
(public pensions, superannuation, dedicated private savings), but 
also reduce future budgetary burdens, which are unfairly and 
unrealistically high at present. This can be done in an ‘Australian 
way’, through a mixture of incentives and regulations, partly because 
consumption levels in Poland are very high, and are unlikely to be 
lowered by incentives to save more and by regulations facilitating 
saving for retirement.
Is there a place for the ‘Fifth P”, namely pronatalist measures, 
understood as policy designed to increase fertility rates and promote 
parenthood? The answer—based on the experiences of Australia, 
other developed societies and Poland—seems to be a qualified ‘yes’. 
Australia may be seen as a moderate success in increasing fertility 
rates without high costs and ‘perverse incentives’ that reduce 
employment (participation) of women. But one has to keep in mind 
the reservations and qualifications mentioned above. Pronatal policies 
are very expensive, their effectiveness is dubious, and they often 
produce unintended consequences, some of them quite perverse 
(like  reducing procreation choices or discouraging women from 
seeking employment). Taxing the childless (discredited in communist 
Poland), reducing access to contraceptives (discredited in communist 
Romania) or direct payments to mothers (discredited everywhere) are 
examples of poor strategies and policies pregnant with perverse effects. 
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They work only as a ‘part of the policy mix’, when designed in a way 
that limits perverse effects (e.g. welfare dependency, discouragement 
of employment)—and, obviously, when they are affordable and do 
not unduly ‘burden’ employers and/or the next generation. Examples 
of such well-designed measures include tax breaks for child-rearing 
expenses, parental leave, subsidised child care, etc. They are flexible, 
easily adjustable, and—most importantly—they have proven effective 
in raising fertility without reducing freedom and/or breaking 
government budgets.
Conclusions: Facing the challenges 
of ageing societies
The meta-principle of policy strategy suggested here may be 
formulated as ‘follow the best practice’ and ‘emulate success’. 
Australia’s response to population ageing seem to closely approximate 
such a best practice—it is comprehensive, complex, sustainable, long-
term—and it has shown considerable success in facing the numerous 
challenges of an ageing society. Hence this attempt to ‘generalise it’ 
and ‘forge out of it’ a general strategic model that can be applicable 
to other highly developed societies, as exemplified by Poland.
Let us summarise the key elements of the complex strategy for 
facing the challenges of an ageing society that we have ‘extracted’ 
(necessarily selectively) from the Australian strategic policy set under 
the label of ‘4Ps’:
• systematic monitoring of ‘old age problems’ (poor health, 
loneliness,  social isolation, dependency, impoverishment)—
their scope, intensity and social distribution;
• systematic monitoring of ‘ageing society problems’: economic 
dynamism, shrinking of working populations combined with 
increasing old age dependency ratios (dependent/working), and 
increasing generational ‘burdens’; rising costs of welfare and aged 
care; rapidly increasing health costs, formation and mobilisation 
of ‘grey lobbies’, and rising conservatism; 
• selective and rejuvenating immigration combined with integrative 
multiculturalism that includes incentives for, and facilitations 
of, swift employment and social engagement;
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• systematic monitoring and promotion of productivity combined 
with reforms that boost productivity, such as ‘productivity 
agreements’ and productivity enhancement (education, skilling, 
investment in technologies, etc.);
• encouraging high labour force participation, especially among 
women and older workers, as well as encouraging longer 
employment, especially among highly skilled workers and 
professionals, and reducing unemployment, especially among 
young people;
• building up the self-funding component of pensions through 
strengthening of superannuation and encouragement of individual 
saving for old age. This also includes incentives for co-funding 
of old-age pensions and services from inheritable assets;
• containment of welfare and old-age care costs through the expanding 
use of ‘partnerships’ between families, volunteers, private service 
providers, philanthropic organisations and government bodies in 
provision and through the continuous rationalisation (qualitative) 
of old-age care;
• adaptation of the environment and ‘living infrastructure’ (houses, 
flats, roads, cars, shops, public spaces) for the use of all age cohorts. 
The success of all of these strategies, it seems, depends on three 
factors. The first consists of stringing all these elements together, 
reducing inconsistencies, and ‘testing’ the model in practice in order 
to identify its ‘sticking points’, strengths and weaknesses early. 
The  second—mentioned only briefly but extremely important—
consists of adapting the strategic ‘model’ to the specific conditions of 
place and time. In social policy, as in transplant surgery, grafts that are 
not carefully prepared are often rejected. The third condition, hardly 
mentioned above, concerns the political presentation and promotion 
that, in turn, secure systematic implementation. This is to a large 
extent dependent on public information, education and systematic 
generation of political approval and good will. Public information 
and education, as the practice shows, are easily provided in highly 
educated advanced societies. The biggest barriers are short-termism—
the best friend of demagogic opportunists—and sectional (ideological 
generational, age group, class, partisan) biases. When faced with 
the problems of an ageing society, conservative politicians tend to 
resort to ‘traditionalist’ strategies, such as ‘pronatalism’ aimed at 
‘restoring’ traditional gender roles and identities, often at the expense 
of women’s rights—an obvious illusion in the contemporary world. 
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Socialists often want to return to the communist-era restrictions 
on individual liberties and human rights by promoting state direct 
interventions, and they often promote popular but expensive policies 
with dubious returns (e.g. shortening working time, ‘baby bonuses’, 
etc.). Liberal-minded politicians are prone to another illusory belief—
that it is enough to ‘restore’ individual responsibility, restrict public 
welfare, deregulate, cut entitlements and build up ‘market driven 
individualism’ in order to encourage rational conduct and the 
accompanied social-demographic balance. Such a strategy, as can be 
seen in Europe and America, does not work either. Instead, this kind 
of strategy exacerbates and masks, rather than mitigates, the problems 
of an ageing society. So do the strategies routinely embraced by the 
socialist left—expansion of services at the cost of mounting deficits 
and crippling debts, increasing taxation and, generally, pushing the 
burden onto the shoulders of coming generations. Therefore, the best 
chance of success is offered by removing policy strategies from the 
realm of ideological and partisan competition, making them supra-
ideological (based on proven success), bi-partisan, or at least by 
removing them from the agenda of daily partisan contests. 
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Social research and actions 
on ageing well
Hal Kendig and Colette Browning
Why do researchers and advocates use the holistic term ‘ageing well’? 
The term encompasses positive and constructive views of ageing, 
health, and wellbeing. It recognises ‘ageing’ as a lifelong, normal 
experience for everyone rather than being limited to those who 
are (often pejoratively) termed old. ‘Wellness’ as viewed by older 
people is grounded in a sense of feeling good as well as maintaining 
or recovering good physical and mental health as a resource for 
daily living. Ageing well is increasingly viewed as a major goal for 
health and care practitioners, as well as for older people themselves. 
A  multidisciplinary approach to health recognises the influences 
of social factors and allows for active pursuit of better experiences 
of ageing.
A social perspective brings us beyond the ‘problems’ approach to 
ageing (which can cast responsibilities onto individuals) to focus more 
on opportunities and societal responses. This constructive approach is 
beginning to complement and at times challenge dominant biomedical 
and ‘decrement’ constructions of ageing. Yet the entrenched stereotype 
(and in some cases the reality) of individual ageing as an inevitable 
process of degeneration, continues to underpin much of the personal 
and public concern for treatment and care of vulnerable older 
individuals. This negative discourse is often promulgated by health 
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professions and organisations, particularly when seeking resources for 
their work treating disease and meeting care needs. Alarmist images 
of population ageing as a ‘tsunami’ or ‘demographic doomsday’ 
are invoked by governments seeking justifications for their fiscal 
strategies. In the ongoing contests of ideas and interests, progressive 
researchers and advocates are finding common ground in ‘reimaging’ 
ageing positively. 
The chapter begins with international and national concepts of ageing 
well and directions for action. We then present a body of Australian 
research on ageing well including the context and funding that has 
enabled these studies to be conducted. Qualitative accounts provide 
older people’s own viewpoints while survey findings highlight social 
variability and the improvability of ageing. The next section provides 
examples of applied studies that have better connected research and 
action, informing new approaches to policies and services. The chapter 
concludes by considering ways in which advocacy organisations that 
represent older people are promoting ageing well.
Conceptualising ageing well and 
action directions 
Much of the research and policy discussion on healthy ageing is 
now centred on the widely accepted World Health Organization 
(WHO) definition: ‘Health is a state of complex physical, mental and 
social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.’ 
It’s comprehensive World Report on Ageing and Health (WHO 2015) 
sets further initiatives in healthy ageing and wellbeing building on a 
substantial evidence base. WHO conceptualises the related concept of 
‘active ageing’ as ‘the process of optimising opportunities for health, 
participation, and security in order to enhance quality of life as people 
age’ (WHO 2002: 12). It also established and now facilitates the global 
‘age-friendly communities’, which guides applied local research and 
action aiming to facilitate active ageing (Kendig and Phillipson 2014). 
International research is demonstrating that processes of ageing are 
amenable to a range of bio-psychosocial influences, with many of 
them being changeable and hence improvable. The origins of the 
ageing well concept can be traced back to ideas on ‘successful ageing’, 
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as initiated nearly two decades ago by Rowe and Kahn (1987) in their 
US-based challenge to the view that old age necessarily equates to loss 
and disability. They take an aspirational approach (rather than ‘usual’ 
ageing focus), defining ‘successful ageing’ as a multidimensional 
concept with the three components of ‘avoiding disease’, ‘engagement 
in life’, and ‘maintaining high cognitive and physical functioning’. 
The research literature subsequently burgeoned with Cosco et al. 
(2014) identifying 105 empirical studies with a range of operational 
definitions—most have a biomedical focus but increasingly they also 
have psychosocial and lay components. 
There has been extensive commentary and criticism of the ‘successful 
ageing’ concept and its terminology. In our own work, we have 
preferred the term ‘ageing well’, because ‘successful ageing’, in its 
original formulation, implicitly defines nearly all older people as 
‘unsuccessfully ageing’. This is clearly at odds with the good quality 
of life reported by most older people, notwithstanding their having 
some health problems (Kendig et al. 2014). A range of commentators 
have pointed out that ‘successful ageing’ focuses on individuals to 
the exclusion of structural, social, gender and cultural explanations 
of their circumstances. We have demonstrated the widely varying 
concepts of ageing well, for example between Calvinist religions in the 
West and Buddhism in the East (Kendig and Browning 2010). Katz and 
Calastanti (2014) take a critical approach, observing that successful 
ageing ‘fails to acknowledge social relations of power, environmental 
determinants of health, and the bio politics of health inequalities’ 
(p 29). They highlight the importance of social exclusion, as well as 
the lifelong accumulation of advantage or disadvantage (Dannefer 
2003) that is central to inequalities in later life, including poor access 
to health care. 
The original formulators of ‘successful ageing’ have responded to these 
debates. They presented a case for research and action on ‘Successful 
Aging of Societies’ in their special issue of Dædalus: Journal of  the 
American Academy of Arts & Sciences (Rowe 2015). Contributors 
reviewed the importance of ageing for productivity; the benefits and 
potential of an ageing society; healthy ageing as a human right; and 
prevention as a core responsibility of health systems. This Successful 
Ageing of Society initiative brought US mainstream ageing and health 
research, and its dominant epidemiological and clinical traditions, 
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closer to European political economy and social determinants 
perspectives (see Chapter 1) that are informing critical approaches to 
social action on ageing.
Phillipson (2013), writing from the UK, provides a sociological 
paradigm for understanding how ageing societies generate age-related 
inequalities in the evolving welfare state. Health providers and 
professionals—as well as socioeconomic groups and governments—
form interest groups that influence as well as benefit from public action 
in health and welfare services. The social practices that underlie these 
relationships form power structures influencing, in the instance of 
health, the subsidies and regulation of the industries and professions 
and the priority issues they represent to the public. Phillipson makes a 
case that the structured dependency of old age, the traditional focus of 
ageing in the welfare state, is shifting to new recognitions as political 
and economic pressures intensify along with population ageing and 
uncertain economic prospects. Health can be viewed as a dimension 
of his general argument that preparing for ageing populations requires 
‘rebuilding institutions’, developing ‘new pathways for later life’, and 
‘recognising new forms of solidarity’. 
Further sociological conceptions are informing proactive ways of 
thinking about ageing. Kohli and Arza’s (2011) observation on pension 
reform in Europe would apply equally to ageing and health: they 
comment on the ‘power of ideas’ that are employed by interest groups 
to portray difficult and interest-laden reforms as being ‘inevitable’. 
Drawing on social gerontology and social welfare practice, Scharf and 
Keating (2012) raise theoretical issues and review evidence on the 
global challenge of moving ‘from exclusion to inclusion in old age’. 
In Australia, Fine (2014a) has applied a political economy perspective 
to how population ageing has been portrayed as a cause of economic 
deterioration and as a rationale for cutting health and social 
expenditure in Australia and other G20 countries. He also examines 
ways in which longevity has accentuated gender and age inequalities 
in caregiving, and the social constructions of care, by the ageing field 
as contrasted with the disability movement (Fine 2014b). Stebbing and 
Spies-Butcher (2015) also apply a political economy perspective, in 
their case to interpret the implications of declining home ownership 
rates in later life and ways in which they can combine with related 
public subsidies, accelerating inequalities of economic wellbeing 
between social classes, age groups, and cohorts. 
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A valuable Australian commentary on ‘ageing well’, Aberdeen and 
Bye (2013) observe the ‘silence’ of critical sociology in Australia in 
the face of what Asquith (2009) has termed ‘neoliberal policies of 
positive ageing’. They comment that, in contrast to scholarship in the 
Northern Hemisphere, Australian gerontology had developed (with 
a few exceptions) in a functionalist tradition focused on individual 
adjustment and economic priorities of government. They observe 
a  predominance of biomedical research and very little political 
economy, feminist, or other theoretical perspectives. Mendes (2013) 
provides an Australian critique of ‘Active Ageing: A right or a duty?’ 
The paucity of critical Australian studies in ageing arises in part 
because the Australian Research Council (ARC) and National Health 
and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) provide funding primarily for 
large-scale empirical research more than critical scholarship. Available 
research funding on ageing supports the medical and health fields 
more than the humanities and social sciences. Australian research is 
underway to inform action on ageing well, inclusive of social as well 
as health dimensions, however, a plurality of disciplinary viewpoints 
is yet to develop very far.
Australian research on ageing well
Our research on ageing well began more than 25 years ago thanks to 
the vision and support of the Victorian Health Promotion Foundation 
(VicHealth), which recognised the value of improving health status 
across the life-course (Kendig and Browning 2010). The Foundation 
funded what eventually became the Melbourne Longitudinal Surveys 
on Ageing (MELSHA), subsequently funded by the NHMRC and then 
the ‘Healthy and Productive Ageing’ Stream in the ARC Centre of 
Excellence in Population Ageing Research (CEPAR). (See Chapter 1 for 
these and other longitudinal studies.)
Each of the studies reviewed below has yielded findings from older 
people that can inform action on ageing well and provide a balance 
of evidence along with that from other interest groups. The studies 
provide guidance as to directions for health promotion in the 
community as well as interventions when people are at risk in later life.
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Older people’s views and experiences
Older people’s views can contrast notably with portrayals of them 
as clients or patients in health systems, subjects in experiments, 
or  respondents in surveys. Rigorous qualitative studies, while 
difficult to fund at a significant scale, can seek out a range of voices, 
hear people on their own terms, and bring balance and insights into 
multidisciplinary studies of ageing. 
Public attitudes are among the most powerful social influences on ageing 
well. Others’ expectations of ageing people can not only influence the 
scope of their social opportunities but more fundamentally influence 
their conceptions of themselves, their capacities, and their value. 
An early qualitative study explored ageing individuals’ perceptions 
of their ‘social treatment’ by others in everyday life, ranging from 
affirmation of ‘normal ageing’ to the ageism, demoralisation, and 
exclusion of being made to ‘feel old’ (Minichiello et al. 2000, 2012). 
The study found that ageist attitudes were most pronounced in terms 
of older people’s experiences in the health system and employment. 
These findings accord with US evidence that negative attitudes can 
impact on ageing self-stereotype, which in turn can predict preventive 
health behaviours, functional health and survival (Levy and Myers 
2004). Research from the Australian Longitudinal Survey on Ageing 
(ALSA) in Adelaide concluded ‘we have shown that the psychological 
resources of expectancy of control and self-esteem are important for 
the maintenance of older adults’ self-perceptions of ageing when 
physical functioning is declining’ (Sargent-Cox et al. 2012). ALSA 
researchers also identified the importance of a ‘sense of purpose as a 
psychological resource for ageing well’ (Windsor et al. 2015; see also 
Chapter 9).
When beginning our own VicHealth-supported study several decades 
ago, we conducted and reviewed qualitative investigations of older 
people’s life goals and the significance health had for them (Kendig et 
al. 2014). They speak of life and health ideals centred around keeping 
active, feeling well, a positive outlook, and capacities to maintain their 
independence and make ongoing contributions. While good health 
is in part viewed as an absence of disease or functional limitations, 
the older people generally viewed health as a valued resource in 
which they invest, for example, through good eating and staying 
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physically active. Many report having made adaptations to their lives 
and homes that have enabled them to maintain their health and ways 
of life, notwithstanding mounting frailty. We concluded that health 
is a critical resource for older people in maintaining continuity in 
their sense of self and continuing to live in their own homes in the 
community.
Listening to older individuals reveals some systematic variations in 
their stories. Gender is prominent as seen in the contrasting ‘his’ and 
‘her’ versions. Women are more likely to view health as a means of 
enabling social participation, while men focus more on their continuing 
physical capacities and contributions. Older individuals have ‘health 
identities’ and view themselves as successful ‘survivors’ (Walker-
Birckhead 1996). While care needs to be taken to avoid cultural 
stereotypes, Chinese Australians have reported the importance of 
physical activity, healthy eating and successful children for their own 
wellbeing (Browning et al. 2011). 
Locale studies
Locale studies can provide rich insights into the many ways in 
which the features of place and community can influence ageing 
well. Winterton and Warburton (2012) report, from their study of 
ageing in two Victorian rural areas, on the significance of ‘place’ and 
historical context of rural living; the life choices (human agency) 
made over people’s lifetimes; and ways in which ‘ageing in the bush’ 
can reinforce successful ageing. A qualitative study of older men in 
rural Victoria found that their work, family, and ethnic identity were 
important resources for health and wellbeing, although rural locations 
imposed significant barriers to accessing services (Radermacher and 
Feldman 2015). 
The importance of place was reinforced in Mackenzie et al.’s (2015) 
Sydney-based analysis of older people’s subjective views on their 
homes and plans for moving or adapting them. Those who most strongly 
identified with their homes and felt connected to their neighbours and 
their communities had more positive perceptions of their homes and 
communities. Housing policies and urban design were recommended 
as important to maintain independence and adaptability as people age. 
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An NHMRC-funded ethnographic study of homeless older men 
in inner  Sydney (Russell et al. 2001; Quine et al. 2004) found that 
many were proactive and capable in securing safe shelter, food, 
companionship, and other necessities for health and independence. 
This research underscored the value of action with vulnerable older 
people at a local level within accommodation and service contexts. 
A qualitative study of older gay men in Sydney found that many had 
experienced positive changes since the 1970s, with greater public and 
private acceptance, but some expressed a loss of gay community as 
they grew older and experienced HIV-related stigma within the gay 
community (Lyons et al. 2015). The authors comment that broader 
community understanding of this potentially vulnerable group would 
facilitate quality of life and quality of care. 
Population findings 
The MELSHA study followed a cohort of older people living in the 
community from 1994 to 2010 (Browning and Kendig 2010; Kendig et 
al. 2014). Respondents had a strong focus on positive health actions, 
notably physical activity, healthy eating, and social activity. Healthy 
actions were encouraged most by spouses (especially wives), with 
friends and adult children also being significant. Education, income, 
and other aspects of social class were related to positive health 
behaviours and risk factors for serious illness. 
At baseline, more than 70 per cent were ‘ageing well’ as defined by 
continuing to live in the community independently (that is not in 
residential aged care), with good self-rated health and psychological 
wellbeing. Subsequent survival was related to low levels of reported 
strain in daily life and higher levels of social activity, while entry to 
residential aged care was predicted by being underweight and having 
low levels of social activity (Kendig et al. 2010). Significant lifestyle 
predictors of continuing to age well included physical activity, 
nutrition, not being underweight, social support, low strain, and 
not smoking (Kendig et al. 2014). These lifestyle factors, which are 
potentially improvable, are major risk factors for chronic disease and 
important targets for health promotion late in life. Gender differences 
in the findings underscore the importance of tailoring promotion 
efforts to men and women. 
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Another longitudinal study based in Melbourne (Hodge et al. 2013) 
reported similar predictors of ageing successfully. A Sydney cross-
sectional study found that physically active lifestyles (and less sitting 
time) were associated with good self-rated health and quality of life 
among ageing people (Rosenkranz et al. 2013). 
The Healthy Retirement Project, funded by the Victorian Health 
Promotion Foundation, followed individuals through retirement 
transitions since the late 1990s (De Vaus et al. 2007). Most managed 
the transitions with continuing good health and wellbeing; many 
had freely chosen retirement and found that it enabled changes 
to healthier ways of life and improved health and wellbeing. Some 
adverse outcomes were apparent, particularly for working-class men 
and those who had been forced to retire by employers or through 
ill-health. Socioeconomic resources and opportunities for choice 
were found to be critical to a rewarding and independent life after 
retirement and managing the life transitions. A national analysis of 
women’s adjustment to retirement, conducted a generation later, found 
a two-stage process (Zhu and He 2015): first, there were significant 
and lasting increases in life satisfaction just after retirement; and then 
ongoing decline through later years. 
The Ageing Baby Boomer in Australia (ABBA) project, funded by an 
ARC Linkages grant with National Seniors Australia (NSA), provided 
evidence on this new cohort entering later life. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, there is great diversity among the boomers, who exemplify 
both continuity and change as compared to earlier cohorts. Focus 
group interviews and a national survey found that to varying degrees 
boomers reject ageist expectations, overwhelmingly evince a fierce 
desire to remain independent and contributing, and have a strong 
‘generational stake’ in their children’s and grandchildren’s futures. 
Health promotion is a priority for the many boomers who have 
significant behavioural risks (notably obesity and sedentary lifestyles) 
that predispose them to diabetes and other chronic diseases (Humpel 
et al. 2010). The global financial crisis significantly reduced boomers’ 
life satisfaction, especially for those still employed with fewer 
socioeconomic resources, and increased expectations to work longer. 
(Kendig et al. 2013). NSA drew on the study to produce popular 
reports used to inform National Seniors membership and in advocacy 
to government. 
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The Life History and Health Survey (Kendig et al. 2016), funded by an 
ARC Discovery project and now CEPAR, is examining how productivity, 
health, and wellbeing on entry to later life are influenced by earlier 
life experiences. Childhood advantage or disadvantage during the 
early post-war era—in terms of (parents’) socioeconomic resources, 
educational attainment and health—was found to predispose 
work and  family pathways through adulthood that had continuing 
influences  on wellbeing on entry to later life. The findings suggest 
the value of investment in human capital from childhood onward 
throughout life. 
Only 5 per cent of Aboriginal people are aged 60 years or more, as 
a result of high birth rates and life expectancies estimated at 15  to 
20 years less than other Australians. The Koori Growing Old Well 
Study in urban and regional NSW (Radford et al. 2014) found that the 
dementia rate in Indigenous communities was three times that of non-
Indigenous communities. Indigenous Australians face a ‘cascade’ of 
risk factors across the life-span, including low birth weight, removal 
from family, education, head injuries, alcohol misuse, smoking and 
inactivity. Another study developed specialised assessment tools that 
took cultural and social context into account in assessing dementia 
and cognitive capacities among older Indigenous people in remote 
areas (Smith et al. 2008.) Efforts to ‘close the gap’ in Indigenous life 
expectancy are directed overwhelmingly to younger people while 
older people ‘age without longevity’ (Cotter et al. 2012). Clapham 
and Duncan (2016) have reviewed initiatives by Indigenous people 
themselves to support ageing well in their own communities.
Migration and ethnicity are major factors in cultural orientations and 
life experiences, yet diversity of ageing in these terms has received 
relatively less research attention. The Melbourne Collaborative Study 
(a large prospective survey) has examined from mid-life onward 
variation in lifestyles and risk factors for those born in Italy and Greece 
as compared to the Australian born (Hodge et al. 2007). Dietary patterns 
were found to be associated with cultural background—e.g. fruit and 
white bread consumption was a larger component of the diet among 
these groups (and meat a smaller component)—which would have 
influenced their risk of diabetes and other chronic disease. A study 
of older men in Sydney (Waern et al. 2015) found that the Italian and 
Greek migrants were at higher risk compared to the Australian born 
for poor nutrition and higher alcohol intake. While low income is a 
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greater risk, the authors suggest ‘the need for nutritional education 
targeted at older men from culturally and linguistically diverse 
backgrounds’ (p 819). 
It can be difficult to conduct surveys on social factors in the health 
of older people from culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) 
background as researchers need to understand the cultural context 
and translation. This knowledge is a priority, given that by 2026 
about 25 per cent of people aged over 80 years will come from diverse 
cultural backgrounds (Productivity Commission 2013).
Research for practice, services, and policy 
to promote ageing well
It is important to reflect on what we would term the ‘political economy’ 
of knowledge and the ways in which interest groups shape research 
funding and directions—and hence the available knowledge. While 
valuable scholarship can be produced relatively independently, larger-
scale efforts in applied multidisciplinary research, yielding rewards 
in the careers for university staff as well as public benefits, depend 
critically on funding, particularly from the ARC and the NHMRC. 
As we have explained elsewhere (Kendig and Browning 2010), 
targeted ARC and NHMRC funding has been essential in building the 
knowledge base in line with the National Research Priority:
Ageing well, ageing productively: Developing better social, medical 
and population health strategies to improve the mental and physical 
capacities of ageing people.
Our knowledge in this priority area has been built with a cornerstone 
of strategic research funding including the NHMRC/ARC Ageing Well/
Ageing Productively Research Program, the ARC/NHMRC Research 
Network in Ageing Well, the ARC Centre of Excellence in Population 
Ageing (CEPAR) (which has a research strand on Ageing Well, Ageing 
Productively). ARC Linkage programs funded on the basis of social 
and commercial benefit (as well as research and investigator quality) 
have also been important. The future direction of these programs, and 
indeed all ARC and NHMRC funding, faces considerable uncertainties 
at present as government deliberates on ways in which research can 
best contribute to Australia’s national development. 
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Research funding is inevitably driven by government priorities and 
other interests, as well as researchers’ own priorities, and these can 
change. Current ageing research, as evidenced particularly by recent 
NHMRC grants and special initiatives, has shown a shift towards 
relatively more research on age-related diseases, notably ‘problems’ 
such as dementia. Observing a similar trend in the US 25 years ago, 
Estes and Binney (1989) warned of the ‘biomedicalization of aging’. 
When ageing is cast as a medical problem, this risks an imbalanced 
knowledge base that yields less understanding of potential action on 
the environmental, social and economic drivers of wellbeing in old age. 
National research funding has been supplemented by philanthropic 
organisations that have a primary concern for informing social actions 
that may follow from understanding the needs and experiences of 
disadvantaged older people. Philanthropic foundations have been 
at the forefront of funding innovative research on action to improve 
quality of life: 
social change philanthropy focuses on the root causes of social, 
economic and environmental injustices; includes people impacted by 
injustices as decision-makers; and makes philanthropy more accessible 
and diverse (Lord Mayor’s Charitable Foundation 2012). 
Governments also fund research to inform specific issues for policy 
or service applications. 
There are multiple ways in which research-based knowledge can 
inform social action on ageing well and the health of older people. 
The traditional approach is that researchers independently design 
and conduct studies, publish in peer-reviewed journals, and then 
this information is eventually identified in literature reviews before 
devising health programs or interventions. This mainstream, and 
indeed usual, approach provides some quality assurance through 
peer review but it relies on uncoordinated connections between 
research and action. The process may also take years, from planning 
to conducting and utilising research. Research commissioned by 
philanthropic organisations or by government, however, may not be 
disseminated through peer-reviewed journals and as such the utility 
of this type of ‘grey’ literature may not be fully realised.
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Program grants (such as the VicHealth-initiated MELSHA studies), 
Linkages grants such as the ABBA project reviewed earlier, and 
the CEPAR Ageing Well/Ageing Productively research strand 
augment traditional research approaches in several ways. Longer-
term partnerships, between researchers and those who will use the 
knowledge, can build collaborations in setting study directions and 
make joint investments attentive to mutual, complementary interests, 
and each can learn from the other while conducting the research. 
Researchers can release information reports and working papers 
fairly quickly, for timely applications by their partners, while articles 
take more time as they undergo the lengthy peer-review process 
for scholarly audiences. With consultancies, researchers conduct 
evaluations and other studies (often with short time-frames) according 
to objectives set in contractual terms by their research partners, with 
attendant risks to quality and independence that require careful terms 
in contracts. 
We now turn to some examples of the ways in which Australian 
social science research has been contributing to actions on ageing well 
in specific policy arenas. 
Research-informed actions in the health arena
In an earlier commentary for the Academy of Social Sciences in 
Australia (Kendig and Browning 2011), we reviewed the research base 
and priority contributions to healthy ageing policy and programs. 
Our  research-informed submissions on the value of comprehensive 
health promotion and integrated health care for older people were 
used to reinforce recommendations from the 2009 National Health and 
Hospital Commission Report. However, national action continued to 
focus on single diseases and behaviours with little attention to older 
people. Eventually, in March 2016, the Prime Minister and Minister 
of Health announced ‘A healthier Medicare for chronically-ill patients’ 
that was said to ‘revolutionise the way we care for Australians with 
chronic diseases and complex conditions—aiming to keep them 
out-of-hospital and living happier and healthier lives at home’. 
An accumulation of evidence and submissions and growing appetite 
for health reform, precipitated by the forthcoming election, appears 
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to have eventually contributed to some action on a difficult and long-
standing priority wrought by Commonwealth–state tensions on 
funding.
Applied research has also been important in recognising self-care as 
a core component of health promotion and clinical care. After trial 
efforts in self-management were proved to be effective, Medicare 
now funds general practitioners to work in collaboration with other 
health professionals to implement Chronic Disease Management Plans 
(Browning and Thomas 2015). However, health assessments for older 
people have continued to focus on identifying ‘problems’ without 
providing much in the way of resources for general practitioners 
and other health professionals to work with patients to assist with 
changing health behaviours as preventive health measures before the 
onset of these conditions and their associated morbidity. Many years 
earlier Byles et al. (2004) had found that while health assessment for 
veterans and war widows resulted in higher quality of life, they also 
increased the probability of residential aged-care placement. These are 
instances where our health systems are not set up to provide integrated 
solutions to assist older people to age well. 
An area of successful research translation has been with falls-
prevention interventions. Clemson et al. (2004, 2012) developed model 
risk-reduction for falls interventions building self-efficacy, behavioural 
changes, and home adaptations. The programs were proven to be 
effective in reducing injuries and hospitalisation. The NHMRC funded 
the core research while the NSW State Government has supported the 
production of training manuals and program implementation. Benefits 
are anticipated in restraining costs to governments as well as better 
quality of life outcomes for older people.
Actions in the aged and community care arenas 
Applied research on ageing well also has contributed to reforms of 
aged and community care. After reviewing literature (including 
MELSHA findings), and extensive consumer and industry 
consultations, the Productivity Commission outlined major new 
directions in its commissioned Caring for Older People report, which 
led to the 2013 Living Longer, Living Better legislative reforms now 
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being implemented.1 The Australian Department of Social Services 
(2012, 2015) is implementing Consumer-Directed Care (CDC) programs 
informed by a government-funded evaluation of pilot programs 
(KPMG 2012) that examined impacts on the wellbeing of older people 
and carers, promoting independence, enabling choice and maintaining 
community engagement. The usefulness of this consultancy was 
limited, however, by its delayed release. There is a small related 
academic literature (Low et al. 2012) and ARC Linkages studies are 
underway.
Practice-based research also has demonstrated the case for prevention 
as well as re-enablement (Lewin et al. 2014) in the design and 
implementation of the national Home Care Packages Program. This 
work has been supported by a partnership between Curtin University 
and the Silver Chain (an aged-care provider). Qualitative research 
and consultations by innovative community-care providers, such as 
the ACH Group’s (2011) Good Lives for Older People, have focused on 
person-centred care building self-help capacities and quality of life. 
Partnerships with local universities in Adelaide are furthering this 
work with the support of ARC Linkages funding. 
Actions in the culturally and linguistically diverse 
community arena
A study funded by the Lord Mayor’s Charitable Foundation (Feldman 
and Radermacher 2014) examined barriers and capacities to enhance 
ageing well in Chinese, Greek and Italian communities. This provided 
the basis for future engagement by the Foundation to progress social 
change. The RDNS Dementia Care in the Community project was 
funded by the Lord Mayor’s Charitable Foundation. This project 
conducted research in the area of a ‘key worker’ to advocate for and 
support CALD clients with dementia and their carers. This approach 
is now being investigated with other at-risk older people in the 
community. Similarly, a project by the UNSW Social Policy Research 
Centre, in  partnership with the Benevolent Society (SPRC 2010), 
identified   number of issues for people from CALD backgrounds, 
including loss of homeland and status within the family, isolation 
1  livinglongerlivingbetter.gov.au.
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and vulnerability due to changes to traditional networks and poor 
English skills leading to poorer access to services and communication 
problems. 
Actions in the age-friendly communities arena
Research has demonstrated the value of the WHO Age Friendly 
Cities approach for facilitating local action to improve wellbeing and 
address inequalities (Kendig et al. 2014). In Canberra, an ANU survey 
(funded by the ACT Government) reported on older people’s views on 
their priorities for improving their neighbourhoods and city and the 
vulnerabilities of groups, including older residents living in public 
housing and older women living alone. Findings have been reviewed 
by subsequent community assemblies, informed modest actions such 
as improvements to the bus system, and yielded academic journals 
as well as National Seniors publications (Pearson et al. 2012). This 
work follows the WHO age-friendly cities initiative and further work 
on implementation is being led by Councils on the Ageing (COTA) 
(Australia) working closely with the International Federation on 
Aging (see below).
Consumer advocacy and ageing well
National and international advocacy organisations provide essential 
leadership in action on ageing well initiatives. COTA (Australia) was 
founded to ‘protect and promote the wellbeing of older Australians’.2 
COTA has played a key part in building the National Aged Care 
Alliance  (NACA): ‘a body of peak national organisations in aged 
care, including consumer groups, providers, unions and health 
professionals, working together to determine a more positive future 
for aged care in Australia’.3 COTA and NACA have been influential 
advocates for consumer-directed care as per legislation now being 
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The National Seniors Association (NSA) is a large representative 
organisation with strong grassroots membership and involvement in 
policy. It’s Productive Ageing Centre, working with the Department 
of Social Services:
aims to play a pivotal role in bridging the gap between traditional 
academic researchers in ageing, the community and decision-makers. 
Our broad research purpose is to “emphasise the positives of ageing 
and an ageing society, as well as flag the challenges (nationalseniors.
com.au/be-informed/research).
NSA is partnering with Per Capita and NAB Bank in convening 
a coalition of interests taking action on their Blueprint for an Ageing 
Australia.5 The Blueprint argues for action recognising that with 
increased longevity we now have ‘25 extra years of high quality 
living with new opportunities for productive work, unprecedented 
leisure, teaching and learning, and fulfilling relationships with family 
and friends’.
The Australian Association of Gerontology (AAG) has the mission of 
‘expanding knowledge on ageing’.6 The AAG plays a pivotal role in 
relating research to action, and in advocacy and coordination to build 
research capacities and translate findings into practice and educational 
programs. It is the principal point for Australia’s engagement with the 
International Association of Gerontology and Geriatrics (IAGG),7 and 
it auspices the International Longevity Centre (ILC) (Australia) as part 
of the international network of ILCs.8 Other important contributors 
in ageing networks are provider organisations including Aged and 
Community Services in Australia (ACSA)9 and Leading Aged Services 
Australia (LASA).10
International developments in ageing also are forming coalitions 
and they provide valuable resources and support for Australian 
initiatives. In addition to leadership by the WHO (as reviewed above), 
international organisations are forming networks for advocacy on 
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• The United Nations’ Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development set as its Goal 3: ‘To ensure healthy 
lives and promote wellbeing for all at all ages’ (UN 2015). It also 
is leading action to establish a Convention on the Human Rights 
of Older People. The UN continues to work towards the 2002 UN 
Second World Assembly on Ageing Declaration that had set three 
priority directions to achieve ‘a society for all ages’: 1) the active 
participation of older people in development that would benefit 
all citizens; 2) the promotion of health and wellbeing as people 
age; and 3) the provision of enabling environments to support 
healthy ageing.
• The World Economic Forum is a ‘comprehensive and integrated 
platform to strategically shape global, regional, national, and 
industry agendas’. It’s Global Agenda Council on Ageing Society, 
comprised of leading international organisation on ageing, 
highlighting the challenges ahead in Global Population Ageing: Peril 
or Promise (Beard et al. 2011), and in 2015 launched a campaign 
on how longevity can create markets and drive economic growth.11
• The International Federation on Ageing (IFA) (a network of non-
government organisations, industry, and academia, and individuals 
in 70 countries) has a mission to ‘influence age-related policies 
that improve the lives of older people’.12
• Help Age International, while its work focuses mainly on 
developing countries, aims to ‘work with our partners to ensure 
that people everywhere understand how much older people 
contribute to society and that they must enjoy their right to 
health care, social services and economic and physical security’.13 
Its Global Age Watch provides comparable data on the quality 
of life and other country ‘performance indicators’. Appendix 1 
benchmarks Australia with comparator countries
• In the United States, eight of the leading ageing-focused 
organisations have formed the Frameworks Institute ‘to  create 
a better public understanding of older adults’ needs and 
contributions to society—and subsequently to improve the lives 
of all people as they age.14 The partner organisations include AARP 
Inc. (representing 40 million older people), the knowledge-based 
Gerontological Society of America, and organisations representing 
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The Institute’s influential report, Aging, Agency, and Attribution of 
responsibility: Shifting Public Discourse about Older Adults (O’Neil 
and Haydon 2015), identifies media and advocacy narratives on 
ageing including ‘the throw-away generation’, ‘Vibrant Senior’, 
‘Demographic Crisis’, ‘Aging Workers’, ‘Government and Solution’ 
and ‘Government as Problem’.
Conclusion
Evidence and ideas-based action is underway on ageing well. 
Constructive images of ageing are being championed by advocates, 
notably COTAs and NSA along with AAG, the Australian Human 
Rights  Commission (AHRC 2015), and researchers and service 
providers  who seek out older people’s views. Research can suggest 
priorities and inform effective directions for achieving ageing well. 
In the short-term, research findings on fundamental concepts such as 
ageing well are unlikely to have much influence among the contests 
of interest groups in the broader economy and public policy. Over 
the longer-term, however, the values-based ageing well approach, 
embedded in the experiences and aspirations of older people 
themselves, can be an important investment in positive approaches to 
ageing people and an ageing society.
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Enhancing cognitive capacities 
over the life-span 
Kaarin J Anstey
Cognitive capacities refer to memory, thinking, reasoning, problem-
solving, planning and processing speed and are also broadly 
described as aspects of human intelligence. Early psychologists used 
the term ‘intelligence’ to refer to what was viewed as a form of ‘innate’ 
cognitive ability that was thought to be relatively fixed throughout life 
and strongly genetically based. However, over the past 50 years, this 
collection of cognitive abilities has been viewed increasingly in a fluid 
and dynamic way, recognising that there are strong environmental and 
experiential influences on cognitive development, as well as genetic 
influences (Horn 1987).
In order to think about enhancing cognitive function over the life-
course we must make the assumption that cognitive abilities and 
their development are not fully predetermined (Baltes 1993). Genetic 
research has shown that heritability of intelligence increases through 
adulthood from about 20 per cent in younger adults up to around 
80 per cent in old age. 
However, this applies to level of cognitive function in old age; the 
rate of cognitive decline does not seem heritable (Deary 2012). 
Moreover, studies on heritability have used traditional psychometric 
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tests of ability and have not examined more dynamic measures such 
as neuroplasticity. Variability within individuals may provide scope 
for improvement and optimising cognitive function (Ackerman 1987).
For several decades it has been recognised that different cognitive 
abilities appear to be vulnerable to different experiences and 
neurological conditions (Dixon 2011; Tucker-Drob 2009). Abilities 
such as reasoning, information processing speed and the higher-level 
planning and executive function appear to decline more with normal 
ageing and have been described as ‘fluid’ abilities or ‘mechanic abilities’ 
(Baltes 1987). Abilities involving the accumulation of knowledge and 
expertise appear to increase slowly through adulthood and are less 
vulnerable to ageing (Baltes 1987; Horn and Cattell 1967). These have 
been described as crystallised or pragmatic abilities. 
At the societal level, the value of cognitive abilities can be viewed 
as a form of ‘cognitive capital’ that enriches a nation’s capacity to be 
innovative and productive, and contributes significantly to wealth. 
Hence there are both individual- and society-level perspectives 
to consider in relation to optimising cognitive function.
Why should we aim for optimal cognitive 
function in an ageing society?
There are at least three important reasons for research into optimising 
cognitive development and cognitive health, and the translation of 
these research findings for public policy. First, as mentioned above, 
cognitive capital is a resource for society that enables productivity 
in both the paid and unpaid workforce (Beddington et al. 2008). 
Greater overall cognitive capital will lead to increased employment 
and economic benefits. Second, better cognitive function in earlier life 
reduces the risk of an individual developing cognitive impairment in 
later life, reduces the risk of dementia and is associated with greater 
longevity (Deary et al. 2004). Individuals with better cognitive function 
will take longer to decline to the point where they are impaired. Third, 
better cognitive function helps individuals age well (Starr et al. 2003). 
Cognitive function enables many aspects of everyday life, such as 
managing finances, planning travel, and managing medical conditions. 
167
8 . ENHANCING COGNITIVE CAPACITIES OVER THE LIFE-SPAN
Hence, optimising cognitive function will improve quality of life for 
individuals and societies and reduce the economic burden of health-
care provision as individuals are able to maintain self-integrity and 
self-care for longer.
Cognitive decline, cognitive impairment 
and dementia—a continuum
Importantly, with increasing life expectancy the integrity of the brain 
and cognition into very old age has become a new focus for research. 
There is a direct link between cognitive ageing and dementia, with 
researchers often seeing cognitive function, cognitive impairment 
and dementia on a continuum (Figure 1), whereas 20 years ago these 
were often viewed as distinct domains of research. There is much 
focus on dementia, and the public generally fear developing dementia 
(Kim et al. 2015; Zeng et al. 2015). However, it is less widely recognised 
that cognitive impairment that is not severe enough to meet criteria 
for dementia affects approximately 10 per cent of adults in their 60s 
(Anstey et al. 2013a) and 20 per cent of adults aged 70 and older, about 
three to four times the number of older adults who have dementia 
(Plassman et al. 2008). A large proportion of older adults with Mild 
Cognitive Impairment ultimately develop dementia (Farias et al. 2009) 
and hence Mild Cognitive Impairment is a strong risk factor for 
dementia. 
Mild Cognitive Impairment impacts on quality of life and the capacity 
for independent living (Anstey et al. 2013b). 
In our epidemiological study, the PATH Through Life, we found that 
adults aged in their 60s with Mild Cognitive Impairment reported 
higher rates of difficulties with instrumental activities of daily living 
such as reading maps, shopping, making telephone calls, and taking 
medications (Anstey 2013b). Hence, with an ageing population, it is 
crucial that we identify and implement methods to enable individuals 
to enhance their cognitive abilities and maintain them into very old 
age. Ideally, a minimal number of adults will experience cognitive 
impairment in their old age and few will develop dementia. 
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Figure 1. Schematic representation of the trajectory of cognitive 
development over the life-course
Capacity may vary according to lifestyle, environment, education and health .
Source: Provided by author .
Life-course perspective
When ageing research focuses exclusively on older adults, for 
example analysing data from studies of adults aged over 70 years, 
the contributions of earlier life are often overlooked. In the case 
of cognitive ageing, the starting point for an individual’s cognitive 
development is prenatal, but the critical point for understanding their 
trajectory is the peak of cognitive ability reached in the mid-20s and 
then the rate of decline in cognitive abilities that commences in late-
middle age. It is widely recognised that a life-course perspective needs 
to be taken into account for the development of cognitive abilities 
over the life-course (Baltes et al. 1999). Cognitive function in late life 
is influenced by the accumulation of the impacts of risk factors, insults 
to the brain, neuropathology, and cognitively enhancing activities 
that may provide some buffer against the impact of risk factors.
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Figure 1 presents a schematic representation of cognitive development 
over the life-course, showing that cognitive impairment is on 
a continuum with normal age-related cognitive decline. The schematic 
illustrates the trajectory for cognitive growth, showing the peak in 
the mid-20s for fluid abilities, and the general stability of cognitive 
function in middle-age, followed by decline in late life. It is clear from 
this figure that increasing the peak of cognitive function in young 
adulthood will improve cognitive function for the remainder of 
the adult life-course. And hence, optimal cognitive ageing requires 
investment in early cognitive development (Anstey 2014). Similarly, 
maintaining cognitive function in middle-age will contribute to 
adults ageing well, minimising risk of cognitive impairment. The fact 
that cognitive function in late life is the accumulation of both 
cognitive growth in childhood and early adulthood, and the degree 
of maintenance through middle-age, means that a life-course approach 
needs to be taken to cognitive ageing at a public policy and health 
promotion level. 
Taking a life-course approach to optimal cognitive ageing requires 
focusing different elements of the cognitive trajectories over the life-
course and developing appropriate interventions for different ages or 
phases. Typically, cognitive function is stable in middle-age apart from 
the slowing of reaction time and processing speed. However, by the 
mid-60s, decline in cognitive function may start to occur. The age at 
which cognitive abilities start to decline and the rate of decline are 
influenced by a range of risk and protective factors. An example of 
how both level and slope of cognitive function may be associated with 
specific risk factors is shown in Figure 2. This depicts the adult life-
course cognitive data from the PATH Through Life project for smokers 
and non-smokers. Smokers perform more poorly at each age, and, 
in the oldest cohort, are starting to show a faster rate of decline in 
processing speed than non-smokers. 
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Figure 2. Processing speed ability for smokers and non-smokers aged 
in their 60s over eight years
Smokers show lower level and faster decline . 
Source: Provided by author .
Cognitive reserve
The ‘building of intelligence’ in early life through enriched 
environments and education that promote peak functioning is related 
to another key concept described by psychologists as ‘cognitive 
reserve’ (Stern 2009). This ‘reserve’ provides individuals with a buffer 
to sustain their cognitive function when they develop neuropathology 
or experience diseases or stressors that impact on the brain and 
subsequent cognitive capacity. The idea of cognitive reserve was 
introduced originally to account for the finding at autopsy that some 
individuals who presented with Alzheimer’s pathology did not have 
dementia. In a well-known study of 137 nursing home residents of 
whom  79 per cent were demented prior to death, 55 per cent had 
Alzheimer’s pathology, 11 per cent had other neuropathology 
and 11 per cent had no neuropathology (Katzman et al. 1988). 
Of patients with dementia, 9 per cent had no neuropathology. This 
study demonstrated that there is no direct correlation between 
171
8 . ENHANCING COGNITIVE CAPACITIES OVER THE LIFE-SPAN
neuropathology and dementia and such results have been replicated 
numerous times over the past two decades. Those without dementia, 
but who had neuropathology associated with Alzheimer’s disease, 
had more neurones and intact pyramidal neurones and heavier brains 
than controls. It was therefore postulated that some individuals have 
a type of ‘reserve’ capacity, originally described as ‘brain reserve’ 
(Richards and Deary 2005; Stern 2002, 2006). 
More recent research has used functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (MRI) to explore the idea of brain and cognitive reserve 
(e.g. Stern et al. 2005; Stern et al. 2008). Greater activation of specific 
brain regions during a working memory task has been associated with 
higher levels of education (Sandry and Sumowski 2014; Sumowski 
et al. 2014). The idea of cognitive reserve developed from this research 
to explain the fact that individuals with higher levels of education 
and higher IQ appear to be at lower risk of dementia and more resilient 
to the impact of neuropathology on cognitive function. At present, 
we do not know the full potential of the human brain in terms of 
how much we can intervene to build cognitive reserve. It is likely that 
cognitive reserve can be enhanced by cognitive and physical training 
throughout adulthood. 
Neuroplasticity
Neuroplasticity is related to cognitive reserve and is another key 
concept for understanding how we may optimise cognitive function 
(Petrosini et al. 2009; Whalley et al. 2004). Neuroplasticity refers 
to the capacity of cerebral neural pathways to grow and adapt to 
environmental exposures, behavioural changes, and specific cognitive 
and brain training (May 2011). This means that intellectually 
stimulating activities may maintain and even improve brain function 
during adulthood, potentially contributing to cognitive reserve 
and reducing the risk of dementia. Support for the benefit of a 
cognitively engaged lifestyle has been seen in studies linking lifestyle 
cognitive activity to the reduced risk of dementia (Fratiglioni et al. 
2004). Results from the largest cognitive training study, the ACTIVE 
trial, have also shown benefits of an intervention that trained older 
adults in either memory, processing speed or reasoning skills as well 
as  everyday function (Willis et al. 2006). Importantly, long-term 
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follow-up of participants trained on reasoning or processing speed 
showed cognitive benefits were maintained after 10 years (Rebok et 
al.  2014). Adults who participated in speed of processing training 
were also less likely to have given up driving over the follow-up period 
(Edwards et al. 2009). 
In another cognitive training study, middle-aged and older adults 
used the speed of processing training paradigm from the ACTIVE trial 
and benefits were found for speed of processing training conducted 
both at home and by groups in a laboratory (Wolinsky et al. 2013). 
The benefits translated into between two and five years of prevented 
cognitive decline on standardised cognitive tests. Most cognitive 
training research has focused on older adults and children with 
attention deficit disorders; results typically demonstrate that cortical 
thickness can be increased through intensive repetitive cognitive 
exercises (Kueider et al. 2012). Research into music training has 
also demonstrated cognitive and brain benefits in children, but the 
long-term impact of musical training in childhood is not yet known 
(Lappe et al. 2011). Research in older adults has shown that there are 
brain changes associated with memory training (Engvig et al. 2010). 
Brain training research in general has been criticised as improvements 
are only noted on those cognitive capacities focused on in the 
training; the transfer of benefit to everyday function has rarely 
been demonstrated. A number of empirical issues relating to dosage, 
frequency, intensity and type of training have not yet been resolved. 
Nevertheless, the field is part of a broader movement that will lead 
to discoveries about how to optimise cognitive function in ways that 
potentially will persist into late life. 
Multidomain influences on cognitive 
development require a multidisciplinary 
approach—the CHELM Model
Influences on cognitive function draw from several different domains, 
including genetics, environment, sociodemographic factors, health 
behaviour, and disease (Fotuhi et al. 2012). Developments in education, 
neuroscience, medicine and psychology have each contributed to an 
emerging framework for understanding cognitive abilities over the life-
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course. These also speak to potential areas where interventions may be 
conducted to reduce risk of cognitive decline, and even promote or 
improve cognitive abilities. 
Interventions to address the influences on cognitive development 
may  occur at multiple levels, from changing individual behaviour 
to changing public policy relating to education, health care 
or the environment (Fratiglioni and Qiu 2011). Ultimately, the 
better our society facilitates optimal cognitive development and 
maintenance, the better we will age as individuals and as a society 
(Beddington et al. 2008). 
A framework for optimising cognitive function is required to pull 
together the multidomain nature of impacts on cognitive function that 
will ultimately lead to the level of cognitive ability an individual has 
in old age (Anstey 2014). I have previously proposed the Cognitive 
Health Environment Lifestyle Model to depict a framework for 
understanding influences on cognitive function that may guide policy 
and intervention.
Figure 3. The Cognitive Health Environment and Life Course Model 
Source: Adapted from Anstey (2014) . 
This model depicts how various domains influence cognitive outcomes, 
providing a framework for interventions at the levels of public policy, 
lifestyle and behavioural changes, and pharmacotherapy.
According to the CHELM framework, intervention can occur through 
public policy, non-pharmacological behaviour change interventions, 
pharmacological interventions and activities to develop cognitive 
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reserve. Public policy interventions are required to address 
environmental and contextual influences on cognitive development 
and cognitive function. These include ensuring as many children as 
possible receive high-quality education to develop brain structure 
and brain reserve. Retaining children in school and promoting lifelong 
learning and occupational training can be influenced by public 
policy in relation to the provision of education and the maintaining 
of standards of education. 
Public policy is also important for addressing environmental influences 
such as air pollution in large cities, and the impact of the built 
environment on the lifestyle behaviours that ultimately impact on the 
brain and cognition. Environmental factors influencing cognition may, 
for example, include the design of environments, access to high-quality 
unprocessed food and access to sporting facilities that encourage 
individuals to engage in activities that promote health and wellbeing 
and ward off disease. Establishing building and design codes that take 
into account the health and capacities of communities and populations 
with specific needs will ultimately lead to gains in cognitive capital as 
well as reduced prevalence of chronic diseases. Hence, our society’s 
approach to a broad range of issues and inequality can be viewed in 
terms of how such factors impact on the cognitive health of individuals, 
which in turn contribute to how well individuals will age. 
Behavioural interventions are required to address risk factors for 
chronic disease that are also linked to brain and cognitive health. 
These include sedentary behaviour (Lautenschlager et al. 2010), diet 
quality (Ashby-Mitchell et al. 2015), smoking (Anstey et al. 2007) and 
unhealthy alcohol drinking (Anstey et al. 2009). While Body Mass 
Index (BMI) is not a health behaviour it is a medical condition that 
may be influenced by health behaviour as well as medical treatment. 
Both low BMI (underweight) and high BMI (overweight and obese) in 
middle-age have been linked to increased risk of Alzheimer’s disease 
and dementia (Anstey et al. 2011). 
Emerging research in the field of dementia risk reduction is focusing 
on developing ways of reducing behaviours that increase the risk 
of cognitive decline and dementia. For example, we have developed 
an online dementia risk-reduction intervention called Body Brain 
Life (BBL) (Anstey et al. 2013a). BBL includes seven modules, two 
of which educate individuals about dementia and dementia risk 
reduction. Another five modules address individual health behaviours 
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using behavioural change principles and techniques such as goal-
setting and self-monitoring. Other more intensive interventions to 
improve cognitive decline have involved walking groups, personal 
exercise prescription and individual dietary prescription and support 
(Ngandu et al. 2015; Richard et al. 2012). 
Preliminary results from one large European risk-reduction trial 
has shown that two years post-intervention, cognitive function was 
improved in the intervention group compared with a control group 
that received usual care (Ngandu et al. 2015). As depression is an 
established risk factor for dementia, behavioural interventions to 
reduce depression are also an avenue for dementia risk reduction. 
Protective behaviours that reduce risk of dementia include increasing 
social engagement (Fratiglioni et al. 2004), cognitive engagement 
(Wilson et al. 2002) and eating fish (Fotuhi et al. 2009). 
Pharmaceutical interventions are also appropriate to treat conditions 
that increase the risk of dementia. These include hypertension, 
diabetes, heart disease and depression. Recent studies have identified 
cardiovascular risk factors in young adults influence cognitive ability 
(Aberg et al. 2009), and cardiovascular risk factors in middle-age 
influence dementia outcomes in late life (Kivipelto et al. 2001). Other 
medical conditions linked to cognitive function and decline include 
head injury and diabetes. However, research is now looking beyond 
purely medical and health explanations for individual differences 
in cognitive function. 
Environmental factors are of increasing concern in the domain of public 
health in relation to respiratory function, and there is now evidence 
for air pollution being associated with poorer cognitive function and 
Alzheimer’s pathology (Calderon-Garciduenas et al. 2012). 
There is growing evidence that a range of pesticides and other 
chemicals are associated with cognitive deficits, yet this area of 
research is currently limited due to a lack of high-quality data (Zaganas 
et al. 2013). Environmental factors relating to diet may affect entire 
populations, in addition to historical effects such as major societal 
stressors and traumas. 
Our society still traditionally views early life as the period during 
which individuals undertake their education and vocational training. 
However, research on brain development combined with increasing 
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longevity suggests that our perspective on education needs to change. 
Participation in education at various points during adulthood may 
have influences on the brain that we have not yet imagined. Bringing 
all our knowledge together and creating the best possible public 
policy for cognitive health is likely to promote genuine increases in 
the numbers of adults who age well, and reduce the prevalence of late 
life dementia. 
Future directions
Research into factors that reduce cognitive capacity and methods of 
optimising cognitive capacity is relatively new and many fundamental 
questions remain unanswered. For example, little is known about how 
interventions at specific ages may influence longer-term cognitive 
outcomes, and whether this again differs by sex and genetic risk 
profile. We still do not know the optimal dosage of most interventions, 
or for how long they need to be administered. Often cohort studies 
are limited by the initial measures included in the study, by short 
follow-up periods or attrition. Intervention studies are typically 
limited by highly selected and unrepresentative samples, and short 
follow-up periods, with few interventions lasting as long as two 
years. In  the context of cognitive function over the life-course it is 
possible that interventions may need to be administered for decades 
or even lifelong, to demonstrate their potential. Cognitive change in 
healthy adults is very slow and hence it is difficult to detect the effects 
of interventions with small samples and over short time-frames. 
In addition to unanswered questions about interventions, there are 
also unanswered questions about the sub-populations in whom they 
may be trialled. We do not know which interventions may be effective 
in adults who already have some degree of cognitive impairment 
and the extent of neural plasticity possible in adults with dementia. 
Many of our hypotheses relating to optimising cognitive function are 
based on observational research that links risk and protective factors 
to better cognition. However, to date there has not been enough 
research to confirm whether risk modification will lead to reversibility 
of cognitive decline or improvement. With increasing longevity, it is 
unknown whether the same risk profiles associated with cognitive 
decline in say adults in their 80s will be associated with cognitive 
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decline in adults in their 90s or beyond 100. Some recent research has 
suggested that the increased longevity associated with lack of risk 
factors (e.g. non-smoking) may actually increase the time spent with 
cognitive impairment over the entire life-span because adults simply 
live longer and age is the greatest risk factors for cognitive decline 
(Anstey et al. 2014). Altogether, there is a need for a major research 
effort in enhancing cognitive capacities over the adult life-course that 
will have major benefits for individuals and societies.
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Social engagement in late life
Tim D Windsor, Rachel G Curtis and Mary A Luszcz 
Gerontologists and older adults agree that remaining socially engaged 
into late life represents a hallmark of ageing well. It is now well 
established that having diverse, supportive social networks can 
promote physical and mental health. Social network members can 
have a positive influence on health behaviours (e.g. a friend or relative 
encouraging exercise or medication adherence), provide support 
during times of need, and allow opportunities for social interactions 
that create positive emotional experiences (Berkman 1995; Thoits 
2006). The past decade has also seen increasing research interest in 
the possibility that social engagement protects against cognitive 
decline and dementia (e.g. Fratiglioni et al. 2004; Hertzog et al. 2008; 
Windsor et al. 2014). Individuals who remain active and socially 
engaged across the retirement transition and into late life are also best 
placed to continue making a strong social and economic contribution; 
a factor likely to prove critical in successfully navigating some of the 
challenges of population ageing.
This chapter draws on theory and empirical research from social 
gerontology and life-span developmental psychology to outline a 
number of key factors that influence older adults’ social engagement 
(Bowling and Dieppe 2005; Rowe and Kahn 1987). Where appropriate, 
we supplement discussion of international research with our own 
findings from the Australian Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ALSA; 
Luszcz et al. 2014) to provide a uniquely Australian perspective on 
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key factors that influence social activity in late life. Finally, we discuss 
issues of relevance to public policy, outlining intervention programs 
designed to reduce social isolation in older adults, discussing the 
economic contribution made by older adult volunteers, and noting 
the challenges and opportunities associated with promoting social 
engagement among oldest-old adults who may be experiencing more 
significant health and cognitive limitations. 
What predicts social engagement among 
older adults? 
International studies have consistently shown that social networks 
tend to become smaller, and social engagement declines with advancing 
age (Lang and Carstensen, 1994). These findings are mirrored in the 
Australian context, as shown in Figure 1, which displays results of 
analysis using the ALSA.1 Here we see that older participants report 
lower levels of social activity engagement, and show a steeper average 
rate of decline in social activity engagement over 18 years. 
Researchers have tended to explain declines in social engagement 
with advancing age in terms of either ageing-related changes in 
resources, or social motivation (Windsor et al. 2011). Resource-based 
explanations tend to focus on how changes in one’s repertoire of 
abilities or external ‘assets’ may have flow-on effects on the nature 
or extent of social activities or participation. They acknowledge that 
shrinking networks in later life are in part due to the loss of network 
members that occurs through the death of family and friends, and 
also focus on how declining health and mobility (including restricted 
access to private and public transport) can adversely affect social 
activity (e.g. Pinquart 2003). 
1  Estimates used to generate Figure 1, as well as additional findings based on the ALSA that 
are reported subsequently, are based on a series of multi-level growth models that examined 
associations of age, gender, partner status, physical and cognitive health, socioeconomic status, 
positive affect, and subjective life expectancy with levels, and rates of change in social activity. 
Interested readers are invited to contact the first author for details of the analysis and results.
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Figure 1. Social activity level change age as people grow older, 
Australian Longitudinal Study of Ageing
Estimated average trajectories of change in social activity for ALSA participants aged 
70, and aged 80 at baseline . Older adults showed lower initial levels of social activity 
engagement, and this age differential increased in size over time.
Source: Provided by author . 
Surviving to the ‘fourth age’ or oldest-old adulthood (e.g. ages  85 
and above) might be regarded as a major achievement in and of 
itself. However, whereas the third age for many is a period of vitality 
and engagement, the fourth age is more typically accompanied by 
significant declines in health and functioning (Baltes and Smith 
2003). In turn, losses in mobility, energy, and cognitive and sensory 
functioning may adversely affect levels of out-of-home activity and 
social contact among the oldest-old (Pinquart 2003). Various empirical 
studies have linked poor health with reduced social activity among 
older adults. For example, a population-based study of adults aged 
57–85 found that those who were more socially disconnected also 
reported poorer health (Cornwell and Waite 2009). Complementing this 
finding, another cross-sectional study of adults aged 65–85 indicated 
that social connectedness (but not social support availability) was 
associated with better self-reported health (Ashida and Heaney 2008). 
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Cognitive health is also likely to be an important resource in driving 
levels of social activity engagement in older adulthood. To date, 
research  has tended to focus on the extent to which maintaining 
levels of social engagement provides opportunities for cognitive 
enrichment that could help to maximise cognitive performance 
potential (e.g.  Hertzog et al. 2008). However, it is also likely that 
normal and pathological cognitive ageing curtails social engagement. 
For example, dementia (particularly Alzheimer’s disease) is preceded 
by a long pre-clinical phase characterised by milder cognitive deficits 
believed to reduce capacity around activities of daily living as well as 
precipitating withdrawal from social and leisure activities (Stoykova et 
al. 2011). The importance of health and cognition as enablers of late life 
social engagement is supported by results of our ALSA analysis, which 
showed that measures of disability and cognitive impairment were 
robust predictors of levels of activity engagement after controlling for 
a range of sociodemographic and individual difference (positive affect, 
subjective life expectancy) variables.
In addition to ageing-related changes in health and cognitive capacity, 
sociostructural factors such as social disadvantage are also relevant 
to social engagement. Theoretical perspectives, concerned with the 
link between socioeconomic status (SES) and health, recognise social 
disadvantage as resulting in fewer opportunities to accumulate the 
economic, behavioural and psychosocial resources believed to protect 
against health risk (e.g. Gallo 2009). For example, financial hardship 
may necessitate living in disadvantaged neighbourhoods where levels 
of social cohesion, trust, and reciprocity are low (Chen and Miller 2013). 
Low neighbourhood cohesion might be particularly disadvantageous 
to older adults living alone and in poor health, who might otherwise 
rely on their neighbours for support (Laporte et al. 2008). 
Different structural opportunities established early in life might also 
have implications for the establishment and maintenance of social 
networks throughout adulthood. For example, individuals with 
higher educational attainment may have greater opportunities to 
develop communication, cognitive, and social skills, which in turn 
facilitate forming and maintaining relationships (Broese Van Groenou 
and Van Tilburg 2003). Empirical research generally supports the 
premise that, among older people, those with low SES report smaller 
networks with fewer non-kin relationships relative to those with 
higher SES (e.g. Antonucci 2001; Smith and Baltes 1998; Wenger 1995). 
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For example, a large study of older Dutch adults found that low SES 
older adults reported smaller networks, and lower levels of support 
from non-kin, relative to those with high SES (Broese Van Groenou 
and Van Tilburg 2003), and our own analysis of ALSA points to those 
who are better educated engaging in more social activity. 
Explanations that focus on motivation for decreasing social 
engagement  recognise the extent to which older adults play a 
deliberate role in shaping their own social development. According 
to socioemotional selectivity theory (SST; Carstensen and 
Lockenhoff  2003), recognition of one’s mortality, or limits to time 
remaining, become more salient with advancing age, and this results 
in a re-prioritisation of goals. Specifically, future-oriented goals 
(e.g. acquiring knowledge to create opportunities) that are well served 
by larger, more diverse social networks are replaced by present-
oriented goals (e.g. maximising the quality of emotional experiences 
in the here and now) that are better served by smaller, more close-knit 
networks. Thus, older adults may reduce their levels of engagement 
with more peripheral social network members in order to spend their 
remaining time with those who are most important to them. 
Ageing-related changes in motivation and social behaviour described 
by SST have been invoked to account for the better quality of emotional 
experience frequently reported by older, relative to younger, adults 
(e.g. Charles and Carstensen 2009; Windsor et al. 2011), and the 
findings that older adults typically report smaller social networks, 
but at the same time greater satisfaction with their networks (Lang and 
Carstensen 1994). Consistent with SST, in the ALSA, perceptions of 
more time remaining to live are associated with greater social activity 
engagement; however, this relationship is accounted for to a large 
degree by individual differences in disability and cognitive limitations. 
Thus, the ALSA findings provide some broad support for SST, but also 
suggest that both perceived limits to time remaining and decreases in 
social engagement could result from underlying declines in functional 
and cognitive capacities. 
Our brief coverage of the relevant literature above highlights the 
broad range of factors that facilitate, or inhibit older adults’ social 
engagement. Among these various influences, physical health 
and cognitive capacity are central. This is important from a policy 
perspective, as it suggests that successful public health interventions 
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designed to promote ageing well (see Chapter 7, this volume) and 
cognitive health (see Chapter 8, this volume) are likely to offer positive 
flow-on effects for social engagement. There is also, however, a growing 
interest in the potential benefits of intervention programs designed to 
directly address social isolation among older adults. In the next section, 
we provide an overview of such programs, and outline contemporary 
thinking regarding how interventions for reducing social isolation 
might be best designed and implemented into the future. 
Programs for reducing social isolation 
among older adults
Numerous intervention programs with diverse characteristics have 
been employed worldwide in an effort to reduce social isolation 
in older  adults. Evidence to date indicates that the most effective 
programs are those that have a theoretical basis, those that include 
an educational component (e.g. health-related education), and those 
including social support or activities that target specific groups 
(e.g.  women, caregivers, widowed: Cattan et al. 2005; Dickens et 
al. 2011). For  example, a group-based friendship program offered 
women weekly lessons over 12 weeks to help them clarify their 
expectations regarding relationships, develop their interpersonal 
skills (e.g. listening, self-disclosure), evaluate the potential of their 
existing friendships to fulfil their relationship needs, and develop 
plans to achieve personal relationship goals. Participants reported 
increased friendships and reduced loneliness during the following 
year (Stevens 2001). Evidence supporting the effectiveness of one-to-
one interventions, such as home-based visits and telephone support 
services, is less compelling (Cattan et al. 2005; Dickens et al. 2011; 
Findlay 2003). 
There has been relatively little research on service-oriented and 
community development approaches to intervention (Cattan et al. 
2005). Although researchers have implemented and evaluated a range 
of interventions for social isolation, limitations in study design 
have often led to inconclusive findings (Findlay 2003). For example, 
many studies are characterised by poorly developed interventions, 
high attrition rates, small or unrepresentative samples, and failure 
to consider confounding variables (Dickens et al. 2011). Reviews 
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of intervention projects are consistent in emphasising the need for 
better-designed, more rigorous approaches to evaluation (Cattan et al. 
2005; Dickens et al. 2011; Findlay 2003). 
A research-to-practice consensus workshop concerned with advancing 
research on interventions for social isolation among older adults 
outlined five practice-based priorities (Sabir et al. 2009): 
• A first priority was concerned with shedding light on barriers 
to  service utilisation and ways to increase participation among 
older adults who do not access free services. 
• Second, emphasis was placed on the need to develop an easily 
administered measure for the identification of older adults at risk 
of social isolation. Positive outcomes of effective interventions may 
have been obscured in previous studies through a focus on general 
populations of older adults assumed to be experiencing isolation, 
rather than targeting those genuinely isolated (Dickens et al. 2011). 
• A third priority concerned the implementation of more effective 
means of evaluating one-to-one direct and indirect contact 
interventions. This is important for older adults who face barriers 
to participation in group interventions due to, for example, 
physical frailty. One-to-one interventions may prove to be more 
effective than has been previously established when implemented 
with a more rigorous research design and approach to evaluation. 
• Fourth, the importance of designing and evaluating interventions 
that address multiple possible causes of social isolation was 
identified. For many older adults, social isolation could arise from 
the cumulative effects of multiple risk factors (e.g. poor health, 
limited transport options, and language barriers); however, 
the  effectiveness of multicomponent interventions designed 
to address manifold challenges is yet to be established. 
• A final priority was concerned with research focusing on how 
provision of services promoting social engagement needs to be 
effectively balanced with the rights of older adults to make their 
own decisions regarding the services they access. Part of this 
focus on ‘self-determination’ was also concerned with the value of 
promoting reciprocity in relationships, whereby older adults have 
the opportunity to make an active contribution to the wellbeing 
of others, rather than simply being passive recipients of services 
(Sabir et al. 2009). 
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Several Australian-based researchers, policymakers, and organisations 
are at the forefront of efforts aimed at reducing social isolation among 
older adults. This is perhaps best illustrated by the Queensland 
Cross-Government Project to Reduce Social Isolation in Older People 
(CGPRSIOP: Bartlett et al. 2013). Through literature reviews, community 
consultations, and the evaluation of multiple demonstration projects, 
the CGPRSIOP developed a set of best-practice guidelines for reducing 
social isolation (Department of Communities 2009). A  number of 
these guidelines echo key recommendations and priorities from the 
international perspectives outlined above (Cattan et al. 2005; Sabir et 
al. 2009), including the need for theoretically based programs with 
a built-in evaluation component, the value in targeting high-risk 
groups, the importance of programs offering meaning and purpose to 
participants, and the benefits of engaging older adults in the design 
and implementation of programs for reducing social isolation. 
Guidelines from the CGPRSIOP study also emphasise the need 
for a whole-of-community response, involving collaboration and 
information sharing across government and non-government sectors, 
to effectively address the wide array of factors that can contribute to 
social isolation. One such factor that is worth highlighting is access 
to appropriate, safe, and affordable transport, which is essential 
for the equitable access of older adults to programs and services. 
A  group who may be at particular risk of isolation are those who 
have given up driving due to declining health (Marottoli et al. 2000). 
Finally, the CGPRSIOP argues that the interventions with the greatest 
potential for long-term success and sustainability are those that build 
on existing community programs, resources, and organisations. 
Pilot programs set up by the CGRSIOP have included physical exercise 
and education groups, a focus on better service integration and 
provision with an associated ‘buddy system’, and a volunteer service 
providing resources to older adults from culturally and linguistically 
diverse backgrounds. Initial evaluation of the pilot programs produced 
mixed findings, and highlighted a number of methodological 
challenges associated with implementing a rigorous evaluation. These 
included problems of adequate sample size, sample composition and 
representativeness, attrition, the difficulty in controlling for changes 
in social contact outside the scope of the intervention, and problems 
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with the standardisation and administration of evaluation procedures 
across different programs, community, and service-provider groups 
(Bartlett et al. 2013). 
Taken together the evidence to date suggests that the establishment 
of  effective, rigorous, and robust means of evaluating interventions 
for  social isolation among older adults may be the most pressing 
challenge facing researchers. It is also a critical challenge to overcome, 
as despite the credibility and likely value of many such programs, 
it will be difficult to justify substantial investment in the absence of 
their demonstrated efficacy. Here, we reiterate Findlay’s (2003) point 
that ‘networking between communities, governments, the private 
sector and researchers is essential to provide target-group input, 
financial support and technical expertise necessary for thorough 
evaluations of interventions’ (p 655).
Efforts at improving approaches to implementation and evaluation 
of social isolation interventions may be boosted by a recently funded 
Australian Research Council Linkage project concerned with analysing 
the effectiveness of social isolation interventions, and identifying 
models of social inclusion that have the potential to make the greatest 
positive impact (see Noone 2011). Although still in its early stages, 
findings from this research program will have the potential to inform 
the further development and implementation of new interventions, 
and/or the expansion of successful existing approaches. 
Social engagement and the economic 
contribution of older Australians
Maximising opportunities for older Australians to remain actively 
engaged in their communities is not only critical for the continued 
wellbeing of individuals and societies, it also represents an important 
economic goal in the context of population ageing. As outlined in the 
final report compiled by the Advisory Panel on the Economic Potential 
of Senior Australians (APEPSA 2011), while projections indicate 
significant economic challenges arising from population ageing, 
it is also true that population ageing brings significant economic 
opportunities. The report advocates a whole-of-government approach 
to maximising the productive potential of older Australians through 
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addressing discriminatory attitudes that restrict opportunities for 
workforce participation, increasing workplace flexibility, removing 
barriers to participation that exist in the built environment, and 
promoting lifestyle choices that enhance population health, and in 
turn older adults’ potential for productive engagement. 
Also recognised in the APEPSA report are the substantial social and 
economic contributions made by older Australians through their 
participation in volunteering. For example, in South Australia, 
volunteering was estimated to contribute just under $5 billion 
annually to the state economy during the early to mid-2000s. In 2010, 
among those volunteering formally for organisations, an estimated 
22 per cent of the total value was contributed by adults aged 55–64, 
with 25 per cent contributed by those aged 65 and older (Ironmonger 
2011). Of additional significance is the well-established finding that 
volunteering is of benefit not just to society and the economy, but 
also to those who volunteer. Volunteering provides a formal social 
role that can replace previous work-based roles post-retirement 
(Greenfield and Marks 2004), and studies have linked volunteering 
among older adults to a range of beneficial outcomes including better 
health, reduced depressive symptoms, increased life satisfaction, and 
longevity (Morrow-Howell 2010). 
The potential for volunteering to offer a salubrious ‘double-whammy’ 
means that identifying opportunities to facilitate volunteering 
for those with the interest and capacity, and removing barriers to 
volunteering, represent topics of keen interest to researchers and 
policymakers. Australian research (Warburton et al. 2007) reveals 
a need for more effective promotion of volunteering among older 
adults, including opportunities for training, flexibility of hours, 
and education for the latent volunteer population, which highlights 
the fact that volunteering opportunities exist for those with a diverse 
array of circumstances, needs, and skills. 
The APEPSA (2011) also point to concerns regarding personal 
liability as a potential barrier to older adults’ volunteering. They go 
on to recommend a review of legislation, and discussions involving 
government and industry regarding the availability of appropriate 
and affordable insurance cover for older volunteers. Facilitating 
volunteering opportunities for older adults with a diverse array of 
backgrounds and skills is likely to be at the centre of future efforts 
to enhance social participation among older adults. To this end, 
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continuing to effectively link older adults with existing volunteer 
organisations will be a central component. In addition, flexible and 
creative thinking concerned with harnessing the potential of older 
Australians to contribute and remain engaged in novel ways represents 
an exciting future challenge. 
Social engagement among the oldest-old
Much of our discussion so far regarding social engagement among 
older Australians rests on assumptions of older adults ageing well 
(see Chapter 7, this volume), retaining independence, and remaining 
relatively free of significant physical and cognitive impairment 
during the post-retirement years. As outlined above, good health 
and cognition are key resources for social engagement, and health 
promotion efforts aimed at compression of morbidity, and delay of 
cognitive decline and dementia (see Chapter 8, this volume) are likely 
to provide downstream benefits for social and productive engagement 
at the population level. However, as individuals progress into oldest-
old adulthood (or the ‘fourth age’), more significant ageing-related 
losses become normative (Baltes and Smith 2003). Consequently, 
a challenge for public policy, service providers, and communities, 
concerns how to best provide opportunities for older adults to remain 
socially engaged in the context of more serious biological limitations.
This challenge is touched upon in a review of evidence concerned 
with loneliness and isolation among older adults in residential 
care (Grenade and Boldy 2008). The transition to care may result 
in a disruption to existing networks and a reduced frequency of 
contact with family and friends. At the same time, some older adults 
(particularly those previously living alone) may experience an increase 
in social contact through day-to-day interactions with staff and other 
residents. Important considerations for fostering positive relationships 
among those in residential care include appropriate staff training and 
retention policies, and providing opportunities for older residents to 
exercise independence, and promote feelings of autonomy and self-
esteem. According to Grenade and Boldy, while evaluation evidence is 
scarce, interventions aimed at promoting contact among residents in 
family- and pet-friendly aged-care environments are likely to provide 
benefits for social connectedness.
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The issue of social isolation among older adults with more significant 
health restrictions is also addressed in a recent briefing paper from 
the Social Policy Research Centre in partnership with the Benevolent 
Society (2009), which identified practice implications for community 
aged-care providers. In line with a number of the strategies for reducing 
social isolation in the community discussed above, the paper identified 
the importance of strategic approaches that target specific groups, 
and involve older adults themselves in program planning, delivery 
and evaluation. Combining social isolation programs with broader 
multifaceted approaches to health promotion is also recommended. 
Another important theme concerned the development of programs 
that enhance the autonomy of older participants by focusing on their 
strengths and achievements, facilitating the identification of goals, 
and building self-worth and confidence. 
George and Singer (2011) recently described an innovative intervention 
involving older adults with mild to moderate dementia participating 
in a volunteer program that involved mentoring kindergarten 
children in educational activities in a classroom setting. Results of 
a small, randomised controlled trial indicated that participants in the 
intervention typically showed better outcomes in stress, cognition, 
and sense of purpose relative to a control group. Only group differences 
in stress reached statistical significance; however, moderate effect 
sizes evident for other quality of life outcomes suggested that this 
was a result of small sample size (intervention n = 8; control group 
n = 7). The role of the intervention in improving outcomes for 
participants was also supported by qualitative ethnographic methods 
that suggested perceived benefits for health, purpose and quality of 
relationships (George 2011). Intergenerational programs of this type 
hold significant promise as a means of enhancing quality of life for 
healthy as well as more vulnerable older adults, and for building more 
cohesive communities by reducing negative aged-based stereotypes. 
We return to the discussion of intergenerational programs in the 
concluding section. 
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Summary and conclusions
Either by choice, or necessity, the nature of our social relationships 
tends to change with age. In this chapter, we outlined some of the main 
factors thought to influence such changes, before discussing approaches 
to interventions designed to reduce social isolation, the relevance to 
society and the economy of older adults’ social participation in the 
form of work and volunteering, and the challenges of promoting social 
engagement and inclusion among the oldest-old. Here, we conclude 
by reiterating several key points, and by introducing some additional 
issues for researchers and policymakers to consider.
An important theme that should inform future refinement and 
development of public policy related to older adults’ social engagement 
concerns how different generations can work together to contribute to, 
and benefit from, broader approaches to social inclusion. As touched 
on above, older adults themselves represent a heterogeneous group, 
with the vitality and productive engagement of many older adults in 
the third age (e.g. ages 65–84) standing in contrast to the relatively 
greater dependency and health restrictions of many in the fourth age 
(e.g. ages 85 and older; Baltes and Smith 2003). Population ageing will 
see an increase in both of these age groups, and creative approaches 
to social engagement might focus on how volunteering efforts of the 
young-old can best support the social inclusion and autonomy of the 
oldest-old. 
Recent years have seen an increased focus on the value of social 
initiatives and aspects of urban design (e.g. Eheart et al. 2009) that 
bring together children and/or younger adults with older adults. Such 
intergenerational programs are concerned with promoting interaction 
and cooperation among different generations in ways that promote 
attitudinal change and build social capital (Cummings et al. 2002). 
Research based on intergenerational programs has revealed promising 
findings including better school behaviour (Cummings et al. 2002) and 
reduced ageist stereotypes (Cummings et al. 2002; Pinquart et al. 2000) 
among child participants, and better perceptions of neighbourhood 
cohesion among older adults (de Souza and Grundy 2007). However, as 
is the case with interventions for social isolation, the wider application 
of intergenerational programs has been restricted by a lack of research 
evidence regarding their effectiveness (Statham 2009). 
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A notable exception is the US-based Experience Corps® (EC) program, 
which recruits older adult volunteers to assist in schools, providing 
support in programs designed to improve student literacy and 
behaviour. The EC program is founded on a number of specific elements 
designed to enhance its broad effectiveness in improving outcomes 
for students, older volunteers, and the community (Glass et al. 2004). 
For example, volunteers are required to make a substantial time 
commitment to the program, which is designed to foster continuity 
of volunteer–student relationships, and maximise opportunities 
for health and cognitive benefits for older adults arising from their 
volunteer activity. The program also offers training and infrastructure 
support for participants, as well as modest reimbursement for 
participants’ expenses, thereby reducing barriers to participation 
among those on lower incomes. The EC program also targets schools 
and volunteers from lower socioeconomic areas, contributing to social 
capital where it is most needed. 
An initial evaluation of the pilot EC program was based on a randomised 
controlled trial, and pointed to beneficial outcomes for volunteers in 
terms of aspects of cognitive test performance, physical activity, and 
social support (Rebok et al. 2011). Its well-developed conceptual basis 
and the rigorous approach to evaluation that underlies the EC program 
means that it provides a useful model to draw on in the design of future 
intergenerational programs in Australia. 
As we have emphasised, social connections offer wide-ranging benefits 
for the health and wellbeing of individuals, and societies. However, 
we would also add a cautionary note that those concerned with 
efforts to enhance social participation and engagement among older 
adults should be mindful of the potential for social relationships to 
result in tension and conflict as well as positive outcomes. A growing 
body of research now demonstrates that negative social exchanges 
are a significant source of stress, and can adversely impact health 
and wellbeing. Moreover, the detrimental effects of negative social 
exchanges on wellbeing may be stronger than the positive effects 
resulting from supportive relationships (Newsom et al. 2005; Rook 
2015). Thus, the most effective interventions may be those that enhance 
engagement and support among older adults while also providing 
a means for participants to readily disengage from relationships that 
they see as problematic. 
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To conclude, physical and cognitive health are important resources 
for social engagement in older adulthood. As a result, public health 
interventions designed to promote physical and cognitive health 
over the life-span are likely to have flow-on benefits for the social 
engagement of older adults. In addition, interventions that directly 
target social isolation among older adults show substantial promise; 
however, better approaches to evaluation are needed to identify those 
interventions most likely to be efficacious for different at-risk groups, 
both in the community and in residential care settings. Researchers 
have emphasised that the inclusion of older adult target groups in all 
stages of program design and evaluation is likely to be essential for the 
development of successful interventions for social isolation. 
The design of interventions should also ensure that the social 
connections being fostered, wherever possible, allow older adults to 
maintain and develop a sense of autonomy, purpose, and meaning 
around their activities; intergenerational programs appear to hold 
considerable promise as a means of achieving these goals. Older 
adults represent a heterogeneous group, with great variation in both 
capacities for, and individual inclinations toward, broader social 
engagement. As a result, social engagement and inclusion is likely to 
be best promoted through multifaceted and multidisciplinary efforts. 
Promoting healthy ageing and addressing issues of social disadvantage 
are likely to be central to these endeavours. 
Ultimately, removing barriers to social engagement among older adults 
stands to create more cohesive communities, and to maximise the 
economic and social contribution of older Australians in the context 
of population ageing. 
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10
Wellbeing and its improvability 
as a national goal 
Richard A Burns and Colette Browning 
There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so 
— Hamlet
Wellbeing has long been a discussion point for national policy when 
considering the impact of social and economic policy. Depending on 
one’s professional outlook, however, we may all arrive at quite different 
connotations of what wellbeing actually reflects. Consequently, quite 
different interventions to wellbeing improvement may be considered. 
Traditionally defined in terms of economic growth and wealth 
accumulation, more recent wellbeing definitions have incorporated 
other objective and measurable social indicators including, but not 
limited to, health-care provision, education access, housing affordability 
and equality, which have been used to provide an objective measure of 
quality of life. In contrast, for others, questions of wellbeing relate 
specifically to the burden of disease and disability in a population, 
including psychiatric illness (e.g. affective disorders, dementias) 
and chronic disease (e.g. obesity, diabetes). However, as behavioural 
scientists, the authors of this chapter relate questions of wellbeing to 
the experiential and existential dimensions from which we interpret 
meaning from personal experiences. In this way, wellbeing relates to 
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both objective and subjective dimensions of psychological functioning 
and feeling, often defined in terms of level of cognitive function, affect, 
motivation and even notions of spirituality. 
As definitions and theoretical models of wellbeing determine what 
is measured, it is important to interrogate how broadly wellbeing is 
addressed in population surveys. It is important to measure wellbeing 
beyond economic and social indicators, and to consider the impact of 
policy on individuals’ experiences. But of those measures that have 
been implemented to date, they have typically focused on clinically 
relevant dimensions of mental health or individuals’ generalised 
evaluations of their life satisfaction and satisfaction with different 
life domains (e.g. work, relationships, etc.), ignoring other important 
psychological indicators of functioning and feeling. One further 
issue often neglected in population wellbeing is the assumption that 
all wellbeing dimensions are equally important to all. Whilst one 
individual prioritises material wealth for their wellbeing, another may 
prioritise community engagement, and yet another developing a sense 
of mastery and competence. 
Some nations are actively readdressing their approach to measuring 
population wellbeing. In the United Kingdom (UK) for example, the 
government is assessing the impact of changes in public policy on 
changes in personal wellbeing. As part of this process, the government 
is taking the opportunity to be informed by its citizens; what do they 
consider important to provide meaning and fulfilment in their own lives? 
Future national prosperity and wellbeing are outcomes of individuals 
being enabled to realise their potential (Foresight Report 2008).
In this chapter, we therefore focus specifically on describing the science 
of wellbeing at the individual level and its importance for population-
level policy. First we examine current population-level approaches 
to personal wellbeing that recognise the importance of including 
social as well as economic indicators of a nation’s ‘wealth’. We then 
discuss wellbeing at the individual level, describing a distinction 
between hedonic wellbeing, with its focus on satisfaction judgements, 
and eudemonic wellbeing, highlighting the limitations of existing 
population methods with a focus on satisfaction measures. Next, we 
use the European Social Survey as a case study to show how multiple 
measures of wellbeing can be used to describe the effects of public 
policy across a number of wellbeing dimensions at the population 
level. We then describe contributions to understanding wellbeing 
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in Australia based on two large-scale longitudinal studies. Finally, 
we reflect on the way forward in terms of incorporating wellbeing 
outcomes in Australian national policy, and the measurement and data 
collection issues that need to be addressed. 
Current population-level approaches 
to wellbeing
Governments and policy advocates have increasingly recognised 
that traditional economic indicators are insufficient alone to describe 
a population’s wellbeing and so broader indicators that encompass social 
and cultural factors are increasingly considered. In line with a social 
determinants of health model, this suggests that personal wellbeing 
is strongly driven by social, economic and health-service factors 
(Dahlgren and Whitehead 1991), and that health outcomes are strongly 
related to the lifestyles people live and the contexts in which they live 
(Wilkinson and Marmot 2003). For example, the most recent US Federal 
Interagency Forum on Aging-Related Statistics (FIF-ARS 2012) report, 
Older Americans 2012: Key Indicators of Well-Being, focused on issues of 
poverty, sources of income, living arrangements, housing, diet, physical 
activity, cigarette smoking, air quality, access to health care, etc., as 
key indicators of older adults’ wellbeing. Developed with input from 
various US federal departments, the forum aimed to: 
stimulate discussions by policymakers and the public … By examining 
a broad range of indicators, researchers, policymakers, service 
providers, and the Federal government can better understand the 
areas of wellbeing that are improving for older Americans and the 
areas of wellbeing that require more attention and effort (p iv).
There is no doubting the role of employment, financial security, 
air quality and service provision, etc., in providing necessary social 
and economic conditions that enable individuals and community to 
thrive, but we note the report failed to consider how individuals 
themselves value their lives and their personal sense of wellbeing. 
Maslow’s (1968) theory of the hierarchy of needs describes well a model 
of need motivation whereby a series of underlying basic physical 
needs, including safety, food and care needs, require addressing 
before individuals can strive for higher-level outcomes, such as 
individual growth and actualising needs. That is, as the most basic 
POPuLATION AGEING AND AuSTRALIA'S FuTuRE
208
human needs are satisfied, so the organism can begin to focus on more 
complex, social, emotional and psychological needs that culminate in 
higher-order psychological functioning. Reports, such as the FIF-ARS, 
however, fail to consider this level of human functioning. 
Similarly, the recent and long-awaited OECD (2014a) report, How Was 
Life? Global Wellbeing since 1820, examined social progress over the 
past two centuries. Again, extending the focus of traditional national 
accounts from simple examinations of trends in GDP per capita growth, 
How Was Life? considered development across a number of other 
social determinants of wellbeing including life expectancy, education, 
personal security and gender equality. Whilst reflecting an emergence 
of the appreciation of social indicators of population wellbeing, the 
report similarly fails to consider dimensions of individual experiences. 
There have been a number of attempts to assess individual-level 
wellbeing in population surveys, however, and a few notable examples 
will provide some context for our narrative. For instance, the 
Bhutanese Government, under the auspices of The Centre for Bhutan 
Studies and Gross National Happiness Research, has undertaken 
a series of  nationally representative wellbeing surveys that eschew 
economic prosperity for Gross National Happiness (GNH), defined in 
terms of social and individual wellbeing. The Bhutanese GNH survey 
measures nine domains of population happiness that encompass 
measures of ecology, health, community, governance, education, 
culture and living standards, and, importantly, several indicators of 
personal wellbeing including life satisfaction, positive and negative 
affect, and spirituality. Based on the 2010 survey outcomes (Ura et al. 
2012), around 90 per cent of the Bhutanese population were identified 
as happy to some extent with sufficiency across most of the domains 
for most in the population. However, cross-national comparisons 
with other objective wellbeing measures reveal troubling patterns: 
Bhutan ranks poorly for healthy life expectancy, life expectancy, 
infant mortality, and suicide (WHO 2014). Specifically, healthy life 
expectancy at birth for males is 58 years (ranked 127th out of 194) 
and for females 59 years (ranked 138th out of 194) whilst infant 
mortality for children under one is reported at 30 deaths per 1,000 live 
births (ranked 69th highest out of 194). And despite Bhutan’s focus 
on ‘happiness’, age-adjusted suicide rates indicated males reporting 
23.1 suicides per 100,000 (ranked 33rd highest out of 172) and females 
reporting 11.2 suicides per 100,000 (ranked 14th highest out of 172). 
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Consequently, serious re-examination of the extent to which the 
GNH survey accurately reflects the wellbeing of its people is needed. 
Perhaps their findings reflect an expectancy effect? That is, culturally, 
happiness is seen as a priority and this drives survey responses?
For our current discussion, at least two implications can be drawn from 
the survey results. First, whilst the Bhutan GNH survey recognises 
the importance of measuring personal wellbeing, it is clear, in line 
with Maslow’s proposition, that government policy must first address 
basic social and economic needs as a priority in order for individuals 
to subsequently flourish and live healthy lives. Second, in the GNH 
survey, individual wellbeing is perhaps too narrowly defined. 
This is an issue we will expand on further in this chapter.
Developed nations have also increasingly focused on reconciling 
notions of economic and social wellbeing with an understanding of 
individual wellbeing and happiness. Of particular note was the British 
Government’s announcement in late 2010, to supplement its national 
accounts with measures of other social and individual wellbeing 
indicators. Speaking on the need for a new measure of wellbeing, 
British Prime Minister David Cameron (2010) stated: 
let me try and address the suspicion that all this is a bit airy-fairy 
and a bit impractical. Now, of course, you cannot capture happiness 
on a spreadsheet any more than you can bottle it. If anyone was 
trying to reduce the whole spectrum of human happiness into one 
snapshot statistic I would be the first to roll my eyes and write about 
it in newspapers. But that’s not what this is all about. Just as the GDP 
figures don’t give a full story of our economy’s growth, but give us 
a useful indicator of where we’re heading. So, I believe a new measure 
won’t give the full story of our nation’s wellbeing, or our happiness 
or contentment or the rest of it—of course it won’t—but it could give 
us a general picture of whether life is improving, and that does have 
a really practical purpose. First, it will open up a national debate about 
what really matters, not just in government but amongst people who 
influence our lives: in the media; in business; the people who develop 
the products we use, who build the towns we live in, who shape the 
culture we enjoy. And second, this information will help government 
work out, with evidence, the best ways of trying to help to improve 
people’s wellbeing.
In a similar vein, the OECD Better Life Initiative (BLI) includes measures 
of personal wellbeing that tap:
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aspects of life that matter to people and that shape the quality of their 
lives. This allows for a better understanding of what drives the well-
being of people and nations, and what needs to be done to achieve 
greater progress for all (OECD 2014b). 
The Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance 
and Social Progress (CMEPSP) report also emphasised the need for 
governments to shift emphasis from measuring economic production 
to people’s wellbeing (Stiglitz et al. 2009). Increasingly, there is a 
growing consensus for governments and policymakers to realise the 
complexities that underpin our understanding of wellbeing at both 
individual and population levels, and to extend the focus from GDP 
to other social, community and, increasingly, individual factors as an 
end goal of national public policy (Forgeard et al. 2011). However, 
from a behavioural science perspective, there remains a level of debate 
about current population approaches to the measurement of individual 
wellbeing. Traditionally informed by individuals’ psychological and 
emotional health, encompassing dimensions of clinical mental health 
outcomes (e.g. depression, cognitive impairment), there is increasing 
theoretical and empirical basis for the need to focus on psychological 
dimensions of wellbeing. Such a focus would relate to questions of 
personal growth, autonomy and mastery, areas of human functioning 
that are significant drivers of future human behaviour, but that are yet to 
have much impact in the national policy sphere. There is a considerable 
need for population-level approaches to be informed by our scientific 
knowledge about drivers of psychological and subjective wellbeing to 
ensure relevance in shaping population behaviour and to assess the 
impact of social and economic policy on individuals’ wellbeing.
Psychological and subjective wellbeing
Within the behavioural sciences, wellbeing has received considerable 
focus in recent decades as the interest in ‘positive psychology’ has 
featured more prominently in lay and academic literature. It is not, 
however, a particularly new area of research; it has been a century 
since Adler’s (1929) The Science of Living and over half-a-century 
since Rogers’ (1961) On Becoming a Person. There are therefore many 
psychological theories, findings and reviews that purport to best 
describe and measure wellbeing. In essence, wellbeing is a multifaceted 
construct. In an increasingly dated but still excellent introduction 
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to the topic, Ryan and Deci (2001) described research on wellbeing 
as deriving from two perspectives: 1) the ‘hedonic’ or  Subjective 
Wellbeing (SWB) approach, which focuses on happiness and defines 
wellbeing in terms of pleasure attainment and pain avoidance; and 
2) the ‘eudaimonic’ or Psychological Wellbeing (PWB) approach, which 
focuses on meaning and self-realisation, defining wellbeing in terms of 
the degree to which a person is fully functioning. 
SWB emerged during the 1960s/70s as an attempt to measure 
quality of life and monitor the impact of social policy on change in 
individuals’ wellbeing (Bradburn 1969). The SWB approach focuses 
on three components: life satisfaction, the presence of positive 
mood, and the absence of negative mood (Diener and Lucas 1999). 
With its philosophical roots in the ancient philosophy of Aristippus, 
SWB is based on the hedonic principles that pleasure and happiness 
are of  primary concern to the individual, an idea echoed later by 
Bentham’s (1789) ‘greatest happiness principle’. SWB reflects people’s 
subjective evaluations of their lives, incorporating an assessment of 
the range of  emotions they experience. These evaluations comprise 
cognitive and affective interpretations of external events, and reflect 
an individual’s personal assessment of their own life. SWB models 
have perhaps been the most often utilised within the literature, with 
life satisfaction a frequently used index of individual wellbeing, 
particularly in larger population studies (Diener et al. 1999). 
Bhutan’s Gross National Happiness approach is an example of this 
conceptualisation of wellbeing.
In contrast, PWB has its foundations in eudaimonic assumptions that 
wellbeing is related to whether individuals live their lives according 
to their true nature or daimon. Many eudaimonic approaches are critical of 
hedonism for its focus on momentary pleasure, and disregard of long-
term purposefulness and growth. Carol Ryff’s (1989a, 1989b) model of 
Psychological Wellbeing is one PWB approach to the measurement of 
wellbeing, from gerontological and life-span research, which led to the 
formulation of six dimensions of PWB: autonomy, positive relations 
with others, environmental mastery, personal growth, purpose in life, 
and self-acceptance. Ryff (1989b) argued that these six key areas were 
consistently identified as indicative of  the good life and  wellbeing. 
However, significant overlap between a number of these domains has 
been reported and suggests that PWB, as operationalised by Ryff, is not 
so clearly defined (Burns and Machin 2008; Abbott et al. 2006). 
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Self-Determination Theory (SDT) (Ryan and Deci 2000) reflects 
another theoretical approach within the PWB paradigm that clearly 
delineates three basic psychological needs: autonomy, competence 
and relatedness. SDT posits that fulfilment of these needs is essential 
for psychological growth, integrity, life satisfaction, and psychological 
health, as well as experiences of vitality, vigour or energy and self-
congruence (Huppert 2009).
PWB proponents (e.g. Ryff and Singer 1998) have argued that SWB 
models are limited in describing long-term positive functioning 
given SWB’s focus on affective states and generalised evaluations 
of satisfaction, which are highly reactive in the short-term but are 
relatively stable as this affective reaction returns to individuals’ set-
points that appear to be stable over time (Headey and Wearing 1989, 
1992). Also, Waterman (1993) has argued that positive functioning 
may require a degree of effort and discipline that may at times run 
contrary to the pursuit of short-term happiness. Becker (1992) provides 
countless examples of people who have lived unjust, pointless lives 
who have nonetheless been happy in the long run, whilst Brickman et 
al. (1978) described well the short-term changes in SWB in paraplegics 
and lottery winners who appear to have returned to their initial SWB 
levels. Diener (1994) suggests happiness is less an end in itself than 
a consequence of other, more noble, pursuits. Regardless of these 
differences, there is growing support for the thesis that PWB and SWB 
constitute two related yet different approaches to modelling wellbeing 
(Burns and Machin 2008; Lucas et al. 1996; Compton et al. 1996) and 
that wellbeing should be considered as both an outcome of lives being 
lived well, and a driver of future living well.
Mental health and wellbeing
At this point, it is important to emphasise a distinction between 
wellbeing and mental health. For some, these terms are synonymous. 
A leading proponent of positive mental health and wellbeing research, 
Keyes (2002) described:
mental health as a syndrome of symptoms of positive feelings and 
positive function in life … The presence of mental health is described 
as flourishing, and the absence of mental health, characterized 
as languishing. 
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For Keyes, mental health is operationalised in terms of subjective 
reports of feelings, not clinically relevant dimensions of mental 
disorders. Similarly, Huppert and So (2013) emphasise the importance 
of governments conceptualising wellbeing as positive mental health, 
which lies ‘at the opposite end of a spectrum to the common mental 
disorders (depression, anxiety)’. 
However, the current authors argue that there is a need to clearly 
discriminate between mental health as the degree to which clinically 
relevant psychological disturbances are present (e.g. affective 
disorders), and wellbeing that relates to the presence of non-clinical 
dimensions of psychological feeling and functioning. Hence wellbeing 
and mental health reflect two, most probably oblique, factors rather 
than a single factor. Consequently, those with varying degrees of 
symptoms of mental illness can be described as possessing mental 
ill health, with absence of these symptoms reflecting mental health. 
Those who present with high psychological functioning and positive 
feelings and low negative feelings can be described as possessing 
high wellbeing, whilst those low in psychological functioning and 
low positive feelings and high in negative emotions can be described 
as possessing low wellbeing. 
Surprisingly, support for distinguishing between wellbeing and 
mental  health comes from Keyes (2002) himself, in a paper that 
examined  the concordance of Major Depressive Disorder with 
flourishing (high  emotional ‘mental’ health) and languishing 
(low emotional ‘mental’ health). Keyes (2002) identified 4.7 per cent 
of the languishers as reporting major depression, while 8.5 per cent 
(those with moderate mental health) and 0.9 per cent (those flourishing), 
reported major depression. Hence, major depression was itself not 
indicative of languishing, nor was possessing moderate mental health 
or flourishing protective against a major depressive episode. This 
finding emphasises the additional benefit to extending our notion 
of mental health to consider issues of psychological wellbeing and 
the contribution they make to describing how well individuals are 
living their lives.
Most population-level approaches to the assessment of individual 
wellbeing have focused on clinically relevant mental disorders, with 
the subsequent burden of mental ill-health on economic growth, 
labour force participation and community engagement. For example, 
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in Australia, two nationally representative surveys, The National 
Surveys of Mental Health and Wellbeing (emphasis added) 1997 and 
2007, estimated the prevalence of mental disorders in Australia and 
identified those social factors (e.g. marital status, employment, age and 
gender) that may indicate which sub-populations were most at risk. 
But what of ‘wellbeing’? In 1997, the General Health Questionnaire 
(GHQ-12) (a measure used to screen for mental disorders), measured life 
satisfaction, neuroticism (a personality measure), and self-rated health 
(SRH). Of these only SRH was included in 2007. Given the theoretical 
wellbeing models presented earlier, it leaves us asking: Where is this 
notion of wellbeing?
Sadly, large longitudinal studies that focus on multidimensional 
dimensions of wellbeing that emphasise personal growth and self-
fulfilment are lacking, even though the Foresight Report (2008) 
emphasised several years earlier the need for policy to concern itself as 
much with the enhancement of wellbeing amongst ‘normal’ members 
of a population (as there are simply more of them), as with maintaining 
appropriate and effective services for those with serious mental ill 
health. Instead, a dominant medical approach has emphasised the 
promotion of wellbeing by the identification and treatment of disease 
and subsequent burden. 
With advances in medical technology, and with greater understanding 
of the way disease develops, much of the health industry has focused 
on identifying, treating and eradicating diseases, with the implicit 
assumption that by treating the disease wellbeing is promoted. Most 
government policy has followed suit. But this position does little 
to promote the notion of health and wellbeing; that individuals 
live with disease and illness (e.g. cancer, diabetes, asthma) does not 
prohibit their capacity to lead fulfilling and meaningful lives, and to 
experience positive feelings and happiness. Indeed, in the preamble to 
its constitution, the World Health Organization (WHO 1946) described 
health as ‘a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing 
and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity’. Two points need to 
be emphasised here. First, health is a ‘state’ of wellbeing and, second, 
wellbeing is not ‘simply the absence’ of a particular disease, rather 
wellbeing means that one possesses something. Hence, a person can 
experience wellbeing whilst living with disease, but those living 
without disease are not necessarily living with wellbeing. 
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The limitation of satisfaction judgements 
as indicators of lives lived well
Advances in psychology and neuroscience indicate that subjective 
wellbeing can be measured with a degree of accuracy. The last 
20 or so years have seen a concerted effort for economic and policy-
related research to utilise subjective indicators of happiness and 
life satisfaction as indicators of interpersonal wellbeing (Kahneman 
et al. 1999). However, despite our earlier description of the way in 
which personal wellbeing can be operationalised, it is surprising that 
life satisfaction and satisfaction with different life domains, such as 
with work, relationships, etc., remain the most frequently utilised 
measure of individual wellbeing in population studies. In Australia 
for example, The Household and Income Labour Dynamics in 
Australia (HILDA) survey (Wooden and Watson 2007) uses multiple 
dimensions of satisfaction with life domains to measure individual 
wellbeing and has been used to assess the extent to which Australians 
are happy with their lives (Cassells et al. 2010). However, there have 
long been questions regarding the utility of satisfaction as a suitable 
index of wellbeing. The Cassells et al. (2010) report indicated that 
88 per cent of the population was satisfied or very satisfied. This may 
simply correspond with the proportion of the population without 
psychological distress at a particular moment, but that so many were 
satisfied leaves little room to examine whether discriminating degrees 
of satisfaction is really of substantive benefit. Let us consider two 
further issues in more detail.
First, consider what is known about life satisfaction, happiness and 
income. Easterlin’s paradox (1974) identified that those with high 
incomes reported higher levels of happiness, but that increases in US 
income in the 25 years prior to 1970 were not accompanied by long-term 
changes in happiness—a decline in the 1960s was reported. Similarly, 
in Japan, self-reported happiness did not increase from 1958 to 1987 
despite a five-fold increase in real income. Whilst others (e.g. Hagerty 
and Veenhoven 2003) have argued that there is evidence for increasing 
happiness with increasing income, Easterlin (2005) identified issues 
with the interpretation of these data and subsequently (Easterlin 
et al. 2010) reaffirmed the paradox in an analysis of 37 countries. Clark 
et al. (2012) have suggested that other confounding social factors 
(e.g. marital status, governance, social equality) drive the purported 
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association between level of GDP and wellbeing. They  have also 
highlighted the importance of relative income and wealth compared 
to level of wealth. 
A second example involves a consideration of what is known about life 
satisfaction and age. Frequently, a curve-linear relationship between 
age and satisfaction is described, but then in which direction? Are 
people least satisfied in mid-life when work and family demands are 
at their highest, or are they most satisfied in mid-life when work 
and family identities are increasingly cemented and accompanied 
by job promotion and a growing family network? Clark et al. (2012) 
have suggested an inverted U-shape is most commonly reported, but 
Baird et al. (2010) reviewed longitudinal data (>20 years) from the 
German Socio-Economic Panel and British Household Panel studies 
and found stable life satisfaction in the German population until age 
70, whilst the British population reported increases in mid-life, and 
substantial declines in late life. In contrast, in Australia, Headey and 
Warren (2008) did identify life satisfaction as lowest in mid-life, and 
this corresponds well with what we know about increased suicide 
rates in mid-life, particularly amongst men. Still, these apparently 
disparate findings indicate the large differences in  life satisfaction 
across seemingly similar countries. 
There are two main reasons for why the existing population wellbeing 
literature describes such contradictory findings. First, there are issues 
relating to the validity of global wellbeing indicators. Comparisons 
of global reports of subjective wellbeing are susceptible to cultural 
differences in the norms that govern self-descriptions (Diener 2000). 
Kahneman et al. (2004) have argued that global indicators are typically 
biased by recency effects and extreme events, and frequently perform 
poorly in experimental studies as these indicators are susceptible 
to current mood, context, comparison groups, and survey design. 
A second issue relates to differences in survey design and 
methodology. For example, many population findings relating to age 
differences in wellbeing are based on single or repeated cross-sectional 
designs that limit analyses to an examination of between-person 
differences only. Such designs ignore within-person change and 
longitudinal designs typically indicate less substantial differences over 
time. For example, using over 20 years of data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel, Headey (2008) identified that for most individuals 
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their SWB does not appear to change over the life-span. Only amongst 
a small proportion, those high in extraversion and/or neuroticism, 
were long-term changes in levels of life satisfaction reported. Similarly, 
when adjusting for within-person changes in physical health, Burns et 
al. (2014a) reported that terminal decline—sudden and rapid decline 
in the years preceding death—in wellbeing and mental health was 
fully attenuated. 
Relatedly, many longitudinal designs typically report overall a single 
population-level trajectory despite significant variance around 
the population slopes. For example, Jivraj et al. (2014) identified 
significant and substantial wellbeing declines in their analyses of 
the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing dataset. However, almost 
three-quarters of the variance was identified around the slope and 
this can have serious implications for our understanding of the extent 
of consistency in SWB changes within the population. For example, 
Burns et al. (2015) identified overall population decline in wellbeing 
and mental health in late life in a traditional multi-level/latent growth 
analysis, but when utilising a growth mixture modelling framework, 
identified wellbeing and mental health decline in only 10 per cent of 
the population, suggesting 1) stability of wellbeing and mental health 
over time for most, and 2) that substantial declines in only 10 per cent 
of the population was enough to drive an overall population decline. 
Only with further substantial investment in longitudinal cohort 
studies that adequately assess both within- and between-person 
effects on various wellbeing indicators over substantial temporal 
context can appropriate conclusions about the course of wellbeing 
over the life-course be made.
The European Social Survey: A new 
approach for modelling personal wellbeing?
Recognising the limitations of satisfaction judgements, and in the 
light of the scientific wellbeing literature, a recent collaboration of 
wellbeing researchers has sought to consolidate the different wellbeing 
approaches into a coherent measure of national wellbeing that could 
be used in national and international surveys to:
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systematically assesses key wellbeing variables for representative 
samples, including positive and negative emotions, engagement, 
purpose and meaning, optimism and trust, and life satisfaction, as well 
as satisfaction with specific domains of life (Huppert et al. 2009). 
The European Social Survey (ESS) Well-being Module (Huppert et al. 
2009) reflects one of the first systematic attempts to reconcile both 
SWB and PWB approaches, which can be conceptualised in terms of 
psychological feeling and functioning, reflecting dimensions of SWB 
and PWB respectively (See Table 1). Huppert et al. (2009) argue that 
the development of such a module provides an:
opportunity for a richly textured description of how the citizens of 
Europe experience their lives. It complements more objective data 
on economic, social and environmental influences on well-being, 
which can be derived from other items within the ESS and from other 
data sources. We believe that the Well-being Module will provide 
invaluable information for behavioural and social scientists, and 
contribute to the development of policies and practices for enhancing 
well-being across Europe (p 311).
There is evidence for the utility of using a complex model of wellbeing 
in population research. For example, using data from the ESS, Clark 
and Senik (2010) identified that those who emphasised the importance 
of economic wealth and frequently compared their economic wealth 
with others were more likely to report lower happiness, optimism, life 
and job satisfaction, and higher levels of depressive feelings. Also, 
Hooghe and Vanhoutte (2011) identified that both individual and 
social factors, such as unemployment, drive wellbeing outcomes, but 
importantly noted that economic and social factors were more strongly 
related to wellbeing for those individuals living in communities that 
were more heterogeneous in nature. That is, wider variability in 
individuals’ economic and social capital resources within a community 
was associated with lower wellbeing for those with lower capital 
resources. Plagnol and Huppert (2010) identified significant national 
differences in volunteering rates between ESS nations, and highlighted 
the role of government policies that to a large extent may determine 
levels of volunteering within nations and personal wellbeing.
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Table 1. Conceptual framework of the intra-personal feeling 




Negative affect Interest in learning
Optimism Goal orientation
Vitality Sense of purpose
Self-esteem Resilience
Source: Adapted from Huppert et al . 2009 .
An increasing evidence base in Australia
Unfortunately, a comparable Australian study that examines the 
impact of social and economic changes on such a range of wellbeing 
indicators is not available. However, some of our findings, utilising 
existing longitudinal Australian studies, may provide evidence for the 
utility of a more complex approach to assessing personal wellbeing, 
and identifies a future need for governments to incorporate additional 
measures that tap multiple dimensions of individual wellbeing in 
future population surveys. For example, using data from The Dynamic 
Analyses to Optimize Ageing (DYNOPTA) project (Anstey et al. 2010), 
a harmonisation of several longitudinal studies of ageing, Burns and 
colleagues have examined the role of vitality, as one indicator of 
positive feeling, in promoting positive health outcomes in older adults, 
in comparison to traditional models examining the effects of mental 
health or psychological distress. Their findings indicate a poor level 
of wellbeing is a stronger predictor of the likelihood of falls (Burns et 
al. 2012), poorer self-rated health (Burns et al. 2014b), and mortality 
(Burns et al. 2015a). 
Using data from the PATH study (Anstey et al. 2011), Burns and 
colleagues (Burns, Anstey and Windsor 2009) have explored both 
psychological functioning and feeling across the life-span, particularly 
in relation to mental health outcomes. They explored the temporal 
associations between measures of SWB or psychological feeling, 
reflected by positive and negative affect, and PWB or psychological 
functioning, reflected by mastery/competence and resilience, with 
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measures of depression and anxiety. They identified strong support for 
a model whereby SWB mediated the effects of PWB on depression and 
anxiety. That is, perceptions of mastery and resilience drove positive 
and negative feelings, which in turn predicted depression and anxiety 
outcomes. More recent evidence indicates psychological functioning 
and feeling to be more sensitive to external life events and work strain 
(Burns et al. 2016; Burns 2014). 
There is clearly a need for future population studies in Australia to 
consider implementing measures that tap a greater array of human 
functioning. This will allow a more detailed examination of the 
effects of policy change on individuals’ lives, reflected by changes 
in their wellbeing. Relatedly, in the UK, following Cameron’s (2010) 
announcement, the Office of National Statistics’ survey of national 
wellbeing now utilises an array of wellbeing and mental-health 
indicators that identify levels of depression and anxiety, and also 
reports on happiness, anxiousness, satisfaction and worthwhileness 
Matheson (2011).
The way forward: Implications for 
policy directions
A number of conceptual issues need to be addressed in order to 
provide robust wellbeing measurement frameworks that can be used 
to monitor the impact of policy on national wellbeing. First, levels of 
wellbeing may be of secondary importance to the stability of wellbeing 
levels over time. Research by Kernis et al. (1998) has demonstrated 
that wellbeing researchers should perhaps be less focused on levels 
of wellbeing than the stability of wellbeing over time. Their study 
investigated the role of self-esteem in the development of depressive 
symptoms and their findings indicated that level of self-esteem was 
not a risk for increased depressive symptomology, whilst greater self-
esteem variability was a significant risk factor. These findings echo 
earlier reports (Roberts and Monroe 1992), where even individuals with 
low self-esteem were likely to report less depressive symptoms than 
those individuals with high but unstable self-esteem. The importance 
of this lies in the proposition that the degree of emotional reactivity 
could be more important as an indicator of health outcomes than level 
of wellbeing, but this requires longitudinal designs with multiple 
assessments to capture intra-individual wellbeing variation. 
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A second related issue is the extent to which different wellbeing 
dimensions are weighted equally for all individuals. Different 
wellbeing dimensions may not be of the same importance for all. One 
person may emphasise the need for positive relationships while, for 
another, spiritual growth may be more important. And it is likely 
that the rank importance of these wellbeing dimensions changes 
over the life-course as a consequence of normative age experiences 
(e.g. widowhood, unemployment). For example, Ryff (1991) identified 
significant differences in the importance of different wellbeing 
dimensions across the life-course. Whilst middle- and older-aged 
adults prioritised the importance of social connections, middle-aged 
adults placed greater emphasis than older-aged adults on the need for 
a future time perspective, assertiveness and self-acceptance.
Given the malleability of personal wellbeing, the role of public 
policy in promoting policy demands serious consideration. However, 
as wellbeing is defined here in terms of psychological functioning 
and feeling, one may well ask whether we would want government 
intervening at the individual level where wellbeing reflects the 
individual’s lived experience. 
Frey and Stutzer (2012) propose that wellbeing research does not offer 
an approach to public policy: 
Citizens as ultimate decision makers are disregarded, and governments 
are seen as benevolent maximizers of social welfare … This view 
neglects that people differ in what judgments they consider to reflect 
their normative preferences. Moreover, the processes of adaptation 
and aspiration change require a decision on how to treat them in policy 
decisions. This decision is not part of the social welfare maximization 
approach … the social welfare approach neglects the negative 
incentives for manipulating empirical welfare measures (p 671).
Perhaps more appropriate is a social determinants approach and an 
examination of the role public policy can make in shaping lives by 
providing the economic and social foundations upon which citizens 
live their lives and promote their wellbeing. Such policies could 
relate to current policy areas such as the provision of safe and healthy 
workplaces free from harassment, bullying and discrimination; 
aged-care provision that is driven by the needs of individual 
consumers; and affordable and accessible health care that prioritises 
prevention of chronic disease and mental ill health. Frey and Stutzer’s 
(2012) conclusion placed the focus ‘thus on rules and institutions 
rather than on specific policy interventions’ (p 671). 
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Relatedly, the National Economic Foundation’s Five Ways to Wellbeing 
report (Aked et al. 2008) is one example of an evidenced-based set 
of policy directions that has been implemented at varying levels of 
UK governance, from Westminster to local UK councils, to promote 
population wellbeing. Commissioned by Foresight to examine evidence 
and develop public health messages concerned with promoting and 
maintaining positive mental health, the Five Ways to Wellbeing 
program focuses on engaging individuals to 1) connect with others, 
2) be active life participants, 3) take time to notice people and the world 
around them, 4) continue to strive for learning and knowledge, and 
5) express gratitude through giving to others. Rather than developing 
wellbeing policies per se, their recommendations emphasised the need 
for policymakers to consider 1) the capacity of their policies to enable 
citizens to engage with one or all of these wellbeing pathways, and 
2) the need to examine the impact of emerging policies on a range of 
individual wellbeing dimensions. For example, Frey and Stutzer (2000) 
identified that in Switzerland, those cantons that afforded citizens 
with greater rights and opportunities to propose and vote on laws 
and constitutional amendments reported higher personal wellbeing 
outcomes. 
Marmot (2014) summarises a number of areas whereby national policy 
can intervene to promote public mental health. These include a focus 
on 1) psychosocial development and medical health in early childhood, 
2) access to education and lifelong learning, 3) fair and equitable 
working conditions, 4) an income to satisfy conditions for health living, 
including a social security net, 5) safe communities, and 6) sustainable 
housing; and a recognition of the importance of  social determinants 
in the prevention of poor health outcomes. In  a  similar vein, we 
would argue that such measures will also facilitate improvements in 
flourishing and feeling. The role of government and advocates is then in 
promoting policies that build the social and economic foundations upon 
which citizens can flourish. And, as we have importantly emphasised 
throughout this chapter, the extent to which we adequately capture 
a range of functioning and feeling outcomes.
Future population-level approaches to measuring wellbeing need 
to examine the question of what it is for an individual to feel that 
they live well, with a sense of vigour, vitality and engagement, in the 
context of work, families, and communities, both within and between 
nations. This involves extending our focus on dimensions of mental 
health and generalised evaluations of life satisfaction to encompass 
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dimensions of psychological function and feeling. However, there are 
considerable limitations in the existing research base in understanding 
the way factors enhance or adversely impact on people’s wellbeing 
over the life-course. 
There is a need for longitudinal cohort studies to examine how 
different socioeconomic experiences impact across the life-course 
and to understand how life experiences shape older adults’ capacity 
to age well, in health, social and economic terms. In addition, future 
longitudinal cohort studies require multidisciplinary approaches in 
order to ensure they maintain relevance with the research base. Such 
capacities in Australia are considerably limited by current funding 
models and by study designs that are not multidisciplinary. As we 
have described, much of the capacity to understand individual-level 
wellbeing in existing population studies is limited. Such limitations can 
be overcome with appropriate reference to the scientific literature, as it 
continues to evolve. The Dynamic Analyses to Optimise Ageing project 
(Anstey et al. 2010) provides one example of how a multidisciplinary 
approach, with leading experts from the psychological, social, 
medical and statistical sciences, could examine ageing experiences 
from a bio-psychosocial perspective using existing longitudinal data. 
Currently, within CEPAR, there is an emphasis on combining these 
perspectives with an attempt to understand the economic foundations 
which underpin successful and healthy ageing. However, new cohort 
studies that may inform the impact of social and economic policy 
changes on future wellbeing demands are sorely needed. 
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Retirement income strategies 
for an ageing population
Hazel Bateman
The aim of this chapter is to assess the ability of Australia’s system 
of retirement income provision to withstand the implications of 
population ageing. It is argued that Australia’s retirement income 
arrangements are better placed that those in most other developed 
countries due to both a slightly slower pace of population ageing and 
its unique approach to policy design for retirement income provision. 
However, an implication of the increased fiscal pressures associated 
with population ageing will be a greater role for the private sector 
in funding of retirement incomes, health and aged care. The greatest 
challenge will be to work out how both the government and private 
sector can best assist individuals and households to deal with 
increasingly complex financial decisions, particularly as they relate 
to saving for and spending down in retirement.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, Australia’s 
current retirement income arrangements and relevant demographic 
trends are summarised. This is followed by an assessment of the impact 
of the demographic trends on the ability of the retirement income 
arrangements to deliver adequate and sustainable retirement incomes. 
We then evaluate the effectiveness of the current policy framework 
POPuLATION AGEING AND AuSTRALIA'S FuTuRE
234
to assist older Australians in their interactions with the increasingly 
complex decision environment, and a final section concludes with 
a menu of possible policy options. 
Policy and demographic background
Retirement incomes
Over the past 30 years, Australia’s system of retirement income 
provision  has evolved into a multi-pillar arrangement comprising 
a means-tested Age Pension financed from general tax revenues, 
a  mandatory employer-financed defined contribution (DC) scheme 
known as the Superannuation Guarantee, and tax incentives to 
encourage voluntary superannuation contributions and other 
private savings. The ‘first pillar’ Age Pension is paid at a rate of 
around 28 per cent of male average full-time earnings for singles and 
41 per cent for couples and is currently indexed to keep up with wages 
in the rest of the economy. Net replacement rates are higher because 
no tax is paid on Age Pension payments. The Age Pension is available 
from age 65 (increasing to 67  between 2017 and 2023)1 and is paid 
subject to income and assets (means) tests, which have the effect of 
excluding the top 30 per cent of the wealth distribution from the 
Age Pension. Around 60 per cent of retirees (of eligible age) receive 
the full rate, while the remainder receive a part pension (Department 
of Social Services 2014). The means tests are comprehensively defined, 
although the assets test excludes owner-occupier housing. 
The ‘second pillar’ Superannuation Guarantee commenced in 1992 
as a derivation of productivity award superannuation introduced in 
the 1986 National Wage Case. The Superannuation Guarantee requires 
all employers to make contributions on behalf of their employees 
into a superannuation fund. The mandatory contribution gradually 
increased from 4 per cent to 9 per cent between 1992 and 2002 and, 
following a decision to increase it to 12 per cent, currently stands 
at 9.5 per cent.2 
1  In its 2014–15 Budget, the government announced plans to further increase the Age Pension 
eligibility age to 70 by 2035. 
2  The mandatory employer contribution is scheduled to rise to 12 per cent by 2026.
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These first two pillars are supplemented by ‘third pillar’ voluntary long-
term savings that include voluntary superannuation contributions 
(currently made by around one-third of super fund members—
ABS 2009) and property, shares, managed funds and home ownership. 
Benefits from superannuation savings can be taken at the statutory 
preservation age, currently age 55, but increasing to age 60 by 2024. 
Individuals are free to choose how they take their retirement benefits 
from a menu that includes lump sums, account-based pensions 
and life and term annuities. When the multi-pillar design was first 
adopted in 1992, differential tax and means tests encouraged purchase 
of lifetime annuities. However, due to low take-up of these products 
and strong lobbying from the financial services sector, these targeted 
provisions were diluted over the following 15 years. The Simpler 
Super reforms of 2007 (Australian Government 2006) removed all 
taxes on superannuation benefits taken from age 60 and eliminated 
the differential treatment and are considered largely responsible 
for the (temporary) disappearance of the annuity market in the late 
2000s (Bateman and Piggott 2011). Today, almost all retirees take their 
superannuation benefits in a non-annuitised form (lump sums or 
account-based pensions), although, as discussed later, there has been 
a  recent sharp increase in the number of life annuity policies sold, 
albeit from a very low base of less than 30 annually in 2009 to over 
4,000 in 2014 (Plan for Life 2015). 
Around 95 per cent of employees are covered by the mandatory 
superannuation arrangements, and compliance is high, with only 
those who are too young (i.e. under 18) or too poor (i.e. earning less 
than $450 per month) excluded from the arrangements. 
For many retirees, mandatory and voluntary superannuation 
is supplemented by a full or part Age Pension. Including Age 
Pension eligibility, the Australian Treasury estimates that a fully 
mature Superannuation Guarantee can be expected to deliver a net 
replacement rate of around 90 per cent (78 per cent) for a worker 
on median (average) earnings (Gallagher 2012). 
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Australia’s ageing population
The most recent statement of Australia’s demographic position is set 
out in the 2015 Intergenerational Report (Commonwealth of Australia 
2015). According to this report, Australians will live longer than 
projected previously and will continue to have one of the longest life 
expectancies in the world. Currently, Australia ranks equal first along 
with Iceland in terms of male life expectancy and fifth for female life 
expectancy after Japan, Spain, France and Italy. Male life expectancy 
at birth is projected to increase from 91.5 years today to 95.1 years 
in  2055, and female life expectancy from 93.6 years to 96.6  years. 
Despite later retirement ages, it is expected that there will be an 
increase in the number of years spent in retirement, and therefore an 
increase in the funds required to sustain living standards throughout 
retirement. 
As a consequence of both increased longevity, and a stabilisation 
of  the  fall in the fertility rate, the proportion of the population 
aged 65  and over is expected to increase from 15 per cent today 
to 22.6  per  cent by 2055, and the absolute number of people aged 
65 and over will more than double, from 3.6 million today to around 
8.9  million by 2055. The  obvious implication of these trends is 
that there will be fewer people of working age to support those in 
retirement. More specifically, the number of Australians of working 
age (15–65) available to support each Australian over age 65 will fall 
from around 4.5 today (which itself has fallen from 7.3 in 1975) to 
around 2.7 by 2055. While these trends appear severe, they must be 
considered in the international context where, due to a slightly higher 
birth-rate and higher immigration, Australia is ageing at a much slower 
rate than many other developed countries (OECD 2014a). 
On the basis of these demographic projections, the 2015 
Intergenerational  Report reveals an increasing gap between 
Commonwealth government expenditure and tax revenue under 
an unchanged tax system (that  is,  assuming tax revenue remains at 
23.9 per cent of GDP over the projection period).3 In particular, with 
no change to current policy settings, Commonwealth government 
spending on health is projected to increase from 4.5 per cent of GDP 
today to 5.5 per cent in 2055, on  aged care from 0.9 per cent of GDP to 
3  23.9 per cent is the average of tax revenue to GDP over 2000–08. 
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1.7 per cent, and on the Age Pension from 2.9 per cent of GDP today 
to 3.6 per cent in  2055.4 These figures suggest that there will be 
continued pressure on successive governments to reduce expenditure 
on these aged-related budget items.
In sum, the most likely impact of population ageing on retirement 
incomes and retirees will be an increase in the role of private provision 
in the funding of retirement incomes, health and aged care for possibly 
longer retirements. Next we explore the extent to which Australia’s 
retirement income arrangements are designed to withstand this 
demographic pressure. 
What does population ageing mean 
for retirement income policy?5
The design of Australia’s multi-pillar approach to retirement income 
provision has long been considered international best practice 
(World Bank 1994; OECD 2014b) largely due to the risk diversification 
provided through a combination of public and private provision 
(the  Age Pension and superannuation), pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
and pre-funding (the Age Pension and DC superannuation) and 
compulsion and individual choice (the mandatory Superannuation 
Guarantee and tax concessions for voluntary superannuation). 
Australia is consistently ranked in the top three pensions systems 
worldwide under the Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index where 
scores reward adequacy, sustainability and integrity (Mercer 2014). 
However, a more careful assessment raises concerns about gaps in 
overall policy design (particularly as they relate to superannuation 
taxation and decumulation), and the increasing emphasis on individual 
responsibility and decision-making, the latter of which is an inevitable 
consequence of its DC design.
4  The 2015 Intergenerational Statement reports that the future cost of the Age Pension 
would fall to 2.7 per cent of GDP by 2055 had a 2014 Budget proposal to reduce the level of 
indexation been implemented. The long-term budgetary implications of the subsequent decision 
(announced in the 2015–16 Budget) to instead alter the assets test taper has not been officially 
reported, although the impact will be a reduction in future cost of the Age Pension to below 
3.6 per cent GDP, the no policy change counterfactual.
5  Parts of this section are drawn from Bateman et al. (2016a).
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Retirement income systems are typically assessed from the perspective 
of their impact on both the broader economy and its citizens as they 
enter and move through retirement. The individual criteria focus 
on the ability of the retirement income arrangements to provide 
insurance against the key economic and financial risks an individual 
may face over  this period (specifically replacement risk, investment 
risk, longevity risk, inflation risk and contingency risk),6 while the 
economy-wide criteria relate to economic efficiency and equity, 
the standard measures for evaluating public policy, as well as long-term 
sustainability and administrative efficacy.
Economy-wide assessment
Turning first to sustainability: on the face of it, the projected future 
population trends reported in the 2015 Intergenerational Report, which 
feed into a projected 50 per cent increase in the aged dependency ratio 
over the next 40 years, could signal severe problems for the future 
funding of retirement incomes. However, in the case of Australia, 
the policy framework of a means-tested Age Pension combined 
with mandatory superannuation participation and contributions 
(as required under the Superannuation Guarantee), and a relatively 
slower ageing of the population than much of the developed world, 
results in some of the lowest current and forecast levels of spending 
on public pensions in the OECD. The projection that spending on 
age-related pensions will increase from 2.9 per cent of GDP in 2015 
to 3.6 per cent of GDP by 2055 (Commonwealth of Australia 2015)7 
is far more sustainable than corresponding projections for other OECD 
countries (OECD 2014b). By comparison, over the next 40 years, 
public pension expenditure is projected to increase to 25 per cent of 
GDP in Greece, 15 per cent of GDP in Italy, Germany and Norway 
and 8–10 per cent in the Netherlands and Denmark (or 2.5 times the 
spending in Australia), who, with Australia, make up the top three in 
the global pension index rankings (Mercer 2014). 
6  The individual criteria are drawn from Bodie (1990) as extended by Bateman and 
Piggott (1997). 
7  In the absence of policy change. This does not include spending on public sector pensions, 
which is projected to fall from 0.4 per cent to 0.2 per cent of GDP over this period. 
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Australia’s retirement income arrangements also fair well in terms 
of overall economic efficiency and equity. Economic efficiency is 
enhanced where policy settings facilitate incentives to work and save, 
and DC systems, such as Australia’s Superannuation Guarantee and 
voluntary superannuation arrangements, implicitly include incentives 
to work and save because later retirement translates into more 
contributions over more years and fewer years over which to spread 
the resulting income, resulting in higher replacement rates. This 
compares with publicly provided defined benefit (DB) PAYG second 
pillars operating in many OECD countries, which are generally funded 
from payroll taxes, and where inbuilt benefit formulas make it costly 
to deviate from a set retirement age. While the Age Pension means 
tests will erode the advantages in the Australian arrangements for 
some levels of earnings and superannuation assets and income, recent 
changes have been made to the Age Pension means tests to lower the 
penalty for income from employment. And, although the availability 
of superannuation benefits up to 10 years prior to the Age Pension 
eligibility age may encourage early retirement and dissaving, analysis 
of drawdown behaviour suggests that Australian retirees are not in 
a hurry to dissipate their superannuation accounts (Wu et al. 2015). 
It is widely agreed that the pre-funding associated with Australia’s 
DC superannuation has enhanced private saving. Superannuation 
assets now total more than $2 trillion, well over 100 per cent of GDP 
and one of the largest pools of retirement assets in the world (APRA 
2015). And, despite initial concerns about saving substitution, most of 
this represents ‘new’ saving (Gruen and Soding 2011). Furthermore, 
being pre-funded, Australia’s superannuation arrangements score well 
on intergenerational equity, with each generation funding its own 
retirement.
However, concerns about intragenerational equity remain, largely 
due to the tax regime for superannuation that has resulted in tax 
concessions skewed towards the higher end of the income/wealth 
distribution (Henry 2010; Department of Treasury 2012). Super tax has 
been on and off the reform agenda since the early 1980s, and, in spite 
of constant tinkering, successive governments have failed to develop 
an effective tax regime. Australia’s approach differs from international 
practice and departs significantly from the standard approaches 
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that are more consistent with an economically efficient system.8 In 
particular, Australia operates a TTE system, where contributions 
to super funds are taxed (T), super fund earnings are taxed (T) and 
benefit payments are tax-free (E). Most of the rest of the world 
operates an EET system, where contributions are free of tax (E), fund 
income accumulates tax-free (E) but benefits are taxed (T) generally 
under the personal marginal tax schedule. Since under Australia’s 
TTE regime, employer contributions and super fund earnings are 
taxed at a flat rate, they are also separated from income tax and its 
progressivity. Separating superannuation taxes from personal income 
tax has facilitated tinkering because changes are not obvious to fund 
members. Moreover, the regressive nature of flat rate taxes has resulted 
in regular, but piecemeal (and  often politically motivated), policy 
initiatives designed to improve intragenerational equity—such as the 
excess contributions tax, low-income superannuation contributions, 
government co-contributions and the extra contributions tax now 
applying to high-income earners (which income plus employer 
superannuation contributions in excess of $300,000 pa).
In its final report, the Henry Tax Review recommended that the 
taxation of superannuation contributions be linked to the progressive 
personal rate schedule, and that the tax on superannuation fund 
earnings be reduced to help the power of compound interest generate 
more accumulations and reduce price distortion between assets and 
over time (Henry 2010). Unfortunately, governments from both major 
political parties have ignored these recommendations and instead 
continued to tinker with the tax treatment of contributions at the top 
and bottom end of the income distribution.
Finally, while international comparisons of mature-age poverty rates 
appear to paint a negative picture of Australia’s retirement income 
system, with recent OECD data indicating that older Australians 
have some of the lowest incomes and highest poverty rates in the 
OECD (OECD 2013), it is essential to point out that this particular 
comparison is misleading in the case of Australia. First, as the OECD 
acknowledges, the Australian figures may be subject to upwards bias, 
since a large proportion of retirement benefits are taken as lump sums, 
which are excluded in the OECD analysis. Second, closer analysis 
8  See Bateman et al. (2001).
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of the data reveals that the average difference between the poverty 
line and the incomes of poor households is one of the lowest among 
developed countries, and that many Australian retirees have incomes 
just below the poverty line. Finally, unlike most OECD countries, 
older Australians have very high levels of owner-occupied housing, 
and public spending on services for the aged is one of the highest in 
the OECD. Once housing costs are taken into account, old-age poverty 
rates are around 15 per cent, which is low compared to many other 
countries (ACOSS 2014). 
Individual assessment
Coverage against the economic and financial risks individuals face as 
they enter and move through retirement is assessed by the ability of 
the retirement income system to insure against the risk of running 
out of retirement savings due to one or a combination of investment 
risk (the risk of unevenness in income due to volatility of investment 
returns), longevity risk (the risk of outliving savings), and inflation 
risk (the risk of erosion of purchasing power), as well as the ability to 
access funds to address uninsurable risks (often known as contingency 
risk). Here, Australia’s retirement income system performs poorly. 
The superannuation system, in common with DC schemes generally, does 
not guarantee a final benefit (let alone one that is at least CPI-indexed 
with payment guaranteed irrespective of age and market conditions). 
While the Superannuation Guarantee mandates participation in 
the superannuation system and a minimum contribution rate into 
a superannuation account, there is no requirement that the retirement 
accumulation be taken in a form that would provide cover against the 
key retirement risks. 
Current take-up of retirement benefits is split evenly between lump 
sums and income streams, with very little interest in annuitised 
benefits. Recent trends are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 below, which 
show a clear switch from lump sums to income streams since the mid-
1990s (Figure 1) and a sharp increase in the take-up of account-based 
pensions (Figure 2). It is important to point out here that despite 
being called a ‘pension’, an account-based pension is in fact a phased 
(or programmed) withdrawal from a superannuation account, which 
provides flexibility of payment (subject to the minimum drawdown 
requirements for tax purposes), but no insurance against investment, 
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inflation or longevity risk. The least popular benefits (term and 
lifetime annuities) do provide protection against market risk (both) 
and longevity risk (for the lifetime version) and can be purchased with 
CPI indexation. 
Figure 1: Superannuation benefit payouts, $’000 pa
Source: APRA (2014, 2015) .
Figure 2: Take-up of retirement income streams, $’000 pa 
Source: Plan for Life (2015) .
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The lack of interest in lifetime annuities is likely due to a complex 
range of factors relating to the demand for annuities, the supply-
side of the annuity market and the regulatory and policy framework. 
The demand-side is influenced by standard rational factors such as 
adverse selection, incomplete markets, demand for liquidity, desire to 
leave a bequest, pre-existing annuitisation (for example, from the Age 
Pension and/or DB pensions) and intra-family transfers (Brown 2008) 
as well as behavioural factors due to framing (Brown et al. 2008; Agnew 
et al. 2008), defaults (Benartzi et al. 2012), loss aversion, myopia and 
complexity (Brown 2008). The supply-side in Australia has all but 
disappeared, with only one provider remaining (down from between 
12 and 15 in the late 1990s) and is characterised by a short menu of 
products, and an overall lack of interest by the financial planning 
community, which increasingly influence decisions at retirement.9 
Finally, the policy framework is also partly to blame with regulatory 
restrictions on the features of retirement benefit products that receive 
concessional treatment under the Age Pension means tests and tax 
rules. Current regulations exclude deferred and variable annuities 
from the menu of possible products and is partly to blame for the 
diminished supply-side, as highlighted in the Henry Tax Review Final 
Report (Henry 2010).10 
That said, interest in lifetime annuities, which fell to a record low 
of 29 new policies in 2009, reached a record high in 2014 with over 
4,000 new policies. This renewed interest in lifetime annuities can 
be attributed to product design and marketing, which address key 
behavioural biases, as well as targeted retirement planning education 
for financial planners in the relevant distribution networks. The most 
popular annuities are called ‘liquid’ life annuities where a 15-year 
guarantee and a one-off option to withdraw the annuity within this 
period address loss aversion, regret aversion and concerns about 
access to liquidity. The marketing strategy uses the ‘consumption’ 
frame, highlighting spending and income, rather than the traditional 
‘investment’ frame, with the official product description highlighting 
9  A recent industry survey indicated that less than one-third of financial advisers were aware 
of life annuities.
10  At the time of writing the Treasury is undertaking a review of these regulations.
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that the product ‘provides regular payments for your lifetime’.11 
Nevertheless, take-up of lifetime products is very small relative to the 
retiring cohort.12 
In other words, the majority of Australian retirees take benefits 
that leave them uncovered for longevity risk, investment risk and 
inflation risk. While the public Age Pension does insure against these 
retirement risks, it is paid at a low rate (around 28 per cent of male 
average earnings) and, due to the operation of the income and asset 
means tests, less than 50 per cent of those of eligible age receive 
the full rate (Department of Social Services 2014). This partial Age 
Pension coverage, coupled with the preference for non-annuitised 
products, could raise concerns about retirement income inadequacy 
in very old age as non-annuitised benefits run out. However, analysis 
of a panel of Age Pension beneficiaries suggests the opposite, with 
households in the bottom two wealth quintiles (of full and part Age 
Pensioners) actually accumulating wealth through retirement (Wu et 
al. 2015). This suggests that these low-income/low-wealth households 
are self-insuring against longevity risk and possibly future aged-care 
costs, and thereby denying themselves a higher standard of living in 
retirement. 
As discussed further below, retirement income stream products are 
complex and their insurance characteristics are likely to be little 
understood. It could be the case that Australians are unintentionally 
exposing themselves to retirement risks because they are unaware of 
and/or don’t understand the characteristics and insurance features of 
the available products. This lack of awareness and specific product 
knowledge is likely to be part of a larger problem relating to an 
increased interaction with complex financial products across the 
lifecycle. 
11  www.challenger.com.au/funds/PDS/GA_Lifetime_PDS.pdf.
12  Less than 7,000 of these liquid lifetime annuities have been sold in the past eight years, 
yet there are currently 1.1 million retirees aged 60–69.
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The challenge of individual decision-making
Australia’s DC superannuation system mandates participation and 
a minimum contribution rate, but then leaves individual retirement 
savers with the responsibility of making often high stakes and 
complex saving and spending decisions over their lifetime. Typical 
decisions for individuals include choosing the super fund in 
which their superannuation savings are managed and accumulate 
(including the option of setting up their own self-managed fund), 
superannuation account management (such as switching funds 
and account consolidation), choosing the investment option or 
options (from increasingly long menus of single and multi-manager 
diversified and single options), whether to make or increase voluntary 
contributions, and if so whether these contributions should be made 
before or after tax (that is, whether to salary sacrifice or not, if that 
is an option), and whether to seek and use financial advice, and from 
whom. Most super fund members also have choice of life and total 
and permanent disability (TPD) insurance options. Even more choices 
confront retirees, who have almost unlimited freedom to manage the 
decumulation phase, which for many will involve questions around 
eligibility for the means-tested Age Pension, alternative residential 
options (including the possibility of monetising the house to provide 
retirement income) and, later in life, eligibility for means-tested 
support for aged care. 
Current policy design and industry practice does provide some 
support for these decisions through choice architecture (such as the 
MySuper default), information provision in the form of financial 
product disclosure, support for financial advice through the regulation 
of financial advisers and some initiatives to improve financial literacy. 
However, it is not clear that this support as currently designed really 
helps people as intended.
Financial literacy and super system and 
product knowledge 
Every three years since 2002 the ANZ Bank has conducted a national 
survey of financial literacy, and each subsequent survey has 
revealed low levels of financial literacy across much of the Australian 
population (ANZ Bank 2015). These findings are confirmed in 
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Australia’s contribution to the Financial Literacy around The World 
(FLaT) study (Agnew et al. 2013a).13 The FLaT study was implemented 
by fielding a survey to a nationally representative sample in each of 
the contributing countries where financial literacy was measured by 
answers to three questions (known as the Big Three) that address the 
basic concepts required to plan for retirement.14 The wording of the 
questions are as follows:
Understanding of interest rate: Suppose you had $100 in a savings 
account and the interest rate was 2% per year. After 5 years, how 
much do you think you would have in the account if you left the 
money to grow? (More than $102, Exactly $102, Less than $102, 
Do not know, Refuse to answer.)
Understanding of inflation: Imagine that the interest rate on your 
savings account was 1% per year and inflation was 2% per year. After 
1 year, how much would you be able to buy with the money in this 
account? (More than today, Exactly the same, Less than today, Do not 
know, Refuse to answer.)
Understanding of risk diversification: Buying shares in a single company 
usually provides a safer return than buying units in a managed share 
fund. (True, False, Do not know, Refuse to answer.)
The first two questions address economic topics related to saving for 
retirement, including calculating interest rates and understanding 
the effect of inflation on purchasing power. Correct responses to these 
questions also test numeracy. The third question tests understanding 
of the concept of diversification. 
The Australian survey was administered in 2012 to a representative 
sample of just over 1,000 people over age 18. The responses of the 
Australian sample are reported in Table 1, and, comparable with other 
developed countries, find only modest levels of financial literacy 
(Lusardi and Mitchell 2011b). 
13  See Lusardi and Mitchell (2011a, 2011b).
14  The questions were developed by Annamaria Lusardi and Olivia S Mitchell (see Lusardi 
and Mitchell 2011a).
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Table 1: Proportion of correct answers to the Big Three financial 
literacy questions
% correct answers
Age Interest rates Inflation Diversification Total
< 35 79% 55% 42% 31%
36–50 85% 69% 58% 44%
51–65 80% 86% 62% 52%
Source: Agnew et al . (2013a), Table 2 . 
While a high proportion of Australians could answer the question about 
interest rates, the under-35s had trouble with the inflation question, 
and understanding of diversification was universally poor. It is 
particularly worrying that less than one-third of younger respondents 
and only around 50 per cent of 51–65 year olds could answer all 
three questions. Moreover, in a question asking respondents to self-
assess their financial literacy, 86 per cent of the sample considered 
themselves above average. 
Subsequent regression analysis in Agnew et al. (2013a) found an 
association between financial literacy and retirement planning 
consistent with international studies reported in Lusardi and Mitchell 
(2011a), however, other studies suggest that one should be extremely 
cautious in concluding direct causation between financial education 
and downstream financial behaviour (Fernandes et al. 2014). In fact, 
numeracy (tested in the first two of the Big Three questions) has been 
identified as more important for financial decision-making in a number 
of experimental studies. In particular, subjects with low numeracy skills 
have trouble understanding diversification (Bateman et al. 2014), are 
more likely to be confused by alternative presentations of investment 
risk (Bateman et al. 2016c), and are insensitive to increasing risk of ruin 
(Bateman et al. 2016d). Overall, the success of initiatives to improve 
financial literacy is unclear. Perhaps the ‘just in time’ alternative, 
as advocated in Fernandes et al. (2014), should be considered? 
At least as important as financial literacy in Australia’s DC-world is 
specific knowledge of the superannuation system to which almost all 
workers belong. Responses to a subset of superannuation-knowledge 
questions, included in the 2012 financial literacy survey discussed 
above, are reported in Table 2 and reveal gaps in key knowledge by 
a large minority of the sample. 
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Table 2: Super system knowledge of a representative sample 
of super fund members
% incorrect or 
‘do not know’
What is the mandatory employer contribution rate under the SG? 34%
For most people, superannuation is taxed at a higher rate than 
a similar investment outside superannuation
38%
A ‘balanced fund’ is invested only in safe assets, such as bank 
accounts and cash management trusts and term deposits .
60%
Do you know the minimum age at which you can access your 
superannuation account?
48%
If you have any superannuation you will qualify for the Age Pension 29%
Source: Agnew et al . 2013b .
For example, one would expect all super fund members (irrespective 
of age) to be aware of the mandatory employer contribution rate, 
and whether or not superannuation is tax-preferred. However, more 
than one-third of respondents could not correctly answer either 
question. More worrying was the large proportion of the sample 
(close to  60  per  cent) who were unaware of the asset allocation of 
a ‘balanced fund’—the typical default option at that time, despite the 
super savings of around 60 per cent of superannuation members being 
invested in that option.
In a related study focusing on decumulation decisions, a representative 
sample of over 800 50–64 year olds, with a super fund but not yet 
retired, revealed extremely poor understanding of retirement income 
products. In this survey, respondents were asked to identify which 
products they were familiar with (from a long list of financial 
products) and for those nominated were asked to identify key product 
features relating to period of payment, income guarantee, drawdown 
flexibility, etc. Responses relating to account-based pensions and life 
annuities are reported in Table 3.
It is clear from these responses that Australian super fund members 
approaching retirement have very poor knowledge of the most common 
retirement benefit product (an account-based pension), and little 
understanding of an alternative (the lifetime annuity) that provides 
comprehensive insurance against the retirement risks discussed 
earlier. More specifically, only one-third of respondents reported that 
they had heard of a life annuity, and few were aware of its insurance 
characteristics: only 22 per cent of the sample knew that a life annuity 
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paid a ‘lifetime’ income and only 8 per cent knew that payments 
are guaranteed. Close perusal of the detailed responses suggested 
confusion between life annuities and account-based pensions, which 
may be a further explanation of the trends in take-up of retirement 
benefits presented earlier. 
Table 3: Understanding of retirement benefit products
Life annuity Yes
Have you heard of this product? 37%
Does a life annuity offer lifetime income? 22%
Does a life annuity provide a guaranteed income level? 8%
Account-based pension Yes
Have you heard of this product? 48%
Does an account-based pension offer choice of income subject 
to a regulated minimum?
25%
Is withdrawal of capital possible? 20%
Source: Bateman et al . (2014b) .
In a practical sense it is unreasonable to expect all Australian retirement 
savers (and spenders) to be experts in lifecycle finance and product 
design. However, the level of understanding and knowledge revealed 
in these surveys is disappointing and raises questions about the ability 
of Australian super fund members to make appropriate superannuation 
and retirement decisions. Policy responses to assist members with 
these decisions, including information disclosure, choice architecture 
and financial advice are discussed next. 
Information provision through financial 
product disclosure
Australia’s financial product disclosure initiatives were initially 
framed in the 1990s on the underlying principle that ‘consumers are 
assumed, for the most part, to be the best judges of their own interests’ 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1997: 191) and that ‘disclosure rules 
would aid and improve the quality of decision making’ (Gruen and 
Wong 2010: 3). Possibly as a response to the ‘high-level’ regulatory 
approach and coupled with a focus by product providers on 
compliance and disclosure obligations, the ‘first generation’ financial 
product disclosure statements were long, detailed and complex. 
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More recently a series of second-round reforms have included shorter 
(eight-page) product disclosure statements and the introduction 
of a regulated default product, known as MySuper, (with its own 
mandatory disclosure format via a ‘product dashboard’). A feature of 
both new disclosure formats is a ‘standard risk measure’, endorsed by 
the superannuation industry and both regulators (ASIC and APRA), 
where investment risk is required to be presented as ‘the expected 
frequency of negative returns over a 20-year period’. 
However, the extent to which this information provision has helped 
or hindered retirement saving and spending decisions is unclear. 
Experimental evidence from the US indicates that shorter financial 
product disclosure statements do not enhance financial decisions 
(Beshears et al. 2011) and that even well-informed investors may be 
influenced by non-salient information (Choi et al. 2010). 
In the Australian context, Bateman et al. (2016b) investigated whether 
Australia’s newly mandated short-form product disclosure had assisted 
superannuation fund members to better use and assess the information 
relevant to super fund investment options. Here the prescribed 
information includes a description of the option, an expected return 
objective, suggested time frame, strategic asset allocation, standard 
risk measure (as discussed above) and risk level. The format for 
disclosure is prescriptive for all information items except strategic asset 
allocation where, in practice, super funds present this information in 
pie charts or tables. A key goal of the regulators, as indicated in the 
regulatory impact statement (Department of Treasury 2010), was to 
prescribe risk and return information in a clear format. However, in a 
lab experiment where student and super fund member subjects were 
asked to make a series of (incentivised) investment choices using the 
prescribed information, neither the return nor the risk information 
were used as expected, with subjects using return information in 
the opposite direction than expected and generally ignoring the risk 
information. Surprisingly, the strategic asset allocation information, 
whether presented as a pie chart or table (and not the main focus 
of the information disclosure), had the largest marginal impact of 
all information provided for most of the subjects. This behaviour is 
consistent with use of the 1/n decision rule, as found in other asset 
allocation studies including Benartzi and Thaler (2001) for US 401k 
investment options and Hedesstrom et al. (2007) for investment choice 
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in the Swedish Premium Pension Scheme. An overall conclusion is 
that regulators need to take more care with the testing of product 
disclosures.
An important motivation for the short-form disclosure was to 
better communicate expected returns and investment risk for the 
menu of investment options. Communication of investment risk was 
specifically investigated in the Australian context in Bateman et al. 
(2016c), who designed and implemented a discrete choice experiment 
to investigate the impact of alternative formats for investment risk 
presentation (including Australia’s standard risk measure) on the 
propensity of individuals to violate some implications of expected 
utility maximisation when making retirement investment choices. 
Investment risk was presented in nine alternative formats, including 
textual and graphical ranges, right and left probability tails and 
right and left frequency tails (i.e. the standard risk measure). Results 
identified large differences in rates of violation of rational behaviour 
by risk presentation format—from around 14 per cent (for range 
presentations) to 37 per cent (for frequency presentations, which 
included Australia’s standard risk measure). In particular, subjects 
with low scores on the numeracy and financial literacy scales were less 
able to ‘see through’ the alternative risk presentations and for many 
subjects the effect of the risk presentations was far greater than large 
changes in the underlying risk levels. 
These findings support previous experimental studies that identify 
the impact of information framing on retirement benefit decisions 
(including Agnew et al. 2008 and Brown et al. 2008)—and suggest 
that more care be taken by Australian financial services regulators and 
industry to address behavioural biases when prescribing formats for 
mandatory disclosure. 
In introducing the short-form disclosure format, the intention of 
ASIC, the regulator, was to reduce complexity, increase comparability 
and encourage engagement with financial decisions (Department of 
Treasury 2010). While there was extensive consultation and even some 
independent consumer testing of the proposed format, the pre-testing 
focused on simplicity and comparability but not on how people would 
use the information provided. 
POPuLATION AGEING AND AuSTRALIA'S FuTuRE
252
In other words, the ‘information disclosure’ approach needs further 
development to be of help to Australian retirement savers when making 
their retirement saving and spending decisions. This issue was in fact 
raised in the final report of the 2014 Financial System Inquiry (FSI 
2014), which recommended to ‘remove the regulatory impediments 
to innovative product disclosure and communication with consumers, 
and to improve the way risk and fees are communicated to consumers’ 
(Recommendation 23). 
Choice architecture
The superannuation system has always made some allowances for 
members who fail to or just don’t want to make decisions. Traditionally, 
if an employee didn’t choose a superannuation fund (if indeed choice 
was an option), the employer placed contributions in a nominated 
‘default superannuation fund’ and most super fund investment choice 
menus included a default investment option for members who did not 
elect one themselves. These arrangements were recently formalised 
with the introduction of MySuper. Since 2014, new employees who 
do not choose their super fund have been defaulted into a MySuper 
product and by 2017 all remaining default fund balances must be 
transferred into a MySuper product. These products are regulated to 
have a simple set of product features, irrespective of who provides 
them, including a single diversified investment option (or a lifecycle 
strategy where asset allocation is varied with age). Standard fees 
must be charged to all members, and are generally restricted to 
administration fees, investment fees, and certain transaction fees 
on a cost-recovery basis, and standardised reporting on a ‘product 
dashboard’ includes information on the 10-year average return, the 
return target, the standard risk measure, the level of investment, and 
fees and other costs.
The jury on MySuper is still out, and, while the initiative provides 
regulated defaults in the accumulation phase, it does not carry over 
to decumulation—as was the intent of its architect (Cooper 2010). 
The absent choice architecture at retirement was another issue raised 
by in the FSI Final Report, in which it was recommended that the 
superannuation system ‘meet the needs of retirees better by requiring 
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superannuation trustees to pre-select a comprehensive income product 
in retirement for members to receive their benefits, unless members 
choose to take their benefits in another way’ (Recommendation 11).
Overall, it is clear that the current approach to choice architecture is 
not meeting the needs of Australia’s retirement savers and spenders. 
It is now time for policymakers and industry participants to consider 
a wider range of choice architecture tools such as use of technology 
and decision aids, and customised information (Johnson et al. 2012). 
Financial advice
The final arm of support for retirement savers and spenders as they 
navigate Australia’s DC retirement income system is financial advice. 
Unfortunately, while greater system and product complexity has 
increased the need for financial advice, questions continue to be 
raised about conflicts of interest and the quality of advice. A review 
of the financial planning industry by a Joint Parliamentary Committee 
(the Ripoll Inquiry) was triggered by several episodes of poor outcomes 
for clients of some planners (JPCCFS 2009), and there are still regular 
reports of ‘bad behaviour’ by advisers. However, the Ripoll Inquiry 
did lead to the Future of Financial Advice (FoFA) reforms, which 
aim to improve financial advice by (among other measures) banning 
conflicted advice, restricting trail commissions, and introducing 
standards for the conduct of advisers.
Nevertheless, there are still many concerns surrounding financial 
advice and advisers. Importantly, both public policy and academic 
studies raise questions about the ability of ordinary people to discern 
advice quality. A clear example here is an ASIC Shadow Shopping 
Study of retirement financial advice conducted in 2012, which found 
that while 86 per cent of clients believed that they had received good 
advice, only 14 per cent of clients had received good advice under the 
criteria set by ASIC (ASIC 2012). As well, there are ongoing concerns 
about the licensing, competence and qualifications of financial 
advisers. Financial advice was also highlighted in recommendations 
in the FSI final report, which aim to enhance the quality of advice, 
including addressing some of the issues surrounding the financial 
advice industry, such as ‘rais[ing] the competency of financial 
advice providers and introduc[ing] an enhanced register of advisers’ 
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(Recommendation 25). However, it is clear that there is still a lot to do 
to ensure that retirement savers and spenders have access to affordable, 
high-quality and unbiased advice. 
In sum, it is not yet clear that we have found the best way to ‘help’ 
or  ‘guide’ people through these complex retirement saving and 
spending decisions.
Concluding comments
Overall, Australia’s retirement income arrangements are well placed 
to cope with the implications of the ageing population. The multi-
pillar framework for retirement income provision represents world 
best practice and provides risk diversification, the pre-funded DC 
Superannuation Guarantee facilitates incentives to work and save, 
pre-funding enhances intergenerational equity, and the means-tested 
Age Pension promotes fiscal sustainability. 
However, the retirement income arrangements perform poorly in 
a number of areas. Particularly in need of review are the tax arrangements 
for superannuation, the lack of policy focus on decumulation, and 
strategies to ‘help’ people with increasingly complex financial decisions 
as they enter and proceed through retirement. A key message is that 
the retirement income system needs to better support fund members 
and retirees as they navigate the decision points inevitable in a DC 
system, which are further complicated under the Australian design 
through interaction with the Age Pension and aged-care means tests. 
It is increasingly evident that super fund members are not equipped 
to make such decisions, and there is increasing evidence that there 
are deficiencies in the support framework of financial product 
disclosure, choice architecture and financial advice. To assist with 
effective decision-making, future policy will require a combination 
of broad education and ‘just-in-time’ knowledge delivery, greater 
sophistication in choice architecture, improved information provision 
(through innovative product disclosures and super fund and industry 
communications) and access to good, unbiased and reasonably priced 
financial advice.
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Ageing, entitlement and 
funding health care
Jane Hall and Kees van Gool
Universal access to health-care services funded under Medicare is one 
of the universal benefit programs targeted for scrutiny as government 
moves to end, or at least reduce, the age of entitlement. Successive 
Intergenerational Reports have demonstrated the extent to which 
health-care expenditure is predicted to grow more rapidly than 
Commonwealth government spending on aged care and pensions 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2010; 2015). While the latter is clearly 
related to population ageing, the former has also been attributed to the 
same demographic change (for example, Dutton 2014a, 2014b). The 
predicted growth in health-care expenditure has been characterised 
as inevitable and as threatening the viability of the health system as 
it is currently unless some significant changes are made (Ley 2015; 
Knott 2015). Thus the rhetoric posits causative links from ageing of the 
population to poorer population health to health-spending blowout to 
justification for major changes to current health-care financing. 
Our intent is to assess these propositions: first, that ageing will 
inevitably place undue pressure on Medicare; and second, that 
a system of tax-funded health care is not economically viable. At first 
glance, it seems paradoxical that improved levels of health (as reflected 
by decreasing premature mortality) are accompanied by rising outlays 
on health service use. Therefore, we explore the relationships between 
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old age and health status, and health status and expenditure. What 
we observe is that, although average expenditure increases with age 
and with number of chronic conditions, the decrease in median health 
status and the increase in median expenditure is substantially less. 
There is considerable variability in health levels, particularly at older 
ages, and in health-care expenditure. As a result, we see a concentration 
of spending in a relatively small proportion of the population. 
We then turn to the need for insurance. Insurance comes about as 
a way to manage exposure to risk. Individuals face the risk of poor 
health and potentially high costs for treatment. Although this is 
uncertain for the individual, it is predictable for population groups 
when risks are pooled. We explore the role of government in managing 
risk and argue that the provision of health insurance is a rational 
response. Medicare is not an unjustified entitlement.
We then turn to recent increases in national health expenditures, 
to  address whether current trends support the view that rising 
health-care expenditure is out of control. We conclude that ageing 
per se is not a threat to the sustainability of the Australian health-care 
system, and that current rates of expenditure are not out of control; 
so that drastic reductions in access to health care are not justified. 
Nonetheless the provision of universal insurance introduces other 
forms of risk and these warrant more investigation to improve health 
system efficiency.
Expectations of survival and health
Dramatic falls in mortality have occurred not just in the younger 
age groups but also in the age group generally regarded as elderly, 
the over-70s. The result is rising life expectancy. The prevalence of 
chronic disease is also increasing, with those at older ages more likely 
to experience multiple chronic conditions and presenting Australia’s 
biggest health challenge (AIHW 2014). To the extent that improved 
survival means that people are living with diseases that once 
were fatal, it is likely their health is relatively poor. An increasing 
prevalence of people in poor health is actually an improvement in 
overall health once deaths avoided are considered. There have also 
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been important changes in what it means to have a chronic disease. 
Earlier diagnosis is  not just possible but encouraged, meaning that 
even if treatment had not changed people would be living longer 
with a disease and that is reflected in increasing prevalence of chronic 
conditions. New US guidelines, for example, have greatly expanded 
the population for whom initiation of drug therapy for cholesterol 
is recommended (Stone et al. 2013). If fully implemented in clinical 
practice, around 13 million more US citizens would be treated with 
the cholesterol-lowering medications called statins, with most of 
these patients aged between 65 and 75 (Pencina et al. 2014). But for 
many diseases, if not most, treatment has changed in a way that has 
dramatically altered quality of life. In diabetes, for example, new 
technologies have transformed monitoring and treatment (Polonsky 
2012), and patients without complications report quality of life scores 
only slightly lower than similar aged counterparts (Redekop et al. 
2002). Today patients expect to manage their condition, not to have to 
withdraw from normal life. So it is important not to conflate having a 
chronic condition with a much poorer health state. It is important to 
know not just how many conditions people have been diagnosed with, 
but how they feel.
This can be done by looking at surveys where respondents are asked to 
rate their own health. We use data reported in 2010 from a large panel 
household survey in Australia, the Household, Income and Labour 
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey, of 7,700 Australian households 
(around 20,000 individuals). This survey uses a standardised measure 
of health, the SF-6D; respondents are asked to rate their health and 
functioning against six criteria which cover pain, vitality, physical 
activities, usual activities such as work, social activities and mental 
health. The distribution of SF-6D scores by age is shown in Figure 1. 
More than half the elderly population remains in reasonably good 
health. These results are consistent with other survey evidence. In the 
Australian Health Surveys around two-thirds of those over the age 
of 75 rate their health as good or better (AIHW 2014). 
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Figure 1. Self-assessed health by age group
Source: van Gool, Mu and Wong’s own work based on data provided by HILDA Survey .
Ageing, illness and health-care costs 
Health-care expenditure per person varies over the lifecycle with 
the lowest average spending in childhood (5–14 year olds) and rising 
rapidly in the over-50s (AIHW 2014). It is now generally accepted 
that historical growth has been driven by non-demographic factors, 
particularly advances in technology. For the future, though, it has 
been argued that increasing numbers of the older-old, with higher 
levels of chronic disease, and expectations of new treatments and 
technologies, will interact to push health-care expenditure to much 
higher levels. We now turn our attention to the extent to which 
higher levels of health-care spending are uniform across age groups, 
and explained by the presence of chronic conditions. 
Again we use data from HILDA, in this case the number of self-
reported GP visits in 2009. We are interested in moving beyond the 
mean to consider the median and the range. The median number 
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of visits does change with age, as shown in Figure 2, but only slightly. 
However, we do see greater variability with increasing numbers 
of high users at older ages.
This can be explored in more detail using another data source, the 
NSW 45 and Up Study, which surveyed more than 267,000 non-
institutionalised people aged 45 and over and can be linked to 
multiple health administrative data sets covering all out-of-hospital 
medical services, all subsidised prescription pharmaceuticals, and 
hospital use. Total average health expenditure by age demonstrates 
the expected pattern. Median expenditure increases gradually after 
the age of 65, but with a much greater increase in variability for men 
and women (see Figure 3). The number of chronic conditions explains 
some but not all of this increase. Median expenditure increases with 
the number of chronic conditions but the mean increases more rapidly, 
reflecting high levels of spending in a small group. Interestingly, the 
same pattern is evident even at older ages, and Figure 4 shows the 
results for the older age group. Although health cost increases with 
the number of chronic conditions, there is much greater variation 
in cost in this sicker group.
Figure 2. Variation in GP visits by age
Source: van Gool, Mu and Wong’s own work based on data provided by HILDA Survey .
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Figure 3A. Health expenditure by age in men 45 and up
Source: van Gool, Mu and Wong’s own work based on data provided by the 45 and up 
Survey linked to MBS and PBS and hospital, NSW Australia (2010) .
Figure 3B. Health expenditure by age in women 45 and up
Source: van Gool, Mu and Wong’s own work based on data provided by the 45 and up 
Survey linked to MBS and PBS and hospital, NSW Australia (2010) .
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Figure 4A. Health expenditure in men 70–79 years by number 
of conditions
Source: van Gool, Mu and Wong’s own work based on data provided by the 45 and up 
Survey linked to MBS and PBS and hospital, NSW Australia (2010) .
Figure 4B. Health expenditure in women 70–79 years by number 
of conditions
Source: van Gool, Mu and Wong’s own work based on data provided by the 45 and up 
Survey linked to MBS and PBS and hospital, NSW Australia (2010) .
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However, the increasing number of chronic conditions is a measure 
of multi-morbidity but not necessarily the seriousness of the conditions 
or the frailty of the patient. Our observation of increased variability 
with multi-morbidity may reflect that we have not captured severity 
adequately. Time to death has also been shown to be associated with 
higher levels of expenditure (Hoover et al. 2002; Moorin and Holman 
2008), with a marked increase in the year before death. The linkage 
of 45 and Up with death registrations allows us to investigate this. 
Similarly, the increase in spending in the 12 months prior to death 
is marked (Figure 5). Again, the mean level of expenditure increases 
more than the median, with much greater variability in spending in 
the year before death. Further, we find that the largest share of costs is 
hospital inpatient care, a finding that replicates others (Kardamanidis 
et al. 2007). 
To some extent, this is simply explained: hospitals are expensive 
places. Over half of Australian deaths occur in hospitals, even at older 
ages (Broad et al. 2013). Death at younger ages is less expected and 
less accepted, and so intensive (and expensive) treatment is justified. 
But this is not the case for older people, most of whom would prefer 
to die at home (Gomes et al. 2013). A survey of US physicians asked 
which of various potentially intensive treatments they would want 
for themselves if they were considered towards the end of their lives 
(Gallo et al. 2003). Such therapies included chemotherapy, artificial 
feeding, ventilation, dialysis and invasive testing. Over 80 per cent 
would definitely want pain relief; but most would not want other 
frequently used interventions. It is important to ask whether health-
care spending is being driven by expensive and invasive therapies 
that the recipients actively do not want. 
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Figure 5A. Expenditure by time to death
Source: van Gool, Mu and Wong’s own work based on data provided by the 45 and up 
Survey linked to MBS and PBS and hospital, NSW Australia (2010) .
Figure 5B. Expenditure by time to death
Source: van Gool, Mu and Wong’s own work based on data provided by the 45 and up 
Survey linked to MBS and PBS and hospital, NSW Australia (2010) .
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The concentration of health-care spending
Australian data show wide variation in health status at every age, 
and  at older ages. Many older people are in good health or better. 
And a growing number with poorer health could well be a consequence 
of what was once acute, life-ending illness being transformed into 
a chronic condition. Improvements in medical technology have allowed 
for earlier detection of conditions (e.g. diabetes) with the benefits of 
earlier intervention and better management. This has also created 
new medical conditions (high cholesterol) and new opportunities for 
commercialisation; after all, a medical condition is generally something 
for which there is a viable treatment. As a result, it is not valid to 
compare ‘chronic conditions’ measured today with those observed 
a generation ago. The growing prevalence of chronic conditions does 
not mean people feel worse. Although there is an increase in health-
care expenditure with age and with increasing conditions, what is 
more striking is that there is such an increase in variability with the 
number of conditions, and with proximity to death. 
The concentration in health-care spending is well summarised by the 
concentration curves in Figure 6, again using the NSW 45 and Up 
data. These rank individuals by health-care spending and show how 
the share of total expenditure corresponds to the proportion of the 
population. This pattern of high levels of expenditure concentrated in 
a fairly small proportion of the population has been well established 
with US data (Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000); but to our knowledge this 
has not been demonstrated with Australian data. It is not surprising 
that there is a high degree of concentration with 25 per cent of the 
population accounting for 80 per cent of total expenditure. Remember 
this is for an older group, NSW residents aged 45 and over. We would 
expect an even stronger concentration for all ages. Perhaps more 
surprisingly, when this is analysed by age group, as shown in Figure 6, 
the pattern remains, even for the older groups.
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Figure 6. Concentration curves for health care expenditure by age
Source: van Gool, Mu and Wong’s own work based on data provided by the 45 and up 
Survey linked to MBS and PBS and hospital, NSW Australia (2010) .
At this point, it seems clear that ageing is not the problem. We see 
that many Australians live into old age with good health, and even for 
those with multiple chronic conditions, many remain low spenders. 
The challenge is to understand why some people are healthy and why 
some are big spenders. There are potentially a number of underlying 
reasons, each of which suggest a different response: unpredictability 
at the individual level; poor management and high prices; missed 
opportunities for prevention. The unpredictability of illness for any 
individual and the potentially high (catastrophic) financial losses 
provides the case for insurance; better to exchange a certain small 
loss (the cost of insurance) rather than face the uncertain prospect of 
very expensive treatment, or no treatment because it is beyond one’s 
means. As we have already shown, the concentration of health-care 
spending remains after accounting for age and chronic conditions, 
which suggests that these two factors do not explain much of the 
observed variation. The observation of higher expenditures and 
hospital use in the months before death is consistent with a greater 
severity explanation. There are other uncertainties in addition to 
severity. Some illnesses are simply more expensive to treat while some 
individuals do not respond well to one treatment and may require 
alternative interventions or treatment for complications. 
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The challenge for health care insurance
A system of health-care financing is needed to prevent people not 
getting health care when they cannot afford it; and to ensure that 
people do not face unreasonable financial hardship when sick and 
needing care. This type of risk is generally addressed by some form 
of insurance, which allows for the pooling of financial risk. However, 
insurance brings with it moral hazard; if the results of loss are 
ameliorated, then individuals may take less care to avoid the loss.
The whole concept of moral hazard needs to be considered carefully 
in the context of health. Health insurance actually provides protection 
against the cost of health service use. It cannot guarantee to restore 
lost health, and even where treatments are completely effective they 
frequently involve time, pain, discomfort and loss of dignity. So it is 
unlikely that individuals will intentionally risk their health for the 
fun of consuming health care. Moral hazard does enter the picture, 
though. Insurance typically includes some services and excludes 
others, so providers, simply by selecting what services they fund, will 
encourage consumers to use those services in preference to others. 
Historically, this has favoured treatment for an identified disease/
condition and excluded prevention; and Medicare favours services 
provided by a medial practitioner where the patient is present over 
allied health providers, or telephone or email consultations. Now it 
would seem sensible for an insurer to invest in prevention to avoid 
expensive payouts for treatment; but the time required to reap the 
returns on prevention is often many years.
Once individuals become patients they rely on medical providers’ 
advice as to what type of health-care consumption they require and 
who is best placed to provide that. The combination of moral hazard 
and asymmetry of information results in higher expenditure, as the 
patient/doctor decision tends towards higher use of services and to 
be less price sensitive than if they faced the full costs. This is not 
necessarily over-use in any normative sense; after all the point of 
insurance is to reduce the costs faced at the point of service so as to 
encourage people to consume health care. But there is a challenge in 
distinguishing needed (or more valuable) from unnecessary (or less 
valuable) care. There is also the opportunity for providers to charge 
higher prices than they would without insurance.
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So however insurance is organised, there is a need to address the 
various issues raised by moral hazard and information asymmetries. 
Some  strategies involve passing some risk back to the customer, 
for  example co-payments, front-end deductibles, a limit to the 
amount that the insurer will pay. Others involve passing the risk on to 
providers, such as through capitation arrangements or encouraging use 
of government-financed services. Yet another approach is favourable 
risk selection, that is to encourage good risks and discourage bad risks 
from buying insurance. Risk is pervasive and the challenge for health 
financing is how to manage and share it, while still meeting the goal 
of universal access but not introducing perverse incentives.
The role of government
Government has an essential role to play in regulating markets. 
This applies no less in health care, where government involvement in 
health-care markets is a prerequisite for efficient market functioning. 
Indeed, without government’s power to ensure some redistribution, 
many groups would be priced out of the health-care market. Given that 
many chronic conditions are associated with low socioeconomic status 
and age, an important aspect of universal coverage is that it raises 
the health care purchasing power of the poor and sick, which then 
affects the type and distribution of health care supplied. Universal 
coverage is not just vital for financial protection from high health-
care costs for these groups but is likely to generate better population 
health outcomes. 
Even without the need for redistribution, government will intervene 
to regulate competition. The market for health insurance is beset 
with widespread failure, including risk selection, the potential for 
individuals to under-insure, and protecting the insured from an 
insurance firm going out of business. A broader way to see this, rather 
than just regulation of a market, is as regulation and management of risk. 
As Moss (2002) explains and chronicles in his book, government, even 
in the US, plays a major and pervasive role in managing risks through 
various approaches but is the ultimate risk manager. Once that view is 
adopted, we can see that there are different ways to meet the insurance 
function with differing degrees of government involvement. At one 
extreme is a market of competitive private insurance funds. Even in 
such a private market, regulation will be required to manage risk, 
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particularly under-insurance and the failure of a particular firm. 
Government will be required to cover poor risk groups, either directly, 
such as in the US with Medicare and Medicaid, or though regulation 
of premiums (such as community rating) or subsidy. The other 
extreme is a national health service where government is not just the 
insurer, but the provider of care, for example, owning and operating 
hospitals and contracting with doctors such as the British National 
Health Service. In between, government may provide the insurance 
function financed through general taxation, as is the case in Australia. 
Whichever approach is chosen, there will be government involvement 
as the ultimate risk manager. 
There are benefits to government as insurer. Universal cover can 
be assured through the government’s power to collect payments. 
The government can directly address the need for redistribution and 
provide the disadvantaged, low-income groups and those with multiple 
diseases with insurance cover. Government can save on the costs of 
monitoring market functioning, in addition to the savings from the 
overheads and administrative costs of multiple insurers. Government 
will benefit from the long-term investment in prevention. In our view, 
government tax-based insurance is not an entitlement but a rational 
option for addressing society’s need for health insurance. 
Can Australia afford to spend more 
on health care? 
Health-care expenditure has increased at a faster rate than national 
income; this phenomenon has been observed over time and across 
countries (OECD 2013). The real growth in health-care expenditure for 
Australia has averaged 5.1 per cent pa over the decade to 2012–13 (AIHW 
2014). Even though ageing is not ‘the problem’, it is reasonable to ask 
whether this can be maintained in the future. Financial sustainability 
can be considered from the perspective of the economy and whether 
future economic growth can continue to support a growing share. 
Compared to other OECD countries, Australia still is very average 
in the proportion of GDP spent on health care; countries that spend 
more include New Zealand and Canada. The most recent health-care 
expenditure data for Australia has shown some slowdown in growth. 
While one data point does not establish a trend, international evidence 
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shows a similar slowing of growth in other developed countries. 
Across the OECD, many countries hit by the global financial crisis 
(GFC) in 2009 have achieved a significant reduction in the growth in 
health spending. This is not surprising given the dimensions of the 
GFC and, in many countries, the imposition of strict austerity. What 
is interesting, and perhaps less expected, is that across 16 OECD 
countries, the economic recessions of the 1970s, the 1980s, and 2000s 
were followed by a downturn in health-expenditure growth, and that 
lower rate of growth has been sustained even during the following 
economic booms. 
And for the future, even conservative predictions of economic growth 
will easily cover the expected increases in expenditure (Richardson 
2014). Thus it is difficult to argue that health expenditure is out 
of control. The perspective of the economy as a whole is a more 
important question than the limited perspective of the Australian 
Government taken in the successive Intergenerational Reports. 
Successful constraint of federal government outlays may simply shift 
cost to other payers in the system; reducing the funding of public 
hospitals shifts the burden to states and territories, while consumer 
co-payments shifts financing to patients. 
That conclusion does not rule out the question of whether the health 
system can be made more efficient. We have already pointed to the 
potential for moral hazard and its effects on health-care spending. 
We have demonstrated that there is substantial variation in spending 
patterns. More research is required to disentangle warranted 
and unwarranted variation and expenditure. Opportunities for 
improving the performance and efficiency of health services can 
meet any challenges of rising expenditures; and, as the Productivity 
Commission pointed out, is a superior way of meeting the challenges 
ahead (Productivity Commission 2013).
Conclusion
The ageing of the Australian population is not a threat to the 
continued viability of the Australian health-care system. Many older 
people remain in good health, and place modest demands on the 
health services. The high concentration of health-care expenditure at 
all ages, with a relatively small group of the population accounting for 
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the bulk of expenditure, points to the need for insurance. Insurance 
can be provided in different ways with tax-financed universal 
health-care insurance as one option. Medicare with its universality is 
a reasonable social choice. Indeed, universal coverage and high levels 
of public insurance must be part of the solution to the healthy ageing 
policy challenge. The new analyses presented here demonstrate that 
there is widespread variation in health service use and expenditure, 
which is not explained by age or health status. More research is 
needed to disentangle warranted variation that should be addressed 
by insurance, and unwarranted variation that should be addressed by 
improving incentives. Meanwhile, policy reforms that are aimed at the 
average are likely to miss their target and have sub-optimal health and 
financial consequences. 
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Financing aged care: 
The role of housing wealth and 
intergenerational relationships
Rachel Ong
The financing of aged care is in many ways the new frontier of policy 
response to population ageing. Over the next 40 years, the group that 
dominates demand for aged care—the ‘old-old’—will increase more 
than any other. For example, the number of people aged over 85 is 
expected to quadruple. It is estimated that Australian Government 
aged-care expenditure will nearly double from 0.9 per cent to 
1.7 per cent of GDP over the next 40 years (Commonwealth of Australia 
2015).
Given the population and expenditure projections above, there 
exists an urgent need for establishing a sustainable system that offers 
adequate funding for aged residential and community care without 
crippling the fiscal budget. However, conflicting views persist in 
regard to the kinds of financing strategies that should be deployed. 
Successful execution of proposed solutions for financing aged care are 
typically hampered by conflicting ethical and operational issues that 
afflict co-existing and future generations. A major policy conundrum 
concerns the question of intergenerational equity, namely preserving 
the elderly’s access to adequate funding for aged-care services without 
encumbering younger generations in their lifetime economic prospects. 
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If funding for the needs of the aged are continually financed through 
government borrowing, and long-term budget deficits are therefore 
tolerated to support the care (and other) needs of a rapidly expanding 
group of elderly Australians, servicing and repayment of this fiscal 
debt will inevitably be borne by current and future generations 
of taxpayers.
This chapter considers the option of enabling older Australian home 
owners to draw on their housing assets to make a greater contribution 
to the funding of their personal aged-care needs. Specifically, the 
chapter explores the pros and cons of such a financing strategy within 
an intergenerational context. 
The intergenerational housing policy debate
The changes in the demographic landscape introduced by growing 
longevity, and the fiscal concerns they raise, have been long 
anticipated in the policy sector. The need for positioning public policy 
formulation within an intergenerational context has been recognised 
by government, an obvious indication being the commitment to 
publication of the five-yearly Intergenerational Reports by both the 
current federal government and its predecessors. 
However, the policy debate has taken on a new overtone in recent 
years. Traditionally, the elderly have been perceived as a universally 
resource-poor group in need of access to publicly funded care and 
support services. This emphasis has changed dramatically in recent 
years. It is increasingly recognised that many Australian ageing 
boomers have reaped significant windfall gains from soaring house 
prices from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. Between 1995 and 
2005, real house prices in Australia climbed by around 80 per cent, 
outstripping the growth in real house prices in several other OECD 
countries that also experienced housing market booms, such as 
Canada and the United States (Girouard et al. 2006). Home owners 
also suffered less diminution of their housing wealth during the 2008 
global financial crisis (GFC) than many of their counterparts overseas. 
House price index data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics show 
that while there was a very slight dip in the weighted average index 
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for all capital cities during 2008 and the first half of 2009, the housing 
market quickly recovered such that the house price index was higher 
than pre-GFC levels again by late 2009. 
In general, baby boomers have enjoyed favourable conditions during 
their prime working years, which have provided a significant boost to 
their capacity to accumulate wealth. These conditions are illustrated 
in Figure 1 below, where the timing of higher education funding 
reforms, changes in labour and housing market conditions, and the 
introduction of the superannuation guarantee are related to the life-
course of a median baby boomer. As the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(2012) defines baby boomers as individuals born between 1946 and 
1966, a median boomer is defined as someone who was born during 
the median year of this period (i.e. 1956). 
As depicted in Figure 1, the Australian Government abolished tuition 
fees in the higher education sector in 1974 (Jackson 2003). The median 
boomer would have just turned 18 years old in 1974. S/he would 
therefore have been commencing higher education when the abolition 
was implemented. It would be another 15 years before the Higher 
Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) was introduced in 1989, and 
yet another eight years before the HECS contribution rate was raised 
for new students and lower HECS repayment thresholds applied in 
1997 (Jackson 2003). Hence, most boomers born around and after 1956 
would have enjoyed access to subsidised education that allowed them 
to build their human capital at a relatively low financial cost.
The years spanning the 80s, 90s and the new millennium also offered 
favourable labour market conditions for baby boomers during their 
prime working years. Broadly speaking, stable labour markets 
prevailed during this period. Unemployment rates generally hovered 
below 7 per cent, with the exception of the early 1980s and early 1990s 
when they peaked at above 10 per cent. However, these labour market 
slumps were short-lived in comparison with otherwise extended 
periods of high employment coinciding with healthy national 
economic conditions. Efforts at personal wealth accumulation were 
of course further boosted by the introduction of the Superannuation 
Guarantee in 1992, when a ‘median’ boomer would have been 36 years 
old. The introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee marked the 
start of a minimum level of mandated employer contributions to 
POPuLATION AGEING AND AuSTRALIA'S FuTuRE
284
employees’ superannuation. When introduced, it covered 80 per cent 
of employees; by 1999, this coverage had extended to 91 per cent 
(Australian Taxation Office 2011). 
Figure 1. Higher education policies and labour and housing market 
conditions during the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and new millennium
Source: Jackson (2003), Australian Bureau of Statistics (2012, 2015b, 2015c) .
^ The term baby boomers refers to the cohort born between 1946 and 1966 (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics 2012). A ‘median’ baby boomer is defined as an individual born in the 
median year of this period, that is, 1956 . 
* Established house price indexes (HPIs) are available from the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics from 1986 . The HPIs reported in this graph are taken from December of each 
year . In 2005, the Australian Bureau of Statistics changed its HPI methodology . Hence, the 
pre- and post-2005 trends are not directly comparable . However, they remain insightful 
with respect to highlighting peaks, troughs and exceptional trends . 
** unemployment rates are available from the Australian Bureau of Statistics from 1978 
onwards . The rates reported in this graph are drawn from June of each year . 
Housing market conditions played a momentous role in boosting the 
housing wealth of baby boomers who had owned a home by the mid-
1990s. House prices soared exponentially from the mid-1990s to the 
early 2000s, adding tremendously to the housing asset base of home 
owners in those years. As shown in Figure 1, the house price index 
shot up from 112 to 245 between 1995 and 2003, a spike of nearly 
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120 per cent over an eight-year period. The decline in house prices 
during the GFC was reflected in just a slight dip in the house price 
index in 2008, followed by a quick rebound in 2009. 
Various studies agree that the favourable economic circumstances 
that prevailed during baby boomers’ wealth accumulation years 
are unlikely to occur again during the wealth accumulation years 
of subsequent generations (Olsberg and Winters 2005; Forrest and 
Izuhara 2009). Housing affordability has been declining over the long-
run so that those who were not fortunate enough to have purchased 
their homes by the time the housing market boom of the mid-1990s 
ended have found it increasingly difficult to access home ownership. 
Indeed, the median dwelling price to income multiple rose from 
approximately four to nearly seven between the mid-1990s and the 
early 2000s (Fox and Finlay 2012). 
Young adults are also currently forging careers within a more 
precarious labour market environment than baby boomers did. Beer 
and Faulkner (2009) note that insecure and short-term forms of 
employment are particularly pronounced among younger people and 
therefore threaten their chances of attaining first home ownership 
status. Furthermore, these forms of employment are incompatible with 
the long-term financial commitment necessary for meeting home loan 
repayments. Hence, those fortunate enough to break into the home 
ownership market may find it increasingly difficult to meet mortgage 
repayments given their income levels after becoming home owners. 
Indeed, estimates from the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ Surveys 
of Income and Housing (SIH) show that among young home owners 
aged 25–34 years owing a mortgage debt, the average mortgage debt 
to income ratio was under 110 per cent back in 1990. However, this 
ratio had escalated to over 210 per cent for this age group by 2011.
In the post-GFC era, youth unemployment is once again on the rise 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2015b). Furthermore, young people 
on the verge of entry into higher education are facing a distinct 
possibility of having to pay unsubsidised tuition fees, should the 
tertiary sector deregulation reforms proposed in the 2014 Budget 
(see Hockey 2014) be implemented in some form in the near future. 
It is therefore conceivable that by virtue of the timing of their birth, 
younger generations will have fewer opportunities to accumulate 
economic resources than the average boomer did.
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A housing asset-based system for financing 
aged care 
The developments described above have led to a shift in policy 
perspective that increasingly recognises that some older Australians 
are in fact well positioned to tap into their personal resources to meet 
their care and support needs in old age. In particular, many baby 
boomers currently hold significant levels of housing wealth, so in 
various countries with high levels of home ownership, the policy 
direction in relation to funding both residential and community 
aged care has seen incremental shifts towards encouraging personal 
responsibility through the use of housing assets. 
Government agencies in some countries have explicitly recommended 
the drawdown of housing equity to help pay for aged-care needs. 
The Productivity Commission’s inquiry into the aged-care sector argues 
that ‘many older Australians with low income have substantial wealth, 
which gives them the capacity to meet their lifetime accommodation 
costs and to make a modest contribution to the costs of their care’ 
(Productivity Commission 2011: xxvi). Specifically, the Productivity 
Commission (2011: 108) has recommended a government-backed Aged 
Care Equity Release scheme that will allow an older home owner to 
use ‘a maximum amount, say 40 to 60 per cent’, of their housing 
equity to help finance their accommodation and care costs, with no 
or limited repayments until the ownership of the home is transferred 
to another individual. A similar shift has been observed in the UK, 
where the Dilnot Commission Report (2011) has emphasised personal 
responsibility as the starting point for meeting the costs of care in 
old age, which can be paid from income, savings, housing assets or 
financial products that allow equity release. Furthermore, in Australia, 
recently announced aged-care financing reforms have introduced 
national means testing and user charges for community and residential 
care which take into account income and assets including the primary 
home (Australian Department of Social Services 2014).
In light of these developments, the rest of this chapter examines the pros 
and cons of positioning housing wealth as an asset base for financing 
aged care. Specifically, the chapter explores this proposed policy 
direction vis-à-vis consequences for intergenerational relationships. 
287
13 . FINANCING AGED CARE
Arguments for using housing wealth 
to finance aged care 
Preferential tax treatment of home ownership
The majority of Australia’s housing subsidies are provided to encourage 
home ownership. Housing consumers have traditionally received 
various forms of direct and indirect subsidies from governments to 
assist with home purchase and with meeting housing cost burdens 
once they become owners. Home buyers received non-means-tested 
direct purchase assistance in the form of the First Home Owners Grant, 
as well as stamp duty concessions. Existing home owners receive 
preferential treatment of the family home within both the tax and 
income support systems. Specifically, home owners have typically 
enjoyed non-taxation of imputed rent, and the exemption of the 
family home from a range of taxes include the Goods and Services, 
capital gains tax and land tax. The family home has also traditionally 
been exempt from the assets test that determine eligibility for income-
support payments such as the age pension. 
In comparison to home owners, the range of subsidies available to 
renters is much narrower and mainly come in the form of Commonwealth 
Rent Assistance and public housing rebated rents that are tightly 
targeted at those on low incomes. The amount of housing subsidies 
received by owners far outweighs the amount received by renters. 
In their report on housing taxes and transfers commissioned by the 
Australia’s Future Tax System Review, Wood et al. (2010) estimated 
the average housing subsidy received by private renters in 2006 at 
$901 (1.1 per cent of income), while home owners received an average 
of $2,201 (2.5 per cent of income). 
Successive decades of preferential tax treatments and concessionary 
assets tests that exclude the primary home from means tests have 
promoted extensive accumulation of wealth in housing assets by home 
owners. Some of these favourable tax advantages would no doubt 
have been capitalised into house prices. Together with historically 
low interest rate settings, these preferential tax treatments for home 
owners have pushed house prices to ever higher levels in recent 
decades, exacerbating barriers to home purchase by the non–home 
owning part of the population. Furthermore, tax expenditures and 
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means test concessions that apply to home owners only are in fact 
subsidised by non–home owners. Hence, concerns of inequitable 
treatment of owners versus renters within the current tax-transfer 
system could be mitigated if some of the housing wealth accumulated 
by home owners with the support of preferential policy parameters 
were diverted to fund their care needs in old age. 
A growing intergenerational housing wealth gap
An important society-wide consequence of the developments 
described thus far is the growing gap between generations with 
respect to housing wealth. Table 1 compares the housing wealth of two 
age cohorts. Ironically, what appear to have been large economic gains 
for baby boomer owner-occupiers have placed the ‘great Australian 
dream’ of attaining home ownership increasingly out of the reach 
of younger generations, now commonly dubbed ‘Generation Rent’ 
(McKee 2012). 
This growing intergenerational housing wealth gap is documented 
in Table 1, which compares the housing wealth of those aged 45–64 
and 25–44. Households aged 45–64 in 2011 broadly comprise baby 
boomers, while those aged 25–44 in 2011 are drawn from Generations 
X and Y (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2012). Table 1 shows that in 
2011, the mean housing wealth of those aged 45–64 years was 2.5 times 
the mean housing wealth of those aged 25–44. In absolute gap terms, 
the mean housing wealth of those aged 45–64 years in 2011 was 
over $230,000 higher than those aged 25–34 years. As such, in 2011 
the average baby boomer held almost half the population’s share of 
housing wealth, while the 25–44 age group held a comparatively 
smaller share of 18 per cent. This resulted in an intergenerational gap 
of 31 percentage points between the two age cohorts in 2011.
Table 1 further explores the housing wealth levels of the two age 
groups about 20 years prior. Back in 1990, the gap in mean housing 
wealth between the two age groups was much narrower at $92,000 
(compared to $230,000 in 2011). In terms of shares, those aged 45–64 
years in 1990 owned around 42 per cent of the population’s housing 
wealth compared  to a 34 per cent ownership by those aged 25–44 
years. Once  again, the gap between the two age groups was much 
smaller in 1990, at eight percentage points (compared to 31 percentage 
points in 2011).
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Table 1: Gaps in housing wealth between those aged 45–64  
and 25–44 years old, 1990 and 2011*
1990 2011
Mean housing wealth
25–44 years $138,302 $149,451
45–64 years $229,849 $379,739
Gap between age groups $91,547 $230,288 
Share of population’s housing wealth
25–44 years 34% 18%
45–64 years 42% 49%
Gap between age groups 8% points 31% points
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics Survey of Income and Housing 1990 and 2011 .
* Dollar values are reported in 2011 price levels . According to the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics (2015a), the Consumer Price Index (CPI) was 57 .5 in 1990 and 99 .3 in 2011 . 
Hence, all 1990 values have been inflated by an inflator of 1.729 (or 99.3/57.5).
Given the estimates reported in Table 1, it is arguably reasonable on 
equity grounds to expect home-owning boomers to draw on some 
of their dividends gained (at least partially) from preferential policy 
treatment of the family home and the housing market boom of the 
late 1990s to early 2000s to finance their care needs in old age, thus 
relieving some of the fiscal burden that segments of the population 
with comparatively lower levels of housing equity would otherwise 
have to carry. 
Intragenerational concerns within older cohorts
While intergenerational housing wealth inequities are a cause for concern, 
another equally worrying phenomenon is that of intragenerational 
housing wealth gaps within older cohorts. Thus far, the discussion has 
revolved around the ‘average’ or ‘median’ baby boomer, who is depicted 
as a home-owning individual who has made significant gains from 
the favourable economic conditions illustrated in Figure  1 and long-
standing preferential tax treatment of owner occupation. However, 
in reality, significant intra-cohort variations exist among the older 
segment of the population. Specifically, there are some older persons 
who cannot benefit from the housing wealth possessed by the typical 
boomer owner occupier. These are the minority of older persons who do 
not own housing assets and therefore have comparatively much lower 
levels of wealth than their home-owning peers. 
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Estimates from the SIH show that in 2011, approximately one-quarter 
of persons aged 45–64 years did not own the dwelling they lived in. 
Over the long-run, the non-home-owning population in this age group 
has grown in proportionate terms. In 1990, non–home owners made 
up a comparatively lower one-fifth of the population aged 45–64 years.
These older non–home owners principally comprise lifetime renters 
who have not had opportunities to accumulate housing wealth or 
those unfortunate enough to lose home ownership through adverse life 
events such as divorce or ill-health. Ong et al. (2014) find that among 
persons aged 45 years and over during the decade 2001–10, around 
742,000 spells of home ownership ended with a move out of owner 
occupation during the decade. The study also found that those who 
lose home ownership as a result of some unfavourable biographical 
event such as marital breakdown, bereavement or long-term health 
conditions are at increased risk of needing publicly funded rental 
housing assistance in older age. 
Older Australian renters who do not own housing assets will be 
particularly adversely affected if governments are forced to cut 
spending on housing assistance, income support or care and support 
services to address long-term budget deficits. Colic-Peisker et al. (2014) 
highlighted the detrimental effect that asset poverty has on older 
Australians’ ontological security and found that some older renters 
have had to severely restrict non–housing consumption in order to 
cope with meeting housing costs post-retirement. Hence, fiscal savings 
derived from home owners’ use of personal assets to finance their aged 
care would ease the burden on taxpayer funding of care and support 
for the elderly who do not have access to housing wealth.
Mitigating intergenerational transmission of advantage
Bequest motives are often cited as an argument against the drawdown 
of equity. However, intergenerational transfers of assets through 
bequests or inter-vivos transfers may entrench and in some cases 
exacerbate existing wealth inequality (Angel and Mudrazija 2011; 
Searle and McCollum 2014). There is a consensus in the international 
literature that those who come from affluent socioeconomic 
backgrounds are most likely to receive substantial intergenerational 
transfers (Kohli 1999; Rowlingson and McKay 2005). Indeed, estimates 
from the nationally representative Household, Income and Labour 
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Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey confirm exactly this pattern. 
The data shows that 26 per cent of bequest recipients in 2011 already 
resided in an advantaged area1 in the year prior to receiving the bequest 
as compared to 20 per cent of those who did not receive bequests in 
2011. Furthermore, 72 per cent of bequest recipients were individuals 
who could themselves easily raise emergency funds compared to 
60 per cent of non-recipients. Bequest recipients also possess more 
well-developed human capital than non-recipients; 77 per cent of 
bequest recipients in 2011 were already employed in the year prior to 
receiving the bequest compared to 69 per cent of non-recipients, and 
36 per cent of bequest recipients in 2011 had a university qualification 
compared to 24 per cent of non-recipients. Hence, encouraging equity 
release by those who can afford it to provide for their own care needs 
might in fact go some way towards combating the entrenchment 
of  wealth inequality associated with intergenerational transmission 
of advantage.
In addition, bequests are typically received later in the life-course due 
to longer life expectancies among aged parents. Thus, the timing of 
intergenerational wealth transfers through bequests is often not early 
enough in the life-course to assist young adults at a time when they 
are purchasing their first home. The 2011 HILDA Survey data shows 
that the median age at which Australians receive intergenerational 
transfers through bequests is 49 years old, by which time over three-
quarters of bequest recipients have already bought their own homes.
At a macro level, the rationale for encouraging a shift to the use 
of personal housing assets to finance aged care is therefore obvious. 
Such a policy reform has the potential to promote intergenerational 
equity by reducing the fiscal burden on younger cohorts who presently 
have lower chances of attaining home ownership than similarly aged 
cohorts did in past decades and (at least partially) addressing the 
perpetuation of wealth inequality associated with intergenerational 
transmission of advantage to young cohorts from affluent backgrounds. 
The reform would also weaken the prospect of government-funding 
cuts to support systems in core areas such as housing, income and care 
that would have more acute consequences for older Australians with 
low asset levels than those who possess housing wealth. 
1  This is defined as the top two deciles of the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ index of relative 
socioeconomic advantage/disadvantage.
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Arguments against using housing wealth 
to finance aged care 
Threats to intergenerational reciprocity 
Despite some obvious benefits in adopting a housing asset-based 
aged-care financing strategy, decisions about asset use and economic 
provisioning in old age are often complex, and plagued with difficulties. 
First and foremost is the emotional attachment that owner occupiers 
and their children have towards the family home. The housing assets 
of elderly parents are often viewed not just as their personal resources, 
but as the future inheritance of their children. Equity release by elderly 
parents might understandably be unpopular if they have the potential 
to fracture family relationships where adult children had expected 
to inherit their parents’ assets. Indeed, Ong et al. (2013) found that 
children who are expecting to benefit from inheriting their elderly 
parents’ homes often express concerns about the use of debt finance 
(e.g. reverse mortgages) by their parents to draw down on the wealth 
stored in the family home and may get actively involved in decisions 
by elderly parents with regards to the use of their housing assets. 
Hence, under a housing asset-based aged-care financing system, some 
elderly persons will likely face a dilemma at the family level in relation 
to balancing their desire to transfer as much of their housing assets as 
possible to their adult children against meeting their personal need for 
adequate care in old age. 
The intra-familial scenario described above is but one example of the 
complexities that govern the links between intergenerational wealth 
transfers and intergenerational reciprocity in care. Previous studies 
have cautioned that a lack of intergenerational asset accumulation may 
weaken traditional ties between the old and the young, resulting in 
resentment and growing unwillingness among working-age adults 
to care for the elderly (see, for example, Hudson 1999). Angel and 
Mudrazija (2011: 170) note that: 
it would be naïve to think that human motivations are solely altruistic 
or that we possess an unlimited capacity for self-sacrifice … a system 
in which the accumulation of assets ties one generation to the next 
is one in which bonds of generational reciprocity and affection are 
maximised. Conversely, a system in which the material ties between 
children and parents are weak faces the risk of turning the young and 
the old into strangers.
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Even if adult children are supportive of their parents releasing some 
housing equity for funding personal aged-care needs, financial risks 
and impediments exist. These financial risks and impediments, 
as described below, can act to significantly reduce housing assets 
below levels that are intended for bequest purposes unless adequate 
safeguards are put in place to counter their impacts on equity levels 
in old age.
Financial risks and barriers
Any financing strategy that is housing asset–based is predicated 
on the assumption that investment in ‘bricks and mortar’ will yield 
significant returns as house prices continue to rise over the long-term. 
To date, the Australian housing market has proven to be remarkably 
resilient even throughout the GFC. However, recent economic events 
worldwide have undeniably highlighted some risks of relying on 
housing as a vehicle for supporting retirement needs. Housing asset 
values are also thought to be more vulnerable to changing consumer 
sentiments because of greater difficulty in determining true asset 
values (Shiller 2005; Baker and Wurgler 2007). Furthermore, housing 
assets are a unique financial investment in that the risks associated 
with future house price movements cannot be hedged (Shiller 2003). 
House price volatility can expose home owners who engage in equity 
release to undesirable levels of house price risks. These risks in 
turn have the potential to significantly reduce the value of housing 
assets unless government policy establishes a floor in retained levels 
of equity. 
Another financial concern exists in the form of repayment risk, for 
those who use equity release products to withdraw housing equity. 
Baby boomers currently aged 45–64 years are now exhibiting higher 
degrees of mortgage indebtedness compared to similarly aged cohorts 
in the past. Long-run trends from the SIH show that the proportion 
of home owners with a mortgage debt has increased in every age 
group between 1990 and 2011, but this rise in indebtedness has been 
the steepest (around 30 percentage points) amongst home owners aged 
45–64 years. The incidence of mortgage indebtedness jumped from 
38 per cent to 70 per cent among those aged 45–54 years, and from 
15  per cent to 44 per cent among those aged 55–64 years between 
1990 and 2011. These statistics are complemented by evidence from 
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the 2001 and 2010 HILDA Survey showing that the proportion of 
boomer owners, who engaged in equity release by increasing debt 
against their primary home, rose over the decade from 18 per cent to 
24 per cent among those aged 45–54 years and 8 per cent to 16 per cent 
among those aged 55–64 years. These higher levels of mortgage debt 
can leave baby boomers more precariously positioned financially, with 
only a limited number of years left in the workforce to pay off their 
mortgage debt. These risks are augmented should adverse life events 
such as divorce, unemployment or ill health befall boomers who have 
not yet paid off their mortgage debt.
Figure 2. Incidence of mortgage indebtedness amongst home owners, 
1990 and 2011
Source: Authors own calculations from the confidentialised unit record files of the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics Survey of Income and Housing 1990 and 2011 .
Government could play an effective role in promoting the acceptance 
of equity release products for financing aged-care needs, by providing 
insurance against its downside risks. Indeed, there are several 
international developments that provide evidence on the merits 
of such government involvement, such as in the case of the Home 
Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) product in the United States. 
The HECM is federally insured and therefore the risk is transferred 
to the Federal Housing Administration, allowing eligible older home 
owners to release the equity stored in their home in a secure manner 
(Federal  Housing Administration 2010). The HECM is typically 
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considered a safe option for equity release in the United States, 
where it accounts for a dominant share of the equity release market 
(Alai et al. 2013). At the same time, Beal (2001) has pointed out that the 
development of an equity-release market that caters for the elderly is 
unlikely to be smooth where its development is not facilitated by the 
government. More recently, the Productivity Commission (2011: 106) 
makes a similar observation by noting that a ‘government-backed … 
equity release scheme may be more acceptable to some older people. 
The higher uptake of government-sponsored schemes, relative to 
private provider schemes, in the US suggests that the added security 
from government backing can help dispel nervousness about using 
the products.’
Releasing housing equity via the traditional sale method can mitigate 
some of the repayment risk concerns associated with the use of equity 
release products. However, transaction costs may deter home owners 
considering downsizing because they represent a significant upfront 
cost on their next purchase. Economists have long opposed the stamp 
duty because it is an inefficient tax that deters residential mobility 
and has adverse impacts on home purchase affordability. Indeed, 
Ong et al. (2013) found that during the period 2001–10, stamp duties 
ate into 8 to 10 per cent of the housing equity that home owners aged 
45+ released via downsizing. 
In addition, Judd et al. (2014) identified some major housing market 
difficulties associated with downsizing in later life. These include 
a  lack of suitable housing types and locations, as well as concerns 
over the affordability of housing. There seems to be a general 
consensus that older Australians increasingly wish to age in place for 
as long as possible. This often involves emotional attachment not just 
to one’s home, to one’s neighbourhood. Hence, those who are willing 
to downsize often express a strong desire to do so within the same area 
so as to maintain links with their community in old age (Ong et al. 
2013; Judd et al. 2014). However, home owners often face difficulties 
with finding an affordable property within the same neighbourhood 
to downsize into. Tackling inefficient taxes such as the stamp duty 
through policy reform would go some way towards alleviating the 
emotional impact and practical difficulties that often accompany 
downsizing. For instance, Wood et al. (2012a, 2012b) has provided 
empirical evidence that the abolition of stamp duty and its replacement 
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by a broad-based land tax would promote residential mobility by 
reducing upfront cost barriers and mitigate affordability concerns 
because a broad-based land tax burden will be capitalised into lower 
land prices. Such a reform has the potential to tackle both mobility 
and affordability concerns that are impediments to downsizing.
Concluding comments
It is unsurprising that governments are increasingly looking towards 
those with sufficient assets in old age to contribute to their cost of 
being supported and cared for in old age. The pressure on individuals 
to assume greater responsibility for their aged-care needs will only 
intensify in the coming years, as governments strive to manage the 
fiscal challenges of accelerated rates of population ageing, especially 
among the oldest-old. 
There are some strong intergenerational equity arguments for 
instituting housing wealth as a pillar of aged-care policy. If older 
home owners were enabled to draw on some of their housing wealth 
to contribute to the funding of their aged-care needs, it would no 
doubt relieve intergenerational equity concerns at a macro level. 
However, more research needs to be done to unearth and disentangle 
the potentially complex links between intergenerational asset 
accumulation and intergenerational reciprocity to avert the undesirable 
consequence of alienating the young from the old. Furthermore, much 
more work needs to done to devise equity release products that allow 
elderly home owners to draw down on their housing wealth in a secure 
manner that will leave them with an appropriate minimum level of 
equity. An in-depth assessment would be required of the multitude of 
risks (and associated solutions) at each stage of product development, 
including product design, regulatory framework, pricing, etc. 
Policy support for family models of caring for aged parents may 
alleviate the need for releasing equity to access formal aged-care 
services and thus avoid some of the more intricate difficulties associated 
with equity and equality discussed in this chapter. Informal housing 
and care arrangements often provide opportunities for two-way 
intergenerational support. For instance, elderly grandparents who 
provided childcare for grandchildren in earlier years may benefit from 
family reciprocity in the form of aged care from their adult children 
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when frailty sets in. The leakage of housing wealth outside the family, 
which typically occurs through the use of equity to pay for formal care 
services, is averted when family members enter into informal housing 
and care arrangements within a multigenerational household context. 
However, informal care solutions are not without its challenges, and 
will have to be crafted thoughtfully with sufficient safeguards for the 
wellbeing of all family members. 
At a macro level, there also exists a long-standing conflict between 
the provision of informal care to family members and participation 
in the paid labour market. For instance, international studies have 
consistently found that working-age carers who provide informal 
care for ill, frail or disabled family members typically have depressed 
levels of labour force participation compared to those who do not 
carry these care responsibilities (see for instance, Austen and Ong 
2010; Carmichael et al. 2008). The issue is particularly pronounced 
among women, who are over-represented among informal carers. 
Here, policies will need to carefully navigate the tension between 
encouraging household production of aged care services and lifting 
economic productivity vis-à-vis greater labour force participation, 
both of which are necessary policy ambitions to address fiscal 
challenges in an era of population ageing.
Acknowledgements
This chapter uses unit record data from the Household, Income and 
Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey. The HILDA Project 
was initiated and funded by the Australian Government Department of 
Social Services and is managed by the Melbourne Institute of Applied 
Economic and Social Research. The author would like to thank Mike 
Woods for offering helpful suggestions and comments on the chapter. 
The findings and views reported in this chapter, however, are those 
of the author and should not be attributed to any other individual or 
organisation.
POPuLATION AGEING AND AuSTRALIA'S FuTuRE
298
References
Alai Daniel, Chen Hua, Cho Daniel, Hanewald Katja and Sherris 
Michael (2013). Developing Equity Release Markets: Risk Analysis 
for Reverse Mortgages and Home Reversions, Working Paper No. 
2013/01, ARC Centre for Excellence in Population Ageing Research.
Angel Jacqueline and Mudrazija Stipica (2011). Aging, inheritance, 
and gift-giving. In RH Binstock and LK George (Eds) Handbook of 
Aging and the Social Sciences (7th edition). San Diego: Academic 
Press, pp. 163–173.
Austen S and Ong R (2010). The employment transitions of mid-life 
women: Health and care effects. Ageing and Society, 30(2): 207–227.
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2012). Reflecting a Nation: Stories from 
the 2011 Census, Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2015a). Consumer Price Index, 
Australia, Time Series Workbook, Cat. No. 6401.0, Canberra: 
Australian Bureau of Statistics.
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2015b). Labour Force, Australia, Time 
Series Workbook, Cat. No. 6202.0, Canberra: Australian Bureau of 
Statistics.
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2015c). Residential Property Price 
Indexes: Eight Capital Cities, Time Series Workbook, Cat. No. 6416.0, 
Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics.
Australian Department of Social Services (2014). Aged Care Means 
Test Assessments. www.humanservices.gov.au/customer/services/
aged-care-means-test-assessments. 
Australian Taxation Office (2011). 20 Years of Superannuation 
Guarantee,  www.ato.gov.au/Media-centre/Commissioners-online-
updates/20-years-of-super-guarantee/.
Baker Malcolm and Wurgler Jeffrey (2007). Investor sentiment in the 
stock market. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(2): 129–151. 
Beal Diana (2001). Home equity conversion in Australia—issues, 
impediments and Possible solutions, Economic Papers, 20(4): 55–68.
299
13 . FINANCING AGED CARE
Beer Andrew and Faulkner Deborah (2009). 21st Century Housing 
Careers and Australia’s Housing Future, Final Report No. 128, 
Melbourne: Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute.
Carmichael Fiona, Hulme Claire, Sheppard Sally and Connell Gemma 
(2008). Work-life imbalance: Informal care and paid employment 
in the UK. Feminist Economics, 14(2): 3–35.
Colic-Peisker Val, Ong Rachel and Wood Gavin (2014, published 
online). Asset poverty, precarious housing and ontological security 
in older age: An Australian case study. International Journal 
of Housing Policy. doi: 10.1080/14616718.2014.984827. 
Commonwealth of Australia (2015). 2015 Intergenerational Report: 
Australia in 2055. Canberra: Department of Treasury. www.
treasury.gov.au/PublicationsAndMedia/Publications/2015/2015-
Intergenerational-Report
Daley John and Wood Danielle (2014). The  Wealth of Generations, 
Melbourne: GRATTAN Institute. grattan.edu.au/report/thewealth-
of-generations/.
Dilnot Andrew, Warner Norman and Williams Jo (2011). Fairer Care 
Funding: The Report of the Commission on Funding of Care and 
Support. London: UK Commission on Funding of Care and Support, 
Final Report. www.thirdsectorsolutions.net/index.php?id=75.
Federal Housing Administration (2010). Consumer Fact Sheet for Home 
Equity Conversion Mortgages (HECM), 1 November. portal.hud.
gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC13006.pdf.
Forrest Ray and Izuhara Misa (2009). Exploring the demographic 
location of housing wealth in East Asia. Journal of Asian Public 
Policy, 2(2): 209–221.
Fox Ryan and Finlay Richard (2012). Dwelling prices and household 
income. Bulletin, December quarter: 13–22.
Girouard Nathalie, Kennedy Mike, van den Noord Paul and André 
Christophe (2006). Recent House Price Developments: The Role 
of  Fundamentals, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, 
No. 475, OECD Publishing. dx.doi.org/10.1787/864035447847.
POPuLATION AGEING AND AuSTRALIA'S FuTuRE
300
Hockey Joe (2014). Budget Speech 2014–15, 13 May, www.budget.gov.
au/2014-15/content/speech/html/speech.htm. 
Hudson Robert (1999). Conflict in today’s aging politics: new 
population  encounters old ideology. Social Service Review, 
73: 358–379.




Judd Bruce, Liu Edgar, Easthope Hazel, Davy Laura and Bridge 
Catherine (2014). Downsizing Amongst Older Australians, Final 
Report No. 214, Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, 
Melbourne.
Kohli Martin (1999). Private and public transfers between generations: 
linking the family and the state. European Societies, 1(1): 81–104.
McKee Kim (2012). Young people, homeownership and future welfare. 
Housing Studies, 27(6): 853–862.
Olsberg Diana and Winters Mark (2005). Ageing in Place: 
Intergenerational and Intrafamilial Housing Transfers and Shifts in 
Later Life, Final Report No. 88, Melbourne: Australian Housing 
and Urban Research Institute.
Ong Rachel, Jefferson Therese, Wood Gavin, Haffner Marietta and 
Austen Siobhan (2013). Housing Equity Withdrawal: Uses, Risks, 
and Barriers to Alternative Mechanisms in Later Life, Final Report 
No. 217, Melbourne: Australian Housing and Urban Research 
Institute. 
Ong Rachel, Wood Gavin and Colic-Peisker Val (2014). Housing 
older Australians: Loss of homeownership and pathways into 
housing assistance. Urban Studies, published online. doi: 
10.1177/0042098014550955.
Productivity Commission (2011). Caring for older Australians, Report 
No. 53, Final Inquiry Report, Canberra: Productivity Commission.
Rowlingson Karen and McKay Stephen (2005). Attitudes to Inheritance 
in Britain. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
301
13 . FINANCING AGED CARE
Searle Beverley and McCollum David (2014). Property-based welfare and 
the search for generational equality. International Journal of Housing 
Policy, 14(4) 325–343. doi: 10.1080/14616718.2014.955334.
Shiller Robert (2003). The New Financial Order: Risk in the 21st 
Century. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Shiller Robert (2005). Irrational Exuberance. Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press.
Wood Gavin, Stewart Miranda and Ong Rachel (2010). Housing 
Taxation and Transfers, Final Report, Research Study for the 
Review of Australia’s Future Tax System, taxreview.treasury.gov.
au/content/html/commissioned_work/downloads/wood_stewart_
and_ong.pdf.
Wood Gavin, Ong Rachel and Winter Ian (2012a). Stamp duties, land 
tax and housing affordability: The case for reform. Australian Tax 
Forum, 27(2): 331–349. 
Wood Gavin, Ong Rachel, Cigdem Melek and Taylor Elizabeth 
(2012b). The Spatial and Distributional Impacts of the Henry Review 
Recommendations on Stamp Duty and Land Tax, Final Report 





Conclusions: An historic 
triumph that presents big 
challenges for public policy
Andrew Podger
The first conclusion from all the material presented in this book 
concerns  the scale of the changes underway, both nationally and 
internationally. They are perhaps the most significant demographic 
changes in human history, building on the dramatic reductions in 
infant mortality over the last century or so and the fall in fertility rates 
over the last half-century (the precise timing varying significantly 
amongst different countries), leading to substantial increases in life 
expectancy at older ages as well as more people reaching old age. 
These changes will be permanent, requiring fundamental and ongoing 
re-conceptions of the life-span of individuals and the age profile 
of societies, affecting family and community relationships as well as 
individuals’ planning for lifetime wellbeing. As a result, we need 
perhaps to consider the idea of ‘multiple beings’ over the life-span 
with individuals choosing more and different roles at different ages.
A second idea that comes through is the need to cease thinking of the 
changes as representing a crisis, and to see them as a triumph as per 
the evidence in Gong and Kendig. They are the result of a series of 
indisputably positive developments—lower child and other mortality 
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at young and middle ages, more choice and control over fertility, and 
now more years of healthy living in old age. The conversation needs 
to shift to how we can take full advantage of the changes.
The policy implications relate to the goals of both individuals and 
society as a whole, and the capacity of governments to facilitate their 
achievement. For individuals, the goals include maintaining good 
physical and mental health, preserving independence and ability to 
control their lives and exercise choice, being socially connected and 
being treated with dignity and respect, and having personal security. 
These goals require access to personally appropriate services, whether 
provided by government or the market or through social organisations.
Achieving broader social wellbeing requires the optimal use 
of  human  resources and social capital. Pakulski suggests that 
Australia’s  ‘3Ps’ (population, productivity and participation) 
strategy has been relatively successful in this regard, a strategy to 
which he adds a fourth ‘P’ (provisions) to meet the financial impact 
of demographic change on pensions, health services and aged care. 
One advantage of this approach is that it addresses both sides of the 
ledger: factors that may facilitate continued economic growth and 
opportunities for improved wellbeing, and cost factors associated with 
population ageing. Similarly, it combines mitigation and adaptation. 
Importantly, however, social wellbeing also concerns social cohesion 
and inclusion, and stability.
In supporting the achievement of individual and social goals, 
governments need to distinguish between the exogenous factors 
society (and government) must adjust to, and the things governments 
can influence. The exogenous factors are not just the demographic 
changes underway (immigration may continue to moderate the 
impact, as McDonald notes), but also the structure of the Australian 
economy and our broad social values and relationships and associated 
expectations, and any economic turbulence, particularly global 
turbulence. Governments may be able to influence labour markets, 
insurance and superannuation and to provide social protection, 
to smooth transition to new demographic or economic circumstances, 
to facilitate effective and efficient health- and aged-care services, and 
to support social engagement through appropriate infrastructure, 




Social and economic participation
Central to future labour market and social policies is that the concept 
of ‘retirement’ needs reconsideration. Rather than being a point-in-
time transition, retirement is increasingly a process taking place over 
a lengthy period. Various contributors highlight how varied that 
process is amongst individuals (for example, McDonald, Kendig and 
Browning, Hall and van Gool). They also suggest the likelihood of the 
process lengthening in future and the variations widening.
Accordingly, the idea of a fixed ‘retirement age’ needs to be rejected, 
though for superannuation and social security purposes ages do need 
to be identified for eligibility for government support. The challenge 
is to set such eligibility rules in a way that recognises the process of 
retirement and offers people reasonable choice about the process that 
best suits them (and best protects those with limited means and ability 
to work) while not imposing undue costs on the community.
A focus on people choosing how they transition into retirement, 
rather than facing a fixed retirement age, requires that they have 
the necessary information and advice, and personal competence, 
to make their decisions wisely. There is a need to simplify Australia’s 
complicated superannuation and social security system (as Bateman 
emphasises). It also assumes there is a wide range of options open from 
which people can choose.
While workforce participation has increased in recent years amongst 
those over 55, there remains considerable room for improvement 
in the range of employment options offered by employers. Some 
shift can be expected as the age profile of labour supply changes 
(with total numbers aged under 55 slowing significantly) but, as Ryan 
highlights, more effort could be made to ensure flexible hours, part-
time work, suitable contract arrangements, appropriate insurance and 
compensation arrangements, and so on. Some serious cultural change 
needs to occur and governments could facilitate this by the sort of 
structural adjustment programs used over the years for industry 
restructuring.
Retraining and continued education in old age should be part of 
such structural adjustment, and is likely to continue as an element 
of the cultural change required. For some, however, employment 
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opportunities are constrained from a much earlier age—from leaving 
school—casting a shadow over their capacity to participate when 
reaching their 50s and 60s. Efforts to improve opportunities in old age 
must therefore include improving participation in school education 
and ensuring post-school training offers opportunities for continued 
up-skilling and new skills development.
While more opportunities for continued participation in the paid 
workforce are needed, given the increasing numbers of people in this 
older but active age group, the idea of continued contribution is not 
limited to paid work. Already many are involved in family caring 
responsibilities (as grandparents, or as children or spouses of frail-
aged people) and in volunteering work. There may be room to widen 
opportunities in these areas and to make the contributions more 
productive by suitable training or other support. Such contributions 
can, however, be burdens rather than ‘opportunities’ pursued by 
choice; and those concerned may need support while providing care, 
and may also need opportunities to participate actively but differently 
as and when their caring responsibilities cease.
Governments should facilitate choice, ensuring opportunities for 
continued participation and contribution to society, but also ensure 
that those bearing the risks involved are able to manage them. 
Governments need to recognise that their policies may influence the 
choices being made, being careful not to encourage decisions that are 
not in people’s best interests.
The emphasis on choice extends to the choice between ‘work’ and 
‘leisure’, and the mix of the two as people transition to retirement. 
One of the most beneficial aspects of economic growth is to reduce 
the drudgery of work, making work more pleasant and satisfying 
and allowing more time for leisure. Today’s policymakers and 
advisers might do well to revisit John Stuart Mills’ ‘gospel of leisure’ 
as  opposed  to  the ‘gospel of work’ propounded by some of the 
moralists of his time: 
In opposition to the ‘gospel of work’, I would assert the gospel of 
leisure, and maintain that human beings cannot rise to the finer 
attributes of their nature compatibly with a life filled with labour. 
I do not include under the name labour such work … as is done by 
writers and afforders of ‘guidance’, an occupation which, let alone the 
vanity of the thing, cannot be called by the same name with the real 
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labour, the exhausting, stiffening, stupefying toil of … agricultural 
and manufacturing labourers. To reduce very greatly the quantity 
of work required to carry on existence is as needful as to distribute 
it more equally; and the progress of science, and the increasing 
ascendancy of justice and good sense, tend to the result. (John Stuart 
Mill (1850), quoted in Castles 2014)
Society and governments should not press for increased workforce 
participation as a goal in itself: better opportunities and better use 
of available human resources will almost certainly involve increased 
workforce participation amongst the able-aged, but people should also 
be free to choose the mix of work and leisure in their lifetimes, subject 
to their being able to manage the risks associated with their choices, 
and those choices not being unduly influenced by government 
(including by too ready availability of taxpayer support).
Health and wellbeing
Health and wellbeing implications of our ageing population are 
explored by various contributors in this volume, including in respect 
of income security, physical and mental health, social engagement and 
housing. A number of public policy concerns arise either explicitly 
or implicitly.
Several contributors (particularly Bateman and Piggott) highlight the 
complexity of the current retirement income system and the problems 
in the ‘de-accumulation phase’ in particular, notwithstanding the 
many strengths of Australia’s arrangements. The strengths relate in 
large part to the extent to which the system involves the spreading 
of individuals’ lifetime earnings rather than relying on public and 
private transfers, by mandating and encouraging superannuation 
savings, as well as the way it protects the poor and those with limited 
savings. Indeed, the World Bank and some other international 
observers see this defined contribution and funded approach, 
(with the safety net of the means-tested age pension) as a benchmark 
for good practice. It is seen as providing guidance for how other 
countries might design contributions and eligibility for benefits in 
their defined benefits schemes (World Bank 1994, 2008; Podger et al. 
2014). On the other hand, it would be better if the Australian system 
had, as a more prominent benchmark in its de-accumulation phase, 
the sort of standards that ‘defined benefit’ schemes use, particularly 
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in terms of income replacement rates and continuing secure lifetime 
income streams. A specific problem to be addressed is the extent to 
which people pass on their tax-supported superannuation to the next 
generation (and the extent to which the next generation feels entitled 
to estates enhanced by tax-supported savings), or run out of savings 
and rely too heavily on the age pension.
The age pension remains an important ‘pillar’ in Australia’s retirement 
income system, ensuring an adequate safety net for those with limited 
superannuation savings. But ‘adequacy’ will not be maintained simply 
by maintaining real rates of pension as was originally proposed in 
the 2014–15 Budget. Over time, social security payments need to be 
adjusted to maintain relativities with incomes across the community.
The complexity of the Australian system, and the degree to which 
individuals bear the risks, suggests the need to consider wider use of 
default mechanisms to guide individuals, as well as better support for 
managing the risk of longevity. The Murray Report on the Financial 
System recommends some modest moves in this direction (Murray 
2014) but more effort may be required. Regular ‘check-ups’ at different 
stages in the life-span would help people review their investment, 
accumulation and de-accumulation arrangements during the period 
from age 50 to age 70 (or more) so they can be confident of achieving 
their planned retirement incomes; such check-ups might also offer 
people default options that guide them towards suitable retirement 
income outcomes.
While there is some uncertainty about whether Australia’s high rate 
of home ownership will continue amongst future cohorts of older 
people, the possibility of drawing on those assets more efficiently and 
effectively could help older people to live more comfortably. As Ong 
suggests, this could also help to fund the increasing costs of aged care 
particularly in the context of older Australians seeking more choice 
over their care and accommodation when very old. The Productivity 
Commission’s proposals, which include a form of social insurance 
(by  capping individuals’ care costs), offer one possible approach 
promoting more choice and greater efficiency by relaxing supply-




The increasing numbers of older Australians will also have an impact 
on politics. A key question will be whether they exercise their greater 
voting power to promote self-interest or to contribute more wisdom 
and experience into public policy deliberations. The latter may be 
more likely if older Australians not only increase their increased 
social and economic participation, but also their participation in 
political processes such as through political parties, think tanks and 
other forums for informed dialogue and debate, and by standing for 
parliament. Such participation could be encouraged if parties, public 
service organisations, think tanks, universities and parliaments put 
more effort into networks of expertise and experience amongst people 
no longer holding full-time positions utilising their skills.
Increasing social and economic participation amongst older people 
is reliant upon their continued good health and capacity even as it 
in turn will contribute to wellbeing. While years of good health are 
increasing, there is more that can be done to enhance health at older 
ages (recognising that ‘good health’ needs some calibration as people 
get older).
Public health and health promotion, and early diagnosis and treatment, 
are often cost-effective ways to enhance health and independent living, 
and ability to participate, as Hall and van Gool suggest. They include 
community effort to support exercise and good dietary practice, and 
systematic screening and other diagnoses based on evidence of risks. 
Governments may be able to help by ‘making the healthy choice the 
easy choice’ such as through promotional activity and appropriate 
rewards and penalties for service providers and/or consumers; civil 
society organisations can also play an important role both in offering 
information and in facilitating voluntary activities.
Cognitive capacity is particularly important and the evidence Anstey 
presents of ways in which such capacity can be sustained more 
effectively offers the potential for significant improvement in the 
future. It seems that, as with other aspects of healthy living, cognitive 
capacity at older ages is also related to prolonged mental engagement 
and healthy living at younger ages. Having some ‘cognitive reserve’ 
is  highly relevant to the theme of choice and informed decision-
making that permeates this book; it is also critical to continued 
capacity to adjust to new technology and new information.
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The evidence of wide variations in the health pathway through 
older years of life identified by Hall and van Gool also suggests the 
need for  the health and care system to be much more responsive 
to individual circumstances. A shift from a service-oriented system to 
a person-oriented one might help to ‘normalise old age’, by treating 
older people as individuals with individual needs and preferences just 
as younger people expect to be treated in their day-to-day lives as 
workers and consumers and family members. This shift will take time 
as it will require considerable adjustment by suppliers of goods and 
services as well as changes in government programs and in consumer 
behaviour.
In promoting such a shift, governments need to recognise that the 
supports available to individuals vary significantly, including 
as a  result of changes in marriage and divorce at younger ages 
(as  McDonald notes). There is also a group experiencing deep and 
persistent poverty whose access to health services as well as social 
and economic support remains limited. A particular example, which 
Hall and van Gool mention, is lack of access to dental health services: 
poor dental health is now a critical indicator of deep disadvantage, 
reinforcing social isolation.
Suggestions about promoting health, distinguishing between age and 
age-related disability, and redesigning health and aged-care systems to 
be person-oriented rather than service-oriented, raises the challenge 
of applying a wider definition of wellbeing. Such wellbeing is linked 
to individual factors such as contentedness and independence 
(the ability to exercise control), feelings and spirituality, and also to 
societal factors such as the respect society has for older people, how 
much they value them and their views and experience, and how well 
younger people want to connect with them, as Windsor, Curtis and 
Luszcz, and Burns and Browning identify. Burns and Browning also 
refer to a UK initiative to promote wellbeing based on five actions—
connect, be active, take notice (and give time), keep learning and 
give (contribute)—that may be worth monitoring to see the extent 
to which it is possible for government and civil society to influence 
social attitudes and improve wellbeing (Foresight Report 2008).
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Specific approaches to building and sustaining active participation 
include measures to strengthen family, social and community 
engagement through communications technology and improved 
transport arrangements. Recognising the current and potential 
contributions of older people is a pre-condition for their more 
active participation, and warrants investment, such as in training 
to be members of NGO boards or to be more effective volunteers 
in a wide  range of community services, or training in child health 
or elderly care.
In addition to the wide variations in pathways through older ages, 
there is a wide diversity amongst older population groups including 
on the basis of ethnicity, Aboriginality, and geographic location 
(particularly urban versus regional and rural). A more personally 
responsive approach to promoting health and wellbeing will address 
this diversity in part, but there also needs to be recognition of for 
example, the language needs of different population groups and each 
one’s shared interests and values. Variations in the ‘density’ of older 
populations in different geographic areas will also impact upon the 
capacity to engage, the nature of the engagement and the supports 
required and able to be provided.
Conclusion
The ageing of our population, both in Australia and internationally, 
represents a profound historic development. A triumph, not a crisis; 
an enhancement of our overall wellbeing.
Taking advantage of the opportunities involved will, however, require 
serious societal reflection about the emerging demographic profile 
and about life-courses over longer life-spans, and also some deft 
public policy responses. These should facilitate informed choices by 
individuals looking to maximise their own lifetime wellbeing and that 
of their families, while recognising a wider diversity of circumstances 
and the need to protect the vulnerable and to ensure risks are 
allocated according to who (individually or collectively) is best able 
to manage them. 
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Appendix 1: International 
perspectives and global 
benchmarking
Hal Kendig and Lisa Cannon
New ways of thinking about ageing are emerging in international 
directions on ageing: 
The United Nations, while long preoccupied with children’s and 
women’s issues in developing countries, is developing more of 
a  balanced life-span perspective. In Transforming our World: 
The  2030  Agenda for Sustainable Development, Goal 3 is to ‘Ensure 
healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages’ (UN 2015). 
It  also is leading action to establish a Convention on the Human 
Rights of Older People.
The World Health Organization, which pioneered the Active Ageing 
and Age Friendly Cities initiatives, released a comprehensive World 
Report on Ageing and Health (WHO 2015), setting further initiatives 
in healthy ageing and wellbeing along with references to a substantial 
evidence base. WHO defines ‘active ageing’ as ‘the process 
of  optimising opportunities for health, participation, and security 
in order to enhance quality of life as people age’ (WHO 2002: 12).
The World Bank, which a generation ago launched its pessimistic and 
influential report Averting the Old Age Crisis (1994), has more recently 
viewed health as an important investment (not just expenditure) for 
national investment. Its European office has commented that pension 
reform in Europe is moving towards sustainability in most nations.
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Non-government organisations—notably HelpAge International, 
the International Longevity Centre, and the International Association 
of Gerontology—are providing advocacy and leadership in progressing 
positive approaches to ageing including important initiatives in the 
Asia-Pacific region (e.g. Kendig and Lucas 2014).
Another important contribution by international organisations is to 
‘benchmark’ progress being made by member countries and to support 
evidence-based reforms. The United Nations and the International 
Labour Organization, for example, provide ongoing, robust, and 
comparable data on population and employment respectively. 
To  complement these contributions HelpAge International with 
the support of Manchester University, has produced the annual 
Global AgeWatch (2015) report of country rankings on older 
people for wellbeing outcomes. These include income security, 
health status, capability (including employment and education), 
and enabling environments (including social connections, safety, 
and perceived freedom).
Table A.1 provides the AgeWatch population dimensions and 
wellbeing outcomes for Australia and comparator countries of the 
UK, USA, and New Zealand as well as China and Japan in our Asian 
region (Chapter 4). Poland is also included as a European comparator 
country (Chapter 6), which has a history of strong migration links with 
Australia. Before interpreting the tables, it is important to caution that 
anomalies of definition nonetheless remain and the results should be 
interpreted cautiously. The ranking of countries are shown because 
this is arguable more useful than trying to make sense of absolute 
measures and their technical definitions. The rankings are shown out 
of 96 countries for which data is available. 
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These findings can be summarised as follows:
• Japan has a much older population, while the other countries are 
broadly comparable, and China is slightly younger. However, by 
mid-century, China and Poland are projected to approach Japan’s 
level of population ageing, while Australia and the other Western 
countries are projected to have a slower pace of ageing.
• Life expectancy and healthy life expectancy at age 60 are 
comparably high across the developed countries, with China six 
years behind the leaders.
• On the global measure of health status, Australia and New Zealand 
approach Japan as the world leader, while the UK and USA lag 
appreciably, and China and Poland are near the middle of the world 
rankings.
• In terms of income security, Australia surprisingly rates barely 
better than China, towards the middle of the world rankings, far 
below the other developed countries. These measures of economic 
standings relative to others in the population reflect a pension 
system based on poverty alleviation rather than replacement of pre-
retirement earnings. Another factor is that these measures do not 
take account of the low housing outlays in Australia attributable 
to the high rates of home ownership. Australia’s GNI per capita 
was second only to the USA (at least in terms of the exchange rates 
at the time of measurement). 
• Australia rates highly in terms of ‘capability’ at the time as 
indicated by workforce participation rates in late-middle age and 
by the proportions of older people having at least a high school 
education. 
• Finally, in terms of the overall global rankings Australian rates 
highly at 17 out of the 96 countries but this level is slightly below 
that of the other developed Western countries.
Data on other countries is easily obtained directly from the Global 
AgeWatch website.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1 Global rank: Countries are ranked from 1 to 96, with 1 being the highest mark; 2 Pension 
income coverage (65+): This indicator measures the existence and coverage of the 
pension system in a country and is what is commonly known as ‘beneficiaries coverage 
rate’; 3 Poverty rate (age 60+): This indicator measures the poverty of older people, using 
the relative poverty definition. It reports the proportion of people aged 60-plus living in 
households where the equivalised income/consumption is below the poverty line threshold 
of 50 per cent of the national equivalised median income/consumption (equivalising 
factor is the square root of household size); 4 Relative welfare (age 60+): This indicator 
measures the income/consumption situation of older (60+) people in relation to the rest of 
the population; 5 GNI per capita ($US): Gross National Income (GNI) expresses the income 
accrued to residents of a country, including international flows such as remittances and aid, 
and excluding income generated in the country but retained abroad; 6 Employment Rate 
(55–64 year olds): The labour market engagement of older people . This indicator measures 
older people’s access to the labour market (both formal and informal) and therefore their 
ability to supplement pension income with wages, and their access to work-related support 
networks; 7 Educational attainment (aged 60+): Proportion of the population aged 60+ with 
secondary or higher education .
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